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Abstract:
Bedevilling the ongoing debate about changes in real-incomes in late-medieval western Europe,
especially during the so-called ‘Golden Age of the Labourer’, is the very troubling issue of  ‘wage-
stickiness’.  The standard and long-traditional explanation for this supposed ‘Golden Age’ of rising real
wages is that sharp fall in population – with the Black Death (from 1348), subsequent waves of bubonic
plagues, and other forces for demographic contraction up to the late 15
th century – dramatically altered the
land:labour ratio in ways that led to a pronounced rise in the marginal productivity of labour, which in turn
forced up real wages.  This simplistic model assumes (1) that rising real wages in the agrarian sector were
transmitted to other sectors (whether or not they also experienced rising labour productivity); (2) that
changes in the marginal revenue product of labour did not diverge or vary from changes in its marginal
productivity; and (3) that wages were flexible, downwards as well as upwards.  Though one might readily
provide evidence that the MRP of various kinds of labour, in England and the cross-Channel Low Countries
(Flanders), did not in fact continually rise as this model predicts, the focus of this paper is instead upon the
behaviour of money wages, with widespread nominal ‘wage-stickiness’, in relation to changes in the price-
index and cost of living, in both of these countries.  For England, the cost-of-living index is measured by the
well known Phelps Brown & Hopkins ‘basket of consumables’ index; and for Flanders, it is measured by
one that I have constructed from Flemish price data, using the same weights as in the PBH index.
For both countries, the evidence indicates that, while money wages for most craftsmen and labourers
did rise following the Black Death – though by no means for all labourers -- such a rise did not in all cases
keep pace with the inflationary rise in prices that both countries endured for almost 30 years after the Black
Death. In England, furthermore, where most craftsmen and workers had suffered a fall in money wages in
the two decades before Black Death, the post-Plague rise in money wages did not regain the level of the
1320s until the 1360s.  In the later 14
th century, however, first England and then Flanders experienced an
equally dramatic deflation, one that endured into the first quarter of the 15
th century. It was during this
deflationary era that real wages finally did rise substantially – and chiefly because nominal money wages
remained fixed, while the cost of living fell sharply. The rest of this paper analyses the various institutional,
social, and other factors that help to explain the widespread prevalence of money-wage stickiness over very
long periods, in England and the Low Countries. For England, the most significant institutional factor to be
considered is the role of the 1351 Statute of Labourers, which tried to fix wages at the unusually low level
that had pertained on the eve of the Black Death. No comparable wage legislation was imposed in Flanders;
and yet the behaviour of real wages there did not significantly differ from those in England.
It must also be noted that, in the early to mid 15
th century, some money wages did slowly rise, while
deflation continued – thus indicating other forces at work to increase real wages; but in Flanders the
resumption of short-term inflations, from the 1420s to early 1440s, with coinage debasements, tended to
eliminate these gains, especially for woollen textile workers, those employed in Flanders’ major
manufacturing industry.
The question posed in the title, ‘did money matter’, is a very important one; for the almost equally
important focus of this paper is that the late-medieval inflations and deflations (including the pronounced
deflation preceding the Black Death) were essentially monetary, and not demographic, phenomena.
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Nominal wage stickiness and the real-wage problem: J.M. Keynes, Adam Smith, and the evidence
Bedevilling the ongoing debate about changes in real-incomes in late-medieval western Europe,
especially during the so-called ‘Golden Age of the Labourer’, is the very troubling issue of  ‘wage
stickiness’.  As used here, the term  ‘wage stickiness’ means the long-term inflexibility, especially downward
inflexibility, of nominal money wages – and thus emphatically not ‘stickiness’ in real wages, which indeed
is a virtual impossibility.  The real wage is the real or physical quantity of goods and services that the artisan,
craftsman or other employee can purchase with his money wage – the  sum that his employer pays for the
piece-work accomplished or the time expended (daily, weekly, monthly) for his labour – plus all the material
‘fringe’ benefits that this employee receives in kind as a further payment for his labour: in terms of food,
clothing, shelter, and other material rewards.  Many, perhaps most, economists focus much more on the
behaviour of real wages rather than on money wages in analysing labour markets and the impact of labour
changes upon the economy; and that was even more true of the Classical Economists in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.
Those who neglect the significance of money wages and the historical problem of nominal wage
stickiness have ignored not only John Maynard  Keynes but also Adam Smith.  The former commented that:
‘the Classical Theory has been accustomed to rest the supposedly self-adjusting character of the economic
system on an assumed fluidity of money-wages; and when there is rigidity, to lay on this rigidity the blame
of maladjustment’.
1   Drawing upon historical evidence, Smith, as the founder of the Classical School,  did
in fact offer supporting evidence for the view that money wages were not so fluid, cogently observing  in
the Wealth of Nations that:
The wages of labour do not in Great Britain fluctuate with the price of provisions, [which]
vary everywhere from year to year, frequently from month to month.  But in many places2
2  Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), ed. with
introduction and notes by Edwin Cannan (New York: Modern Library, 1937), p. 74.
3  E.H. Phelps Brown and Sheila V. Hopkins, ‘Seven Centuries of Building Wages,’ Economica, 22
(August 1955), and E.H. Phelps Brown and S.V. Hopkins, ‘Seven Centuries of the Prices of Consumables,
Compared with Builders’ Wage Rates’, Economica, 23 (November 1956): both reprinted in E.M. Carus-
Wilson, ed., Essays in Economic History, 3 vols. (London, 1954-62), Vol. II, pp. 168-78, 179-96, and in E.H.
Phelps Brown and Sheila V. Hopkins, A Perspective of Wages and Prices (London, 1981), p. 178:  indicating
22d-24d per day from 1730-36, and 24d from 1736-73; and 24d rising to 29d per day from 1773 to 1776.
I have also revised the values of the sub-indices and of the composite price index from tabulating the data
from their working sheets, in: Archives of the British Library of Political and Economic Science, the Phelps
Brown Papers Collection.
4 See Phelps Brown and Hopkins (n. 3); and James E. Thorold Rogers, A History of Agriculture and
Prices in England, Vol.  II: 1259-1400 (Oxford, 1867), p.  317; Vol.  III: 1401-1582 (Oxford, 1881), p.  628.
With a base of 1451-75 = 100, the PB&H ‘basket of consumables’ CPI stood at 96.90 in 1510, and about
110.0 in 1515-17; but by 1536 this CPI had risen to 164.25.  The summer daily wage for master masons and
carpenters rose to 7d in 1542, and thereafter by 1/2d increments to 10d in 1559, remaining at that rate until
1574.
the price of labour remains uniformly the same sometimes for half a century.... The high
price of provisions during these ten years past has not in many parts of the kingdom been
accompanied with any sensible rise in the money price of labour.
2
He was not far off the mark.  For, in southern England, the money wage of master masons and carpenters
had remained fixed at 24d per day (i.e. 2s 0d) for precisely 40 years, while the well-known Phelps Brown
& Hopkins ‘Basket of Consumables’ composite price index had risen, over the same 40-year period (1733-
73), by 57.4 percent.
3  By far the longest recorded period of nominal wage stickiness recorded in English
price-history is to be found in the payment records for late-medieval masons and carpenters at Oxford’s
colleges. From 1363 to 1536, a period of  174 years, they were paid an unvarying wage (certainly for the
Easter-Michaelmas season) of 6d per day, or 3s 0d per six-day week.  When they then received their first
modest increase, to 6½ d in 1536-37, they had already suffered some considerable ravages of inflation, a
more than 50 percent rise in the price level, from the well-known Price Revolution, which had commenced
around 1516-20.
4 
If the continental evidence fails to provide evidence quite so impressive, nevertheless long-term
nominal wage stickiness was clearly also the prevalent feature of labour markets in the Low Countries for
the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.  Thus, in Bruges,  the daily money-wage for a civic policemen3
5  The policemen were paid this daily rate for the full 365 (or 366) days in the year, while the average
master mason or carpenter worked at most about 210 days a year.  Data from Stadsarchief Brugge,
Stadsrekeningen 1331-32 to 1475-76; and Algemeen Rijksarchief, Rekenkamer, doc. nos. 32,461 - 32,566
(1406-1513) .  For Bruges’s craftsmen, see Jean-Pierre Sosson, Les travaux de la ville de Bruges, XIVe - XVe
siècles: les matériaux, les hommes, Collection Histoire Pro Civitate no. 48 (Brussels, 1977); but the wage-
data given here, in this paper, have been taken from the town accounts; and I have not compared them with
those given by Sosson.
6  Charles Verlinden, E. Scholliers, et al, eds., Dokumenten voor de geschiedenis van prijzen en lonen
in Vlaanderen en Brabant/Documents pour l'histoire des prix et des salaires en Flandre et en Brabant, 4
vols. (Bruges, 1959 - 65), Vols. I and II;  Herman Van der Wee, The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the
European Economy, 14th - 16th Centuries, 3 vols. (The Hague, 1963), Vol. I: Statistics, pp. 333-89 (Synoptic
Tables of Wages and Appendices 27-30); Herman Van der Wee, ‘Prijzen en lonen als
ontwikkelingsvariabelen:  Een vergelijkend onderzoek tussen Engeland en de Zuidelijke Nederlanden, 1400-
1700,’ in Album aangeboden aan Charles Verlinden ter gelegenheid van zijn dertig jaar professoraat (Gent,
1975), pp. 413-47; reissued in English translation (without the tables) as ‘Prices and Wages as Development
Variables: A Comparison Between England and the Southern Netherlands, 1400-1700,’ Acta Historiae
Neerlandicae, 10  (1978), 58-78.
was fixed at 5d groot Flemish (summer and winter) from 1398 to 1476, nominally and initially at half the
rate for a master mason, though on an annual payment basis about 90 percent as much.
5  At Mechelen, the
predominant daily summer wage for master masons and carpenters in the town’s employ was an inflexible
12d  groot Brabant (= 8d  groot Flemish) from the Burgundian monetary reform of 1434 to 1490, despite
the often enormous fluctuations of the Van der Wee composite price-index between those years: from 99.5
in 1434, a mean of 100.0 in 1451-75, to peak of 200.7 in 1488. From 1490 to 1540 they were fixed at a
constant 13½ d groot (9d  groot Flemish).   In Antwerp that daily summer wage of 12d  groot Brabant had
prevailed for these craftsmen from 1442 to 1513, except for the ultra-inflationary years of Archduke
Maximilian’s debasements in 1487-89, when it was temporarily increased, but to just 13½ d per day.
6
Consider the implications of these data on wage stickiness and prices. For, if we calculate the real
wage as the quotient of the nominal wage index and the consumer price index (RW = NWI/CPI), then
obviously changes in the price level – the extent of inflation or deflation – will fundamentally determine the
changes in real wages.  Adam Smith himself commented that , if  ‘the labouring poor can maintain their
families in dear years, they must be at their ease in times of moderate plenty, and in affluence in those of4
7 Smith, Wealth of Nations (n. 2), p.  74.
8 James E. Thorold Rogers, Six Centuries of Work and Wages: the History of English Labour
(London, 1903), p. 326; Gustav F. Steffen, Studien zur Geschichte der englischen Lohnarbeiter mit
besonderer Berücksichtigung der Veränderungen ihrer Lebenshaltungen, 3 vols.  (Stuttgart, 1901-05).
9 See sources in n. 3 above. The RWI = NWI/CPI:  a measure that can be verified by computing the
number of baskets of consumable that a master mason could purchase with his annual money-wage income.
In 1477, the RWI was 123.76 (1451-75=100).  By 1536, when Oxford masons received their first pay
increase, the RWI was only 65.96; and the early-modern nadir was reached in 1631, when the RWI = 31.81.
In 1886, the first time that the RWI exceeded that for 1477, the index was 128.88.
10 See Herman Van der Wee,  ‘Prijzen en lonen’ (n. 6), pp. 413-47.   His data show that Antwerp
craftsmen did not suffer the same deterioration in real wages as did English craftsmen during the Price
Revolution era (1520 - 1640), with substantial demographic growth and inflation in both countries.
11  Keynes, General Theory (n. 1),  p. 5: ‘The wage is equal to the marginal product of labour’; and
more generally, pp. 4-22, 257-79.  As argued below, however, WL = MRP of labour (p. 8).
extra-ordinary cheapness’.
7   The most famous example of affluence was the post-Plague, later-medieval
England (and indeed parts of western Europe).  As Thorold Rogers stated so long ago, and as so many others
have continually reiterated since:  ‘the fifteenth century and the first quarter of the sixteenth were the Golden
Age of the English labourer, if we are to interpret the wages which he earned by the cost of the necessities
of life.’
8    The accompanying tables 2, 4, and 8 clearly indicate that this long period was also one of
prolonged deflation, with only a few, sporadic spikes of high prices, especially in England, but also in the
Low Countries.  Revised data for the  Phelps Brown & Hopkins ‘ basket of consumables’ index and building
craftsmen’s wages, also indicate that the medieval peak in real wages, achieved in 1477, was not again
achieved for over four centuries –  not until 1886.
9
Although southern England’s subsequent experience with real wages, into the early-modern era, was
not replicated, for example, in the cross-Channel Low Countries,
10 surely this historic pattern of real-wages
is a most remarkable experience, and one that poses serious theoretical problems for both economists and
historians.  As Keynes has reminded us, one of the most basic postulates of Classical Economics is that ‘the
wage is equal to the marginal product of labour’;  and of course by that statement he meant the real wage.
11
Are we really to believe that in early-modern England, even during a period of relative labour scarcity and5
12  In this study, the real wage has also been computed, for the Low Countries, by calculating the
number of ‘Baskets of Consumables’ that a master craftsmen could purchase with his annual money-wage
income (based on a mean of 210 days’ employment).  Other methods, such as estimating wages values in
equivalent grams of pure silver or in litres of grain (wheat or rye), have not been used (as in the following
recent study).  See Jan. L. Van Zanden, ‘Wages and the Standard of Living in Europe, 1500 - 1800',
European Review of Economic History, 3:2 (August 1999), 175-97: ‘...that there was no clear cut relationship
between economic development and real wage growth’ (p. 192); and that his research on real-wages ‘throws
doubt on some of the conclusions of the optimists’, referring in particular to Jan De Vries, ‘The Industrial
Revolution and the Industrious Revolution,’ Journal of Economic History, 54:2 (June 1994), 249-70.
13  See in particular  Wilhelm Abel, Agrarkrisen und Agrarkonjunktur, 3rd edn. (Berlin, 1978; 1st
edn. 1966): translated by Olive Ordish as Agricultural Fluctuations in Europe from the Thirteenth to the
Twentieth Centuries (London, 1980), chapters 1-3;  Michael Postan, ‘The Economic Foundations of
Medieval Society,’ Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie, 161 (1951); and Michael Postan, ‘Some Economic
Evidence of Declining Population in the Later Middle Ages,’ Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 2 (1950),
of significant economic advancement, from the early eighteenth century and throughout the Industrial
Revolution era, the marginal productivity of the craftsman’s labour still remained below that of the mid-
fifteenth century, and would remain so until as late as 1886?
There are of course several intractable measurement problems with these indices.  The prices in the
Phelps Brown & Hopkins ‘basket’, and in the other two ‘baskets’ used here, for Flanders and Brabant, are
those paid by institutions, often wholesale for bulk lots, and not retail prices paid by the typical artisan
consumer; and they include those for  many primary rather than finished products (i.e. raw grains rather than
bread), which tended to fluctuate more widely. Furthermore, even though Phelps Brown and Hopkins did
periodically change the composition of their basket (about every 250 years, n. 3), the otherwise fixed nature
of the index for quite long periods does not reflect the ability of most consumers to make substitutions with
changing relative prices. No alternative price indices, however, are likely to change the basic picture and
resolve these problems.
12 
Plague, prices and real-wages according to the demographic school: the Postan-Abel model
Avoiding these intractable problems, most medieval historians have instead found a far simpler and
more compelling explanation for the remarkably high real wages of later-medieval western Europe: the
impact of demographic catastrophes upon agrarian productivity:  By far the best known rendition of this view
is to be found in the Ricardian-Malthusian models of Wilhelm Abel and Michael Postan.
13  Even the few6
130-67; both reprinted in his Essays on Medieval Agriculture and General Problems of the Medieval
Economy (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 3 - 27; and 186 - 213 (the latter, with the revised title of ‘Some Agrarian
Evidence of Declining Population in the Later Middle Ages’); Michael Postan, ‘The Trade of Medieval
Europe: the North’, in M.M.  Postan and E.E. Rich, eds., Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol.  II:
Trade and Industry in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 119-256; Michael Postan, ‘Medieval Agrarian
Society:  England,’ in M. M. Postan, ed., Cambridge Economic History, Vol. I: The Agrarian Life of the
Middle Ages, (2nd rev. edn. 1966), 560-70; Michael Postan, The Medieval Economy and Society:  An
Economic History of Britain, 1100-1500 (1972), chapter 3, pp. 27-40;  John Hatcher, Plague, Population,
and the English Economy, 1348-1530 (London, 1977), pp. 11-73.
14  See Hatcher, Plague, Population, and the English Economy (n. 13 ), pp. 11-73; John Hatcher,
‘Mortality in the Fifteenth Century:  Some New Evidence,’ Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 39 (Feb.
1986), 19-38; Ian Blanchard, ‘Population Change, Enclosure, and the Early Tudor Economy,’ Economic
History Review, 2nd ser. 23 (1970), 427-45;  Bruce Campbell, ‘The Population of Early Tudor England:  A
Re-evaluation of the 1522 Muster Returns and the 1524 and 1525 Lay Subsidies,’ Journal of Historical
Geography, 7 (1981), 145-54. For an estimate of 4.5 million in the 1290s, see Pamela Nightingale, ‘The
Growth of London in the Medieval English Economy,’ in Richard Britnell and John Hatcher, eds., Progress
and Problems in Medieval England (Cambridge and New York, 1996), 89-106; for the estimate of 7.2 million
in 1292, see H. E. Hallam, ‘Population Movements in England, 1086-1350', in H.E. Hallam, ed., Agrarian
History of England and Wales, II: 1042-1350 (Cambridge, 1988), p.536; for an estimate of 2.5 - 3.0 million
in 1377, see Edward Miller, ‘Introduction: Land and People,’ in Edward Miller, ed., Agrarian History of
England and Wales, III: 1348-1500 (Cambridge, 1991), p. 6.
15 As indicated by the standard textbook graph on land:labour ratios, if population growth had earlier
produced diminishing returns, i.e. a falling MP of labour, depopulation should clearly have had the opposite
opponents of their model must now accept as an established fact the very drastic nature of the late-medieval
depopulations, especially in England, whose population fell from a peak of at least 4.5 to 5.0 million in the
1290s (if not 7.2 million) to about 2.5 or perhaps 3.0 million in 1377, finally reaching a nadir of about 2.25
million in the early 1520s.
14 Familiar though the Postan-Abel model  may be, its key elements must be briefly
reiterated, if only to clarify the arguments that follow.   In essence: (1) the fourteenth-century depopulations,
especially those following the Black Death of 1348-49 and subsequent outbreaks of bubonic plagues, and
accelerated by a consequent fall in fertility (live-births), drastically altered the land-labour ratio, thus
supposedly increasing the marginal productivity of agrarian labour;  (2) in a fundamentally agrarian
economy, such changes took place all the more rapidly as so many high-cost marginal lands, previously
subject to diminishing returns with population growth, were soon deserted, thus allowing arable husbandry
to be concentrated more and more on much better quality, higher-yielding lands that produced so much more
grain and livestock products with proportionately much less labour;
15 (3) agricultural labour in particular may7
effect, so long as state of relative underpopulation was not realized.
16 Thus, Postan stated that: ‘A fall in population would also have, so to speak, a selective effect on
prices, in that it would tend to lower the prices of agricultural products, which were previously being
produced at high and every rising cost ..  under steeply diminishing returns..  but would have little effect on
commodities not greatly subject to diminishing returns, i.e. most industrial products.’  Postan, ‘Trade of
Medieval Europe’ (n. 13 ), p.  214. And also: Butter happened to be a semi-luxury entering into popular
consumption.  It is not necessary to know what [Alfred] Marshall said about the elasticity of the demand for
bread to in order to conclude that agricultural labourers were now better able to indulge in a little butter,
however expensive... It is therefore highly significant that the price of butter and the price of grain diverged
more widely than the prices of any other commodities [during] the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. [And
furthermore] the prices for animal products in current coinage actually rose [continuing from 1351] the rising
trend of the previous two centuries for another 125 years.  Ibid., pp.  208-09.
have become even more scarce, as former itinerant labourers took up deserted tenancies or sought better
employment in the towns; (4) this agrarian re-organisation served to increase real-incomes even more by
reducing the relative cost of bread-grains and other basic foodstuffs and housing (with much more freely
available land); (5) the labourer and artisan, enjoying such rising real incomes, with a greater share of
disposable income left after meeting the basic necessities of life, would thus have chosen to spend it on more
meat, dairy products, industrial goods, and semi-luxuries, thus driving up their relative prices, with such
demand shifts; (6)  for many manufactured goods, for which labour accounted for a greater share of
production costs than was true for most grain products, rising industrial wages would also have served to
drive up their relative prices.  Such is the classic model, which indeed seems most reasonable, and certainly
plausible.
This emphasis upon the behaviour of  relative prices – i.e. a change in the price of wheat relative to
a change in the price of, say, linen cloth – is crucial for any consideration of the Postan model and of the
analytical discussion that follows.  In Postan’s so strongly pronounced views, demographic and not monetary
changes were chiefly responsible for late-medieval price movements, whose major fluctuations were to be
found almost solely or chiefly in grain products.
16  If only grain prices were affected, diverging from other
prices, then, in Postan’s view, ‘ monetary factors could not have been the sole or the main cause of the price
changes, for the pure logic of the monetary explanation demands that the effects of changes in the circulating
medium should be felt throughout the economy, i.e. in the prices of all the goods bought and sold, since8
17 Postan, Medieval Economy (n. 13), p.  239.  See also Postan, ‘Trade of Medieval Europe’ (n. 13),
p.  213: ‘And price changes which are not ‘general’ but are mainly confined to grain point to a factor which
has already been shown to have operated in the opposite direction in the early centuries of the Middle Ages,
i.e. population’; and ‘Economic Foundations (n. 13)’, p.  9: ‘..the movements of agricultural and industrial
prices did not synchronize’.
18 Anna Jacobson Schwartz, in a review of Spooner’s International Economy and Monetary
Movements in France (n. 112 below), Journal of European Economic History, 3: 1 (Spring 1974), 253,
comments that: ‘the author subscribes to a familiar fallacy, namely that a monetary explanation to be valid
requires that all prices move in unison’.  Her verdict would be equally valid if directed against Postan’s
injudicious criticisms of the following article: W.C. Robinson, ‘Money, Population, and Economic Change
in Late Medieval Europe’, Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 12 (1959), 63-76; and Postan, ‘Note’, pp. 77-
82.
changes in money must be, so to speak, “neutral” as between different commodities’. 
17
Such views about the behaviour of late-medieval price-movement are, however, are quite fallacious.
First, as the accompanying tables 2, 4, and 8 on English, Flemish, and Brabantine prices indicate,  the
component price-indices for grains, livestock-products, and industrial goods generally all  tended to rise or
fall together, in distinct phases of inflation and deflation, though with varying amplitudes and differing short-
term oscillations.  Second, no respectable monetary economist would ever contend that, while monetary
forces were at work in the economy, demographic and other real forces would remain suspended or frozen,
in time, i.e. without having their usual impact, interacting together, in altering  the relative prices of many
individual commodities.  Third, monetary expansions or contractions, in terms of changes in both the stocks
and flows of money, including the supply of credit, achieve their impact by the ways in which those money
flows are distributed amongst the various economic sectors and individual economic agents.  Thus that
impact becomes a function of those agents’s individual income-elasticities of demand, and also of the all the
various demand and supply elasticities for those goods and services upon which those persons and agents
expend their additionally acquired funds, expenditures that  again would affect  the behaviour of relative
prices, as well as the overall price level.
18
Postan, to his credit, did understand the distinction between the behaviour of relative prices and
shifts in the overall price-level.   But he did not observe the now readily available evidence for oscillating
price-movements of general inflation and deflation in late-medieval Europe.   Many of his disciples,9
19 As noted above, population growth, acting to increase pressures on relatively fixed stocks of land
and capital, will induce diminishing returns, producing rising marginal costs and thus rising grain prices.
But the same analogy does not hold for macro-economics.  Suppose that we employ a common Keynesian
model, with aggregate demand and supply curves (ignoring for the moment the question of what these curves
actually represent), as the latter curve, in effect serving as a long-term Supply curve, becomes ever more
steeply sloped, when intersected by the upward-shifting aggregate demand curves, i.e. rising from Time1 to
Time2.  Then, drawing horizontal and vertical lines from the intersections of D1.S1 and D2.S2, we apply
numbers to the points of intersection on the Y and X axes, as P and Q respectively.  Multiplying the results,
to indicate the total value of NNP or NNI at each of the time periods, we find that: P1.Q1 has a value £17.220
million sterling, while P2.Q2, for the subsequent time period, has a much larger value of £122.960 million
sterling.  The obvious question now becomes: from where did the economy obtain all that extra money, in
order to transact those expenditures that collectively make up Net National Income?  From either an increase
in the money stock, or from an increase in the money flow (i.e. an increase in Velocity), or from an increase
in the two together, which may have been the situation during the Price Revolution era?  Consider also that
these prices are all expressed in terms of a silver-based money of account, in which the pound [£] always
represents 240 currently circulating silver pence; and that the prices, and changes in price levels, were very
different when expressed in gold florins.
however, subsequently did become quite aware of these longer term price-movements, yet still incorrectly
attributed those price movements to demographic changes.  They did so  by confusing micro-economics with
macro-economics: by assuming that a perfectly valid explanation for grain price-changes can be applied to
the entire economy and its overall price-level.
19  A growth in population that encounters diminishing returns
in agriculture will likely cause relative grain prices to rise; but, acting alone, population growth cannot cause
all or even most prices to rise. Indeed, with normal budget constraints, one may expect that a sharp rise in
grain prices would force consumers to reduce expenditures and thus demand for other, less necessary
commodities, driving down their relative prices.  
In short,  demographic forces can influence long-term price movements only by their interaction with
other real economic forces, and by their ancillary consequences in inducing changes in both money stocks
and money flows, including changes in credit.  They may also have done so through their impact in inducing
changes in real net national output and national income. Monetary expansion can, in so many ways, induce
or promote economic growth. As is often the case, in such circumstances, demographic growth, urbanization,
and economic development ultimately reduced or even eliminated elements of ‘slack’ (elastic supplies) in
the economy, so that it failed to achieve the same proportional rate of growth as did the still ongoing
expansion in money stocks and/or flows. Consequently, as Keynes himself observed, most prices were bound10
20  See Keynes, General Theory (n. 1),  p. 300: ‘It is probable that the general level of prices will not
rise very much as output increases, so long as there are available efficient unemployed resources of every
type. But as soon as output has increased sufficiently to begin to reach the “bottle-necks”, there is likely to
be sharp rise in the prices of certain commodities...[But] the elasticity of supply partly depends upon the
elapse of time.’ For further arguments on these issues, see John Munro, ‘The Central European Mining
Boom, Mint Outputs, and Prices in the Low Countries and England, 1450 - 1550,’ in Eddy H.G. Van
Cauwenberghe, ed., Money, Coins, and Commerce: Essays in the Monetary History of Asia and Europe
(From Antiquity to Modern Times) (Leuven, 1991), pp. 119 - 83; my review of David Hackett Fischer, The
Great Wave: Price Revolutions and the Rhythm of History (Oxford and New York, 1996), reviewed for
EH.Net Review <ehreview@eh.net>, 24 February 1999; and n. 18.
21 See in particular David Farmer, ‘Crop Yields, Prices and Wages in Medieval England’, Studies
in Medieval and Renaissance History, 6 (1983), 117-55; David Farmer, ‘Prices and Wages [1042-1350]’,
in H. E. Hallam, ed., The Agrarian History of England and Wales, Vol. II: 1042-1350 (Cambridge, 1988),
pp 760-78, 811-17 (Table F); David Farmer, ‘Prices and Wages, 1350-1500',  in Edward Miller, ed., The
Agrarian History of England and Wales, Vol. III: 1348-1500 (Cambridge, 1991), pp.467-90, 516-24 (Tables
H and I); Gregory Clark, ‘The Long March of History: Farm Laborers’ Wages in England 1208-1850', UC-
Davis, http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gclark/papers/long_march_of_history.pdf; the sources cited in
n. 3, 4, 8, 57, 75.
to rise under these circumstances.
20
For the wage question itself, there remains one further problem with the Postan-Abel model, and
indeed with the usual presentation of Classical Theory.  For, in a frictionless market economy, without long-
term wage contracts or other institutional impediments, the real wage for any particular occupation or task,
defined by time and place, should be determined not just by the marginal product but by the marginal
revenue product of labour: i.e. the extra revenue that the employer derives by selling the last unit of output
produced by the last unit of labour added to his fixed stock of land and capital.  If, according to the Postan
model, the marginal productivity of agricultural labour rose, with the agrarian and price shifts so posited for
the late-medieval English economy, then presumably the marginal revenue from the sale of grain and other
arable products so produced on the now chiefly more productive lands should have fallen, with falling prices,
thus producing a possible ‘wash’ in real wage changes.  If, however, contrary to the Postan model, relative
grain prices did not consistently fall, then real agricultural wages may well have risen.  Though much
evidence has been published that purports to show such a rise in agricultural wages during the later Middle
Ages (in decennial means),
21 the  accounts of several Winchester manors do not consistently validate that
view.  For example, on the Taunton manor, post-Plague casual farm-labourers enjoyed a doubling in their11
22  See Table 3: for ‘hired’ and not ‘stipendary workers’, or workers ad tascam; and without food or
other payments in kind.
23 David Farmer, ‘The Famuli in the Later Middle Ages’, in Richard Britnell and John Hatcher, eds.,
Progress and Problems in Medieval England: Essays in Honour of Edward Miller (Cambridge, 1996), pp.
214-20, and Table 11.4.  On the selected Winchester manors, labour productivity on the arable fell from 34.3
acres per famuli ploughman in 1305 only marginally to 32.3 acres in 1382, but then more precipitously to
27.9 acres per ploughman in 1421, a 15.8 percent decline.  In animal husbandry, the number of sheep under
the care of a single shepherd (again chiefly famuli) rose  from 231 in 1341 to 342 in 1421, a 48.1 percent
increase. For some corroborative evidence on Glastonbury and Ramsey manors, see also, in this same
volume, Ambrose Raftis, ‘Peasants and the Collapse of the Manorial Economy on Some Ramsey Abbey
Estates’, pp. 191-206.
24  In late-medieval Flanders, weaving a standard fine woollen broadcloth of 42 ells by 3.5 ells
(29.4m by 2.45m = 72.0m²), containing 84 lb. or 38.2 kg of wool (16.3 kg of warp and 21.8 kg of weft),
typically required about 12 - 14 days, with two weavers and a boy. Another dozen days of labour were
expended in wool-beating, wool-greasing, carding, combing, spinning, reeling, and warping the yarns for the
same cloth, involving about 26-30 artisans and helpers; and at least another 6 - 9 days in the finishing
processes of foot-fulling (three or four days per broadcloth), napping, shearing, and dyeing.  According to
a Parliamentary report of the 1790s, weaving a superfine broadcloth of 34 yards (i.e. before fulling), with
80 lb. of wool (36.2 kg), then required 364 man-hours (= 14.5 days, with two weavers and a boy), and a
further 888 man-hours in wool preparation, spinning, reeling, and warping, and fulling (74 days). Fulling had
been mechanized in England (water-wheels) from the thirteenth century, and remained the only significantly
powered manufacturing process before the Industrial Revolution. See Parliamentary Papers, vol. 23 (1840),
439-41 [for the years 1781-96]: report reproduced in Ephraim Lipson, The History of the Woollen and
Worsted Industries (London, 1921), Appendix I, pp. 258-59; Walter  Endrei, ‘La productivité et la technique
dans l'industrie textile du XIIIe au XVIIe siècle,’ and Raymond Van Uytven, ‘Technique, productivité, et
money wage, with a substantial increase as well in their real wage, from 1349 to 1356; but thereafter their
money and real wages both fell, and from 1362-63 fell sharply to pre-Plague levels even in money terms.
Their real wages fell even more steeply below such levels, recovering only from 1378; but their money wages
did not do before 1412-13.
22  Furthermore, recently published research on agricultural production in several
Winchester manors  indicate that labour productivity fell rather than rose on the arable, from 1341 to 1421,
while rising in pastoral farming.
23 
Second, if the logic of the Malthusian-Ricardian model (combined with the ‘law of diminishing
returns’) clearly explains why the marginal product of agricultural labour should have risen with
depopulation, such models becomes rather fuzzy in attempting to explain a comparable rise in industrial
productivity, especially in the building and textile trades. In woollen-textile manufacturing, productivity in
fact remained quite unchanged from the early fourteenth to the late eighteenth centuries.
24   Were there any12
production au moyen âge: le cas de la draperie urbaine aux Pay-Bas,’ both in Sara Mariotti, ed., Produttività
e tecnologia nei secoli XII-XVII (Florence, 1981), pp. 253-62, 283-94; Walter Endrei, ‘The Productivity of
Weaving in Late Medieval Flanders,’ in Negley B. Harte, and K. G. Ponting, eds., Cloth and Clothing in
Medieval 0000000Europe: Essays in Memory of Professor E. M. Carus-Wilson, Pasold Studies in Textile
History no. 2 (London, 1983),  pp. 108-19; John H. Munro, ‘Textile Technology,’ and ‘Textile Workers,’
in Joseph R. Strayer, et al., eds., The Dictionary of the Middle Ages, Vol. XI (New York, 1988), pp. 693-715;
reprinted in John Munro, Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of Late-Medieval
England and the Low Countries (London, 1994).
25 Such a process would depend upon or be facilitated by the increased labour mobility that ensued
from the later fourteenth century, with the breakdown of the manorial domain economies, the consequent
leasing of domain lands to peasant tenants, and the decay of villeinage (serfdom). See Raftis, ‘Peasants and
the Collapse of the Manorial Economy’, pp. 190-206; J. Ambrose Raftis, Tenure and Mobility: Studies in
the Social History of the Medieval English Village (Toronto, 1964).
urban industrial crafts in which forces of later-medieval depopulation led to any truly positive qualitative
changes in the composition, structure, and institutional utilization of the surviving labour force?  Classical
theory would suggest, however, that any rise in real wages in the agrarian sector would necessarily be
translated to the other sectors, lest the latter lose labour to or from the agrarian sector (i.e. in reduced
migration to towns).
25  But without real productivity increases, presumably the employment of urban
industrial labour would have been restricted to those crafts in which  WL = MRPL . Real urban industrial
wages might have risen through a rise in relative industrial prices, thus increasing the employer’s marginal
revenue; and they would have risen further through any fall in the cost of living, chiefly in foodstuffs.   
The first lesson to be learned in this study is that real-wage changes in the late-medieval economy
were very complex and confusing to the observer, then and now.  The other, to be seen, is not to generalize
from the experience of late-medieval southern England. 
Some problems with the data on long-term wage stickiness: 
#  Are these wage data truly representative: do ‘sticky’ wages really reflect labour markets?
Many historians, of course, have pointed out an even more serious problem: the nature of the
available wage data, which seem to be very unrepresentative.   For the medieval era, by far the most familiar
wage data are those published late in the last century by James E.  Thorold Rogers and made even more13
26  See nn.  3-4 above.  The Phelps Brown & Hopkins wage data are also based on other sources
drawn from Buckinghamshire, Hampshire, Sussex, and Kent.
27 Peter Lindert, ‘English Population, Wages, and Prices: 1541-1913’, Journal of Interdisciplinary
History, 15 (Spring 1985), 618-26; E.A. Wrigley and R.S. Schofield, The Population History of England,
1541-1871:  A Reconstruction (London and Cambridge Mass., 1981; 2nd edn. with new introduction,
Cambridge and New York, 1989).
accessible in the famous wage and price indices of Henry Phelps Brown and Sheila Hopkins.
26   They
themselves expressed a few reservations about the validity of these data in truly depicting long-term,
downward wage stickiness:
Certainly our method of taking a representative rate is biased towards stability ... since for
most of our period these payments were made not by employers to wage-earners but by
customers to craftsmen working on their own account, and these customers were generally
institutions and not private persons who had to put their hands into their own pockets.  But
after due allowance for these things, the absence of sustained falls and of falling trends
remains remarkable. It has been called the elbow-joint or ratchet effect.
Unconvinced by this argument, Peter Lindert, the eminent American economic historian, accused
them of deliberately seeking wage rates that could be regarded as ‘representative because they were
recurrent’, and then constructing their wage series ‘in such a way as to overstate wage stickiness.’
Nevertheless, while pleading for historians to produce ‘other long-term wage series to ease the strain of over
reliance on the classic Phelps Brown-Hopkins series’, Lindert himself necessarily still used them, as have
Wrigley and Schofield, and so many other eminent historians.
27
In medieval economic history, however, beggars seeking statistical data cannot be choosers; and
neither Thorold Rogers nor the Phelps Brown-Hopkins team had much choice.  Nor have other historians
in subsequent publications.  The only readily available daily-wage data are those provided by such
institutions capable and willing to record them over long periods of time; few if any are the records left by
individual agents freely operating in the open market.  Indeed, by far the great majority of labourers and
craftsmen in the later-medieval and early-modern economies, and most especially those in textiles, leather-
goods, metalwares, and to a large extent in agriculture as well, received piece-work wages rather than time-
based wages (daily, weekly), which, when available, are often difficult to interpret.  Most of  our time-based14
28  The Ordinance of Labourers, decreed on 14 June 1349, is restated and reissued in T.E. Tomlins,
J. Raithby, eds., The Statutes of the Realm, 6 vols., Record Commission (London, 1810-22), vol. I, 307-
08; for the Statute of Labourers, 25 Edwardi III stat 2. c. 3 Ibid., I, 311-12; for the 1388 Statute of
Cambridge, see Statute 12 Ricardi II, c.3-c.5 (1388) in Statutes of the Realm, II, 56-57: stipulating the annual
stipends for agricultural servants and labourers, ranging from the Bailiff of Husbandry, at 13s 4d sterling per
year, with clothing, to 6s 0d (72d) for ‘Swineherds, Women Labourers, and Deyrie Women’.  See below,
n. 87.
29  See  Thorold Rogers, A History of Agriculture and Prices in England (n. 4);  Steffen, Studien zur
Geschichte der englischen Lohnarbeiter (n. 8); Farmer, ‘Prices and Wages’ and ‘Prices and Wages, 1350-
1550' (n. 21);  Douglas Knoop and G.P. Jones, ‘Masons’ Wages in Medieval England’, Economic History,
2 (Jan. 1933), 473-99 (and n. 36 below); Douglas Knoop and G.P. Jones, The Mediaeval Mason: An
Economic History of English Stone Building in the Later Middle Ages and Early Modern Times, 3
rd edn.
(Manchester, 1967); William Beveridge, ‘Wages in the Winchester Manors’, Economic History Review, 1st
ser., 7 (1936-37), 22-43; William Beveridge, ‘Westminster Wages in the Manorial Era,’ Economic History
Review, 2nd ser., 8 (1955-56), 18 - 35; Johan Schreiner, ‘Wages and Prices in the Later Middle Ages,’
Scandinavian Economic History Review, 2 (1954), 61-73.
wage data are limited to building craftsmen, including thatchers and street-pavers, as well carpenters,
masons, tilers, plasterers, which, by no coincidence, are specifically those listed and ostensibly regulated by
the famous  Ordinance (June 1349) and Statute of Labourers (1350-51), and by most other late-medieval
English wage legislation (except the 1388 Statute of Cambridge).
28 
In their presentation, the Phelps Brown & Hopkins wage data differ significantly from not only the
Thorold Rogers wage-tables but also those published, before and since, by several other historians: in
particular William Beveridge, Douglas Knoop (with G.P. Jones), Johann Schreiner, Gustav Steffen, and
David Farmer, whose tables may well convince many readers that medieval wage stickiness was just a
myth.
29  For their tables, whether annual or decennial, reveal almost continuous oscillations in wage-rates,
sometimes small but often significant.  Seemingly inexplicable, these oscillations disappear when one reads
the original sources (manorial and town records) and then realizes that these historians have computed their
annual data and decennial means by taking averages of the wage payments or wage rates in each record, and
so producing ‘compositional errors’.  Consider, as an example, a building project or manorial repairs
employing a dozen carpenters in the year: with three senior master carpenters earning 4½ and 5d per day,
seven ordinary master carpenters earning 4d per day and two junior, less experienced master carpenters15
30 See the 1495 statute, in n. 43, below, which authorized the payment of a higher wage to those
master masons and carpenters who supervised seven or more men.
31  For the following urban and manorial records, in:(1)  Archives of the British Library of Political
and Economic Science, the Beveridge Price and Wage History Collection: Canterbury, 1393-1600 (Box D.3);
Dover, 1227-1565 (Box H.13-14); Exeter (Exebridge Accounts), 1338-1600 (Box  F.1); Westminster Abbey,
1393-1541 (Box P.10); Winchester College, 1354-1513 (Box F.8); York, 1354-1513 (Box I.10); Battle
Abbey: Alciston Manor, 1336-1487 (Boxes H.10-11); Downton, 1257-1306 (Box C.157); Esher, 1257-1306,
1270-1308, and 1300-1453 (Boxes C. 157, A.31-32); Hinderclay (Suffolk), 1262-1405 (Box G.14);
Itchingswell (Ecchinswell), 1270-1453 (Box A.33); Meon, 1257-1306 (Box C.157); Nailsbourne, 1257-1306
(Box C.157); Overton, 1309-1453 (Box A.33); Redgrave (Suffolk), 1323-1492 (Box G.14); Southwark
(Bishop of Winchester), 1406-1454 (Box A.34); Taunton, 1270-1308, 1309-1453 (Boxes A.31-32);
Wargrave, 1257-1306 (Box C.157); Witney, 1257-1306 (Box C.157); Wycombe, 1257-1306, 1309-1453
(Boxes C.147, A.33); (2) The London Guildhall Manuscripts Library: Armourers’ Company Accounts (1499-
1557): MS 12.065, vol. I;  Bakers’ Audit Books (1505-1547), MS  5174, vol. 1; Brewers’ Guild, Warden’s
Accounts (1424-1562): MS  5440; Carpenters’ Guild, Warden’s Accounts (1456-1573): MS 4326, vols. I and
II; Cutlers’s Guild Accounts (1442-1497): MS 7146, roll 1; Grocers’ Guild, Warden’s Accounts (1452-1578):
MS 11,570-571, vols. I - VI: Ironmongers’ Guild Accounts (1455-1561): MS 11,698: Vols. I - II; Pewterers’
Company Accounts (1474-1500): MS 7086, Vol. I; (3) Corporation of London Record Office: Bridge
Master’s Account Rolls, 1381-1398; Bridge Master’s Accounts: Weekly Payment Series, 1404- 151 0 (Vols.
I - III). 
earning 3½d per day.
30  Their mean  wage would then be 4.250d unweighted and 4.083d weighted.  If, in the
following year, only ten carpenters were employed, with only one senior carpenter, earning 5d per day, six
earning the standard 4d per day, and three earning 3½d per day, the unweighted mean would now be 4.167d
and the weighted mean, 3.950d. An examination of these accounts year after year would reveal that, for each
class or status of master carpenters,  the wage rates were in fact unchanging  – and thus very sticky.  Phelps
Brown and Hopkins, to their great credit, selected for each year what appeared to be the standard or
representative wage, which, admittedly, becomes a more difficult task during periods of transitional wages.
Further proof that the Thorold Rogers’s and Phelps Brown & Hopkins’s published wage data are
indeed representative of the contemporary labour markets may be found in the wage-payment records for
urban craftsmen (stone- and brick-masons, carpenters, pavers, tilers, thatchers, daubers, etc) in such medium-
sized towns as Canterbury, Exeter, Dover, Winchester, and York.
31  Certainly from the post-Plague era and
during the second half of the fourteenth and during the fifteenth century, their wage rates differed  in no
important respects from those that Thorold Rogers found in the Oxford and Cambridge college records, with
generally the same degrees of long-term wage stickiness, if not for as long a period as for the Oxford16
32 See below pp.   ,with more detailed discussion of this wage evidence.
craftsmen.  Together all these town wage-data for master building craftsmen, or post-Plague data, were or
came to be about mid way between those for master building craftsmen recorded in the manorial accounts
of Battle Abbey and the Bishop of Winchester’s estates, at the lower end, and the wages recorded for London
artisans, at the upper end.  Thus, during the second half of the fourteenth century, the standard wage for
master craftsmen on the Battle Abbey and Winchester rural estates was 4d per day.  At Oxford and
Cambridge, as noted earlier, the wages for such craftsmen had risen from 5d to 6d per day about 1363, while
the wages for such building craftsmen in the other medium-sized towns listed above generally remained at
5d per day until about 1410-15, just before the wage rates for most London building craftsmen had risen
from 7d or 7½ d to 8d per day; and about that same time, the manorial wage rates for these building
craftsmen also rose, from the standard 4d to a now prevailing 5d per day
32.
# Was medieval wage stickiness confined to long-term, contractual  institutional employment?
The best answer to this question, and one that further reinforces the previous answer on the
representative nature of such wage data, can be derived from a comparison of wage payments in various
London records, in particular those of:  (1) the Tower Bridge authority (Bridge Master) (2) the various
London guilds (Brewers, Cutlers, Carpenters, Grocers, Ironmongers), (3) Westminster Abbey; and (4) the
Bishop of Winchester’s urban Southwark manor, across the Thames from but close to the London guild
houses.  The Bridge Masters , in maintaining their various buildings and residential tenements, employed
many craftsmen who appear to be virtually ‘tenured’, i.e. continuously employed for many years or decades;
but the other three employers listed here hired their masons, carpenters and other such craftsmen only on a
purely occasional basis, generally for just a few days at a time, on what appears to be virtually a ‘spot
market’ for labour.  For almost all such building craftsmen, in those fifteenth-century years for which a
quadripartite comparison is possible, the wage data are virtually identical, and thus indicate that all four sets
of London-based institutions were compelled to pay the same market wages, for both short and long-term17
33 See the London sources cited in n. 31.
34  See, in particular,  John Hatcher, ‘England in the Aftermath of the Black Death,’ Past & Present,
no. 144 (August 1994), pp. 3-35; Simon Penn and Christopher Dyer, ‘Wages and Earnings in Late Medieval
England: Evidence from Enforcement of the Labour Laws’, Economic History Review, 2
nd ser., 43:3 (August
1990), 356-76;  Nora Ritchie (née Kenyon), ‘Labour Conditions in Essex in the Reign of Richard II’,
Economic History Review, 1
st ser., 4:4 (1934), reissued in revised form in E.M. Carus-Wilson, ed., Essays
in Economic History, 3 vols., II (London, 1962), pp.  91-112; and  n. 3.
35 The monthly or annual wage data are found in: Stadsarchief Brugge, Stadsrekeningen 1350/51 to
1479/80; Stadsarchief Gent, Stadsrekeningen 1350/51-1479/80;  Stadsarchief Mechelen, Stadsrekeningen
1350/51 to 1499/1500, nos. 44-180; Stedelijke Archief Leuven, Stadsrekeningen 1350/51 to 1499/1500, nos.
4986-5125; Algemeen Rijksarchief, Rekenkamer, reg. nos. 31,412 - 31,485 (Aalst: 1395-1500), 32,461 -
32,566 (Bruges:1406-1500); 33,147 - 33,238 (Kortrijk, 1393-1493), 38,635 - 38,722 (Ieper/Ypres: 1406-
1500); and Verlinden-Scholliers, Documents (n. 6).  Ghent wages have also been collected from the expense
section of the Ghent mint accounts in ARA, Rekenkamer, reg. 18,195-200 and Acquits de Lille, liasses nos.
936-37.
employment.
33  Of equal interest is the fact that wages for occasionally employed craftsmen on the Bishop
of Winchester’s Southwark manor, in matching those paid elsewhere in London, were consequently about
double those paid on his rural manors (i.e. 8d vs 5d or 4d per day in the early fifteenth century). Such
evidence therefore also does not support the commonly expressed view that daily wage rates were higher
for casual short-term employment than for guaranteed annual employment.  That in turn casts some doubt
on the ancillary view that  late-medieval labourers, agricultural workers, and craftsmen came to prefer both
the greater individual freedom and higher (real) rates for the former type of discontinuous employment.
34
 For the Low Countries, similar institutional sources, but most especially civic government accounts
-- for Bruges, Ghent, Ypres, Mechelen, Leuven, Antwerp, Aalst (Alost) -- and some urban-based abbeys,
churches,  and hospitals provide even more voluminous daily-wage data to support all of these conclusions:
for the very same sets of building craftsmen, and also for some policemen.
35   The wage data for such
craftsmen and policemen throughout the late-medieval Low Countries, exhibit patterns very similar to those
of the English artisans, as suggested earlier, most especially during periods of stable coinage, even though
their governments were sensible enough never to impose wage ordinances, certainly none as restrictive as
the Statute of Labourers.  In most, if not in all cases, the craftsmen receiving such wages were similarly not
long-term privileged employees, but those working for short-terms for many and various employers.  In the18
36  Fullers, organized into guilds, also received piece-work wages, but since they were required to
full a cloth in three to five days, according to the size and quality, a daily-wage rate can be extrapolated.
Master weavers, who were actually industrial entrepreneurs, earned their incomes as profits, while dyers and
shearers, also guild-protected, earned professional fees. See John Munro, ‘Industrial Entrepreneurship in the
Late-Medieval Low Countries: Urban Draperies, Fullers, and the Art of Survival,’ in Paul Klep and Eddy
Van Cauwenberghe, eds.,  Entrepreneurship and the Transformation of the Economy (10th - 20th Centuries):
Essays in Honour of Herman Van der Wee (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1994), pp. 377-88. For the
fullers’ strikes, see below, pp.  and n.
37 See the sources cited in nn. 123-132.
38 See above n. 28; and below nn. 87-88 for a further discussion of the significance of these wage
statutes.
woollen draperies of the late-medieval Low Countries, their predominant manufacturing industry, daily
wages are available only for the fullers, since most other textile workers received piece-work wages or fees
(shearers and dyers).  Most fullers similarly worked for not one but a variety of different master-weaver
drapers, for short and discrete periods of time. They were free to change their employers -- and they were
also capable of going on strike to achieve their collective guild-wage demands, if not always successfully.
36
# Was late-medieval wage stickiness the consequence of state intervention?
Many historians, especially British economic historians, believe that, in so far as we may discern such wage
stickiness, it was both the consequence of the ‘wage freeze’ imposed by the infamous Ordinance (1349) and
Statute of Labourers (1351) and/or an artifice to evade it: i.e. payment records to simulate compliance, when
employers were in reality paying more than the recorded amounts.
37  The short answer in response to such
charges is that the patterns of long-term wage stickiness were virtually identical in the medieval Low
Countries.   In England itself, furthermore, such wage stickiness, and most especially downward wage
stickiness, continued to be the prevalent feature for the employment of day labourers and artisans for
centuries after such legislation – from the June 1349 Ordinance of Labourers to the 1563 Statute of Artificers
(5 Elizabeth I c.4) – had become dead letters.
38 
Such answers will, nevertheless, not satisfy those historians who believe that the late-medieval
records of wage-payments reflect, in some fashion, compliance with these Statutes, all the more so since
Putnam, Ritchie, Hatcher, Penn and Dyer have all provided strong and convincing evidence that the crown19
39  Hatcher, ‘England in the Aftermath of the Black Death (n. 34)’, pp. 3-35; see also Penn and Dyer,
‘Wages and Earnings (n. 34)’, pp. 356-76. The classic study remains: B.H. Putnam, The Enforcement of the
Statute of Labourers during the First Decade after the Black Death (New York, 1908). See below, n. 87.
40 Discussed in much greater detail below, on pp.   and in nn. 86-89.
41  H. T. Riley, ed., Munimenta Gildhallae Londoniensis: Vol. II: Liber Custumarum (London, 1860),
I, 99-100; II, 541-43; H. T. Riley, ed., Memorials of London and London Life, in the XIIIth, XIVth, and XVth
Centuries: From the Archives of the City of London, A.D. 1276-1419 (London, 1868), pp. 253-55; R. R.
Sharpe, ed., Calendar of Letter-Books Preserved Among the Archives of the City of London at the Guildhall:
Letter-Book G. c.A.D. 1352-1374 (London, 1905), pp. 148, 301; Letter Book H.,  c.A.D. 1375-1399 (London,
and local authorities did seek to enforce these statutes, at least until the late 1380s. Their arguments and
evidence, especially Hatcher’s, must be taken very seriously, even if such evidence does not really extend
beyond the late fourteenth century.
39  Yet the observer may just as strongly question the longer-term success
of such enforcement of wage-rate ceilings by examining more closely the manorial wage records – and
thereby acquire greater confidence in their validity. 
For virtually all of them demonstrate that most of the wide variety wages so recorded were
substantially above those permitted by the 1349 Ordinance and the 1351 Statute of Labourers.
40  Why would
they all feel free to pay and record these higher wages, even if a few other manors paid or recorded wages
corresponding to the Statute?  Furthermore, in most manors, including those in the latter small category that
paid wages in accordance with the Statute, some craftsmen, evidently senior and/or more skilled, received
wages that were 25 percent to 50 percent in excess of permitted rates.  Did the lower wages on that smaller
number of ‘compliant’ manors correspond to rural labour-market values and the rural cost of living? 
Certainly the later-medieval English towns, with presumably a higher cost of living, readily
permitted wages above those prescribed in the Ordinance and Statute of Labourers, even though they in no
way exempted the towns or tolerated higher rates. In blatantly ignoring the 1349 Ordinance, the London’s
civic government issued its wage ordinance, the following year (1350) to fix the maximum wage for building
craftsmen at 6d per summer and 5d per winter day (i.e. Easter to Michaelmas to Easter), one pence higher
than the maximum summer wage permitted in the previous such ordinance of 1290, but double that permitted
in the 1349 royal Ordinance and the 1351-52 national statute.
41   Not until 1495 did Parliament recognize20
1907), p. 184. As noted below, p.  and n. 91, by 1349 the higher rate was already in force at Westminster
Abbey.
42 Statute 11 Henry VII c.  22 (1495), in Statutes of the Realm (n. 28), vol. II, pp. 585-87. The major
exception was a maximum daily rate of 7d, summer and winter, for those senior or chief master masons and
carpenters employing or supervising six or more men; or a rate of 5d  daily, with food and drink. See n. 30
above.
43  See pp.  and nn. 21-22 above.
London’s special status within the kingdom, and its much higher cost of living, with legislation to authorize
these very same rates of 6d and 5d per day, respectively (but only 4d daily with food and drink), with some
minor exceptions.
42 In any event, long before then, and certainly by the 1370s, most employers of building
craftsmen in London were ignoring not only the Statute of Labourers (and the 1388 Statute of Cambridge)
but also the local civic ordinances on maximum wages, as the evidence just cited clearly shows.
43
Nevertheless the impact of such labour legislation cannot be fully ignored in that it may have served to
restrict the full impact of those forces driving up wages, and in particular may have led to the elimination
of seasonal wages, discussed in the answer to the following question.
# Does institutional wage stickiness reflect adjustments in the real wage by other means: 
(1)  by adjusting hours of work and thus by substituting more leisure for paid employment?
Since medieval and early-modern employers, not only in England, but throughout Europe, paid those
employees receiving time-work wages commonly by the week and then more commonly by the day, but
certainly not by the hour, employers and employees could have bargained to adjust real wages, according
to changing economic circumstances, by altering the length of the work -week or day.   Many historians have
suggested that, in pre-Industrial societies especially, many artisans, craftsmen, and labourers had a ‘backward
bending supply curve of labour’.  Thus, many workers, on finding that their real wages had risen to permit
them to acquire some desired level of sustenance and comfort, would have preferred to enjoy increased
leisure time over further increases in money income; and thus they would have chosen to work less, or  to
refuse to work for  traditionally long hours. John Hatcher has indeed recently suggested that such a
substitution of leisure for paid work may have been a major component of rising real wages after the Black21
44  Hatcher, ‘England in the Aftermath of the Black Death (n. 34)’, pp. 3 - 35.
45   Ian Blanchard, ‘Labour Productivity and Work Psychology in the English Mining Industry, 1400 -
1600,’ Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 31:1  (February 1978), 1-24.
46 John Munro, ‘Urban Wage Structures in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries: Work-
Time and Seasonal Wages’, in Ian Blanchard, ed.,  Labour and Leisure in Historical Perspective, Thirteenth
to Twentieth Centuries, Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Beiheft series no. 116
(Stuttgart, 1994), pp.  65-78.
Death.
44 
Indeed, several years earlier, Ian Blanchard had provided some evidence for such a ‘backward
bending’ supply curve for labour in the late-medieval English mining industry, many of whose rural workers
were seasonal, primarily engaging in the agrarian economy.
45  Obviously such circumstances would vary by
time, region, and occupation.  Yet there is no convincing evidence that such a backward-bending supply
curve for labour was a significant feature of employment in the late medieval economy, certainly not in the
building and textile trades.  Some research done on this very question may be found in one of my recent
publications on seasonal wages and leisure in late-medieval England and the Low Countries.
46  For neither
region did I  find any convincing evidence that urban craftsmen sought to increase their leisure time, even
after real wages had peaked in the mid fifteenth  century,  by reducing either the work day or the work week,
which was usually six full days.
There are, of course, only scant, sporadic data on the actual number of days worked per year, except
for the invaluable data that Herman Van der Wee has provided on employment in the building trades in the
Antwerp-Lier region, for each and every year from 1436 to 1600. For the base period employed in this study,
1451 to 1475, the mean number of days so worked was 210 days, precisely the same average in the late
sixteenth century. The fewest number so worked, 191 days, occurred during the civil war era (towns vs
Maximilian) from 1485 to 1491 (91.01 percent of this mean); the highest number, 260 days (124.0 percent
of the mean), during the 1540s and early 1550s. If the scope of these data are restricted to the first full22
47 Van der Wee, Antwerp Market (n. 6),  vol. I, Appendix 48, pp. 540-44 (interpolating 208 days for
1436). For this regression, R
2 = 0.00002943; adjusted R
2 = -0.01017; F = 0.002885.
48 Statute 11 Henry VII c. 22, in Statutes of the Realm (n. 28), vol. II, pp. 585-87; repeated in  6
Henry VIII c. 3 (1514-15), in Statutes of the Realm, vol. III, pp. 124-26. The framers of the 1495 statute,
however, evidently believed that too many wage-earners were stealing leisure time during working hours
by ‘late commyng unto their worke, erly departing therfro, long sitting at ther brekfast, dyner, and nonemete,
and long type of sleping at after none’.
49  See R. Campbell, The London Tradesman [1747] (republished New York, 1969), pp. 331-41. In
specifying hours of work for 380 crafts, this treatise indicated that the typical working day still remained a
very long one: from 6:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. (or during all ‘daylight’ hours).  Subsequently, the 1833 Factory
Act had stipulated a maximum working day of nine hours for children, aged nine to thirteen; and for those
aged thirteen to eighteen, a maximum of  69 hours a week, with no more than 12 hours per day. The 1844
Factory Act limited the working day for women to 12 hours per day, and for children aged eight to thirteen,
to 6.5 hours.  Fielden’s Act, imposing a limit of ten hours per day for both women and men (implicitly), was
passed at a time of great labour unrest, on the eve of the 1848 Chartists’s Revolt.  See John H. Clapham, An
Economic History of Modern Britain, vol. II: The Early Railway Age, 1820 - 1850 (Cambridge, 1964), pp.
572-78; S.G. Checkland, The Rise of Industrial Society in England, 1815 - 1885 (London, 1964), pp. 244-49;
John Derry, A Short History of Nineteenth-Century England (New York, 1963), pp. 124-37, 151-54.   In the
U.S., New Hampshire’s state legislature also enacted,  in the same year 1847, a maximum ten-hour day; but
the legislation applied only to women, and proved to be unenforceable. The effective state legislation dates
only from 1887. See Claudia Goldin, Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History of American
Women (New York, 1990), pp. 189-92, and Table 7.1; Jeremy Atack and Peter Passell, A New Economic
View of American History: From Colonial Times to 1940, 2nd edition (New York, 1994), pp. 542-44.
century, 1436-1535, we find absolutely no correlation between real wages and the number of days worked.
47
Some idea of the length of the normal working day, in this era, may be gleaned from data on seasonal
wages. For in medieval and early-modern Europe, such wages were paid in accordance with the basic
principle that ‘man works from sun to sun’. Indeed the stipulation that both men and women were required
to work at least twelve hours during summer months can be found in the 1495 parliamentary statute on
maximum wages.  From mid-March to mid-September all English ‘artificers and labourers’ were to work
from 5:00 a.m. to 7:30 p.m., with 30 minutes for breakfast, 30 minutes for nonemete (or sleep) and one hour
for dinner; and in the other half of the year, they were to work from sunrise to nightfall.
48  Certainly that
customary working day and week, if not the law,  prevailed in Great Britain, until the enactment of Fielden’s
Law or the Ten-Hour Day Act in 1847.
49  In the Low Countries, numerous fifteenth-century guild records23
50 See Sosson, Les travaux publics de la ville de Bruges (n. 5): citing guild statutes in Rijksarchief
Brugge, Ambachten, no. 1: ‘dat hi sculdich es te werkene van nuchtens toten avonde alzo wel tsaterdaechs
up vighelie avond als up anderen daghen...’Similarly the Bruges carpenters guild forbade them ‘te
weerkene... by avonde of bi nachte met keersen [candles]’. See other guild records that specify working
hours in the textile trades (forbidding work by night), in Octave Delepierre and M.F. Willems, eds.,
Collection des keuren ou statuts de tous les métiers de Bruges (Ghent, 1842); Georges Espinas and Henri
Pirenne, eds., Recueil de documents relatifs à l'histoire de l'industrie drapière en Flandre:  Ire partie: des
origines à l'époque bourguignonne, 4 vols. (Brussels, 1906-1920); Henri Joossen,  ed., ‘Recueil de
documents relatifs à l'histoire de l'industrie drapière à Malines, des origines à 1384', Bulletin de la
Commission Royale d'Histoire, 99 (1935).
51 See however the London ordinance of 1350, in setting maximum summer and winter rates (6d and
5d respectively), cited in n. 41 above.
52 See Table 1.  The subsequent Statutes of 1444 and 1495 did more clearly specify a winter
maximum wage, lower than the stipulated summer wage.  In London, and possibly also in Bruges, seasonality
reappeared, after the 1440s in the form of a slightly higher summer wage. See sources in nn. 31, 35, 39, 43,
and 48 above.
53  In 1441: by reducing the uniform daily rate to 7½d (or even 7d for some) for the winter season
(three months), while raising it to 8½d for the rest of the year.  Corporation of London Record Office,
London Bridgemaster's Accounts, Weekly Payments, First Series, Vol. IV (n. 31). Unfortunately these
accounts cease in 1445.  See also Knoop and Jones, Mediaeval Mason (n. 29),  pp. 105-06. 
affirm that the normal paid working day was then identical to the English, with a full six-day working week.
50
Far more so than in England, furthermore, the wage data for this region reveal a clear distinction between
summer and winter wages (November to March); and, since the number of hours of daylight during winter
months at this latitude (50° N) is about eight hours, the winter wage was only two-thirds the summer wage,
despite the much higher cost of living during these cold months. 
In London, and some other English towns, however, seasonal wages generally disappeared after the
Black Death.
51  Quite possibly the payment of a uniform wage rate, i.e. a winter wage equal to the summer
wage, came to be an acceptable method of circumventing the Statute of Labourers’ wage controls, since the
Statute and its enforcement really focused only the summer maxima
52.  Possibly the combination of the
consequently higher wage throughout the entire year may have permitted some such substitution of greater
leisure, at least in the summer months, for paid work.  In the mid-fifteenth century, however, the London
Bridgemaster did  introduce a slight differential in seasonal payments (1441), and one that effectively raised
the annual wage.
53  In the Low Countries, south and north, where seasonal wages prevailed up to the French24
54  For accounts of wage payments in Bruges, see: Stadsarchief van Brugge, Stadsrekeningen 1424-
25 to 1449-50. There are only occasional and sporadic indications of seasonal wages: some master masons
and carpenters were paid 12d per day in December 1435, February 1436, December 1437, while some were
paid 10d daily in June and September 1437, May and September 1438 (and thereafter to April 1444), in May
and September 1446; and accounts for 1458-59 and 1460-61, indicate that 10d was a winter rate for street-
pavers, ‘paid before Easter’. Ibid., Stadsrekeningen 1450/51 to 1467/68. See other sources in n. 35 above;
and Jan De Vries, ‘An Inquiry into the Behaviour of Wages in the Dutch Republic and the Southern
Netherlands, 1580-1800,’ Acta Historia Neerlandicae, 10 (1978), 79-97;  reprinted in Maurice Aymard, ed.,
Dutch Capitalism and World Capitalism (Amsterdam, 1982), pp. 37-62;  Jan De Vries, ‘An Employer's
Guide to Wages and Working Conditions in the Netherlands, 1450-1850,’ in Carol S. Leonard and Boris N.
Mironov, eds., Hours of Work and Means of Payment: The Evolution of Conventions in Pre-Industrial
Europe, Proceedings of the Eleventh International Economic History Congress, Milan, September 1994,
Session B3b (Milan, 1994), pp. 47-63; Phelps Brown and Hopkins, ‘Building Wages’ (n. 3), p. 172.
55  See sources cited in n. 29, 31, 35, 39, 43, 45, and 50-51 above; nn. 84- 88 below.
Revolution, Bruges was exceptional in generally having a uniform wage rate throughout the year; and, in
the fifteenth century, Ghent also discarded  seasonal wages.
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# Does institutional wage stickiness reflect adjustments in the real wage by other means: 
(2) by adjusting the proportion of the total wage package made ‘in kind’?
According to very commonly held views about medieval and early modern wages, most artisans and
labourers received a significant  portion of their total wage package ‘in kind’ or ‘in truck’,  so that employers
adjusted the real wage by altering the amount paid in the form of food, drink, and clothing amounts. Thus,
according to this same view, nominal money-wage stickiness is illusory and/or irrelevant. That some
medieval wages were indeed paid partly in kind, especially in the agrarian sector,  is incontestable.  Most
wage-payment records, including all the English statutes, are perfectly clear, however, in indicating whether
the wage was in coined money alone, or ‘with food’ (or other benefits); and for the latter, the money wage
is always proportionally less.
55  Most economic historians in publishing wage data have been equally clear
in specifying that the payments were in money alone.  
Across the Channel, in the towns of later-medieval Flanders and Brabant, the town accounts provide
virtually no evidence  of any significant wage payments made in kind; and, for the rare instances in which
they do occur in the records as a drincgeld, they account no more than one percent of the wage packet, and25
56  See sources cited in n. 35 above.
57 See, for example, in Nicolaas Posthumus, ed., Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van de leidsche
textielnijverheid, 1333-1795, Vol. I: De Middeleeuwen, 1333 - 1480 (The Hague, 1910), no. 74.111-113, pp.
90-91 (Mar. 1415); no. 132.vi.9 (1436/37); no. 508:10-13, pp. 621-22: ‘ende die meester sal gehouden wesen
sijn volle gelt te nemen van elc laken ...dat die drapenieres hoir volres hoir volle loen geven sullen, ende alle
Saterdages hoir gelt geven sullen, sonder horen volres enigerhande drinck te vercopen...’ [also not: ‘bier,
broot, sout, kairssen, seep, butter noch kase.’] (Nov. 1478); no. 525:25, pp. 653-56 (Dec. 1478).
58 See n. 6 above.
59  On this issue, for early modern England, see also Donald Woodward, ‘Wage Rates and Living
Standards in Pre-Industrial England,’ Past and Present, No. 91 (May 1981), 28-46; Donald Woodward, ‘The
Means of Payment and Hours of Work in Early Modern England,’ in Carol S. Leonard and Boris N. Mironov,
eds.,  Hours of Work and Means of Payment: The Evolution of Conventions in Pre-Industrial Europe,
Proceedings of the Eleventh International Economic History Congress, Milan, September 1994, Session B3b
(Milan, 1994), pp. 11-21; Donald Woodward, Men at Work: Labourers and Building Craftsmen in the Towns
of Northern England, 1450 - 1750 (Cambridge, 1995).
seem to be for special workers hired outside the town.
56 In fifteenth-century Leiden, the fullers’s  guild
ordinances (keuren), authorized by the town government (gerecht), are quite explicit in forbidding any
payments in ‘truck’ (kind), stipulating that payments be made each Saturday in silver coin alone. A remnant
of some former partial payment in drink evidently continued in sporadic, occasional payments of drincgelt;
but this too was paid in silver coin (a stuiver, worth 2d. groot).
57   Similarly, in their analyses of medieval
Flemish and Brabantine wages, Verlinden and Van der Wee found little evidence of payments in kind; and
thus also provided only data on money wages.
58
Nevertheless, the Flemish and Brabantine town accounts, which generally provide the full names
and occupations of the craftsmen so paid, do provide evidence that many master masons, carpenters, slate-
tilers, and street-pavers, were also industrial entrepreneurs who made substantially more money than their
daily wages by selling their supplies -- bricks, stones,  sand, lumber, nails, wire, etc. -- to the city
government.
59  Indeed,  some masters  were also drapers, cloth merchants, brewers, or minor civic officials,
many of whom so prospered in these roles that they ultimately relinquished their original status as daily-
wage earners.  Nevertheless many  other minor masters and virtually all journeymen (knapen) and other
assistants did not seem to earn any such extra incomes, though some of them may have had their own small26
60 Van Zanden, ‘Wages and the Standard of Living (n. 12)’, p. 178.
61 Archives, BLPES, Beveridge Price and Wage Collection, Battle Abbey: Alciston Manor, 1336-
1487 (Boxes H.10-11). See also n. 31 above.
62 Archives, BLPES, Beveridge Price and Wage Collection, Westminster Abbey: 1393-1541 (Box
P.10).
agricultural holdings, either within or just outside the town walls. Those circumstances obviously make a
complete and proper estimate of real incomes difficult.  As Jan Van Zanden has recently contended:
60
This [artisan’s household] budget is made up of different sources of income, of which wage
income is only one. But we assume it was an important source (and not a marginal one) for
the European working classes of the early modern period. Moreover, the wage rate is
exogenous for the household: it cannot influence its level in the short or the long run. This
means that a rationally acting household will adapt its strategy to this given wage-level.
In manorial accounts, especially the Winchester accounts, for later medieval England, wage
payments  in kind were quite common up to the eve of the Black Death, often accounting for 50 percent of
the total wage package; but after the Black Death  the component in food and drink fell to a third or less of
the total pay package and they became less common in the following generations, except principally at Battle
Abbey.  The Battle Abbey manorial accounts generally provide two series of wage payments for the same
classes of craftsmen and agricultural workers: those paid in both money and kind, and those paid in coined
money alone.  The sum of the former seems to equal the latter; and the rates for those paid in money alone
at Battle Abbey were identical or virtually identical to those for unspecified but presumably ‘money-alone’
wage payments on other manors.
61   One may surmise that when the price of foodstuffs fell sharply in the
late fourteenth century (see tables), labourers and artisans would have resisted having any substantial portion
of their pay package supplied in kind.
There are very few available urban wage data before the Black Death; but for later-medieval London
and other smaller English towns (Canterbury, Dover, Exeter), I did not find any significant evidence of
payments in kind, other than some allotments of clothing (chiefly and only significant for master-masons
and some carpenters in long-term employ at Westminster Abbey).
62   For these reasons, one may conclude
that wage payments in kind did not appreciably alter the picture of real wages constructed by using money27
63 Hatcher, ‘England in the Aftermath of the Black Death (n. 34),’pp. 3-35.
64  For both quotations, see David A.  Wilton and David M.  Prescott, Macroeonomics: Theory and
Policy in Canada, 2
nd edn.  (Toronto, 1987), p.  214.
65  See John Munro, ‘Monetary Policies, Guild Labour-Strife, and Compulsory Arbitration during
the Decline of the Late-Medieval Flemish Cloth Industry, 1390 - 1435':  UT-ECIPA-MUNRO-98-05,
http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/economics.
payments alone, at least not for the later Middle Ages, even if such views are not endorsed in John Hatcher’s
recent (1994) and otherwise persuasive article discussed above.
63
The Keynesian inflexible-wage model and the nature of medieval labour contracts
Even if these recorded nominal money-wage data reflect market conditions, and are not institutional
artifices, such wages would, however, clearly not be determined in the short-run by the Classical equation:
i.e. that WL = MRPL  – not then and just as certainly not now.   As most contemporary macro-economists
would agree, if only because of its obvious truth,  ‘nominal wage rates are not determined on a daily basis
according to the law of supply and demand... even though it is the real wage that determines the demand for
and supply of labour’; but not necessarily all of them would find the full solution in ‘the modern
interpretation of the Keynesian inflexible-wage model [which] focuses on the role played by labour
contracts’, explicit or implicit.
64   
My own current research in the late-medieval era has revealed only one form of explicit long-term
wage-contracts produced by formal and arbitrated collective bargaining between a guild and an association
of entrepreneurial employers: those for the aforementioned fullers of Flanders, Brabant, and Holland, whose
analyses would require and justify a completely separate paper.
65  As Knoop and Jones, and more recently
Heather Swanson, have shown from extensive investigations, medieval English building craftsmen did not
enjoy any similar form of guild protection that would have permitted collective bargaining and labour
contracts.  Nevertheless Knoop and Jones have also demonstrated that for major building projects in later
medieval England, France, and Italy, the chief master mason, acting more as an contractor-entrepreneur than
as an artisan, often required or obtained  written contracts that clearly specified not only the costs of building28
66 Douglas Knoop and G.P. Jones, ‘The Rise of the Mason Contractor’, Journal R.I.B.A., Oct.  1936;
Knoop and Jones, Mediaeval Mason (n. 29); Knoop and Jones, ‘Masons’ Wages in Medieval England (n.
29)’, pp.  473-99;  Gwilym P. Jones, ‘Building in Stone in Medieval Western Europe’, in M.  Postan and E.E.
Rich, eds., The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol.  II: Trade and Industry in the Middle Ages
(Cambridge, 1952), pp.  493-518, esp.  pp.  508-09, on ‘Masons’ Contracts’; Heather Swanson, ‘The Illusion
of Economic Structure: Craft Guilds in Late Medieval English Towns’, Past & Present, no. 121 (November
1988), pp. 29 - 48; Heather Swanson, Medieval Artisans: An Urban Class in Late Medieval England (Oxford,
1989); John Blair and Nigel Ramsay, eds., English Medieval Industries: Craftsmen, Techniques, Products
(London, 1991).
67  Michael Huberman, ‘How Did Labor Markets Work in Lancashire?  More Evidence on Prices and
Quantities in Cotton Spinning, 1822 - 1852’, Explorations in Economic History, 28  (January 1991), 87 - 120;
Michael Huberman, ‘Invisible Handshakes in Lancashire: Cotton Spinning in the First Half of the Nineteenth
Century,’ Journal of Economic History, 46 (1986), 987-98; Michael Huberman, Escape from the Market:
Negotiating Work in Lancashire (Cambridge, 1996).
materials but also the rates of pay for his workers for the duration of the project.  Sometimes, however, the
contract was in the form of an opus ad tascam whose specified sum amounted to pay for piece-work
accomplished, rather than daily rates.
66  Other, older master masons might rise in status to become wardens
or foremen for large building projects, in the service of a secular or ecclesiastical lord, receiving a contract
for many years, or even a lifetime, specifying an annual salary, with clothing and other material benefits. 
Many other labour contracts may have been unwritten, i.e. the ‘implicit contracts’ (by ‘invisible
hand-shakes’, etc.) about which modern macro- and labour-economists and some economic historians have
published so extensively.  Their analyses, however, cannot be readily applied to the often intractable
medieval sources on artisans.
67  We may at least surmise that the long-term and virtually permanent artisan-
employees of the London Tower Bridge Authority probably did enjoy at least the privileges of an implicit
contract.  But, it seems hardly credible that short-term, part-time, itinerant craftsmen, working for a variety
of employers (while frequently mixing occupations), for discrete but indeterminate periods, would have
benefited from any such form of implicit contracts, even if their wage patterns demonstrated the same degree
of wage stickiness.  In any event, fully enforceable written contracts would have succeeded, at the most, in
fixing wages for only a few years at a time – or for medieval building projects, for their duration. Thus they
can hardly explain these many examples of very long-term wage stickiness lasting  for over half-a-century,
or as much as 174 years, in that singular Oxford example just cited.29
68 Keynes, General Theory (n. 1),  pp.  12-13.
69  Ibid.; and Wilton-Prescott, Macroeconomics (n. 64), pp.  216-17.
Nevertheless, in the absence of good data and theory, one may still offer credible (rather than merely
plausible) hypotheses to explain at least some forms of wage stickiness. During periods of inflation, most
employers were reluctant to award nominal wage increases that matched rising consumer prices and living
costs, especially if the prices of their own products were not rising as steeply as were food prices.  Despite
the emphasis to be given to deflationary periods in this analysis, certainly continental western Europe, during
the Hundred Years’ War era especially (1337-1453), experienced frequent, if short term, inflations from
periodic war-induced coinage debasements.  With so many jagged oscillations in prices, we, as modern
computer-assisted observers, are better able to detect those trends than were medieval employers.  If late-
medieval England had less frequent short-term inflations,  possibly the Statute of Labourers, whatever its
real impact, did reinforce a psychological resistance  to, or ‘moral suasion’ against, awarding any wage
increases.  Nor is the employer likely, then or now, to encounter much resistance from labour in such an
inflationary situation, despite the necessary fall in its real wage.  As Keynes noted, in citing one of his chief
objections to one of the prime ‘postulates’ of Classical theory: ‘A fall in real wages due to a rise in prices,
with money-wages unaltered, does not, as a rule cause the supply of labour available on offer at the current
[money] wage to fall below the amount actually employed prior to the rise of prices’.
68  Indeed modern
macro-economic models convincingly demonstrate that under such inflationary conditions wage stickiness
‘results in an increase in employment and output’, and usually, though not necessarily, in employer profits.
69
Conversely, during periods of deflation, most wage-earning employees, whether or not they were
truly suffering from a ‘money-illusion’, were and still are extremely hostile to any  attempts to reduce  their
nominal wages, even if, with some inevitable wage reductions,  they still ended up better off in real terms.
Workers surely had and do have some legitimate concern that wage rates and other benefits once cut will
not readily be restored, without some considerable struggle, once market conditions improve and prices
begin to rise.  As Keynes also cogently remarked: ‘Every trade union will put up some resistance to a cut in30
70 Keynes, General Theory (n. 1), p. 15.  Cf.  also Wilton-Prescott, Macroeconomics (n. 64),  p. 215,
in commenting on the ‘the very deep recession of 1982’, when the International Woodworkers ‘resisted wage
cuts at sawmills in British Columbia.  The union took the view that if the weakest firms succeeded in getting
wage concessions in order to maintain employment, then all firms would demand the same concessions and
all workers would suffer.  Moreover, the union would have to fight battles already won in order to restore
wage and benefit levels once market conditions improved’; and thus ‘wage cuts were resisted and many
sawmills were closed’.
71 See above, n.27; and below, pp.  and nn. 77-78.
72 See below, pp.  and nn. 138-42.
money-wages, however small.’
70  
In late-medieval Flanders and Holland, that is precisely what the fullers did, in the form of organized
strikes (uutgangen),  when faced with minor wage reductions during periods of monetary reform and
deflation.
71   If other late-medieval wage-earning craftsmen, in both England and the Low Countries, did not
enjoy similarly strong guild protection, undoubtedly many, with or without less formal organizations, were
still able to convey their opposition with sufficient conviction or hostility to prevent any nominal-wage
reductions. Obviously those unprotected, such as itinerant or part-time agricultural labourers, were much
more likely to suffer nominal-wage cuts during periods of deflation, as seems to have been the case in both
late-medieval England and Flanders
72.
Money, prices, and wages before the Black Death (England, 1280-1348)
What then do the medieval wage and price data reveal about the nature of longer-term wage
stickiness, and its results, especially downward wage stickiness during deflations – i.e. the ratchet effect?
The long-term historical evidence for both England and the Low Countries does indeed indicate that wage
rigidity was more pronounced during these deflations, but far more so during the later-medieval deflations.
For proper historical perspective, one should commence this analysis with thirteenth-century
England, which offers the historian by far the most plentiful data.  Contrary to much of the economic history
literature, however, and indeed to one’s rational expectations, the inflationary final decades of this century
do not reveal any truly distinct trend of falling real wages – and indeed none subsequently, before the Great
Famine era (1315-22).   Thereafter, in the decades following the Great Famine,  we witness one of the most31
73 Postan, ‘Economic Foundations of Medieval Society (n. 13 )’, p.  14.
74 Lawrence  R. Poos, ‘The Rural Population of Essex in the Later Middle Ages,’ Economic History
Review, 2nd ser. 38 (November 1985), 515 - 30; Lawrence R. Poos, A Rural Society after the Black Death:
Essex, 1350 - 1525 (Cambridge, 1991).
75  David Herlihy, Medieval and Renaissance Pistoia: The Social History of an Italian Town, 1200
-1430 (New Haven, 1967), pp. 55-77; David Herlihy and Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, Tuscans and Their
Families: A Study of the Florentine Catasto of 1427 (New Haven, 1985), pp. 232-79;  John Munro,
‘Industrial Transformations in the North-west European Textile Trades, c.1290 - c.1340: Economic Progress
or Economic Crisis?’, in Bruce M.S. Campbell, ed., Before the Black Death: Studies in the ‘Crisis’ of the
Early Fourteenth Century (Manchester and New York, 1991), pp. 110 - 48; and also, in this volume, Barbara
Harvey, ‘Introduction: the ‘Crisis’ of the Early Fourteenth Century,’ pp. 1 - 24.
76 Bruce M. Campbell, ‘Agricultural Progress in Medieval England:  Some Evidence from Eastern
Norfolk,’ Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 36 (Feb. 1983), 26-46;  Bruce Campbell, ‘Arable Productivity
in Medieval England:  Some Evidence from Norfolk,’ Journal of Economic History, 43 (1983), 379-404;
Bruce Campbell, ‘Population Pressure, Inheritance, and the Land Market in a Fourteenth-Century Peasant
Community,’ in  Richard M. Smith, ed., Land, Kinship and Life-Cycle (Cambridge, 1984),  pp. 87 - 134; and
striking and puzzling phenomena in all of England’s recorded monetary and price history: (1)  a severe,
indeed dazzling, plunge in English mint outputs, still entirely in silver; and, accompanying that, (2) an almost
equally drastic deflation, reflected in the 35 percent fall in the Phelps Brown-Hopkins index,  from 138 in
1321-25 to just 90 in 1341-45, on the eve of the Black Death.
Postan, of course, evidently wanted to attribute the fall in at least the grain-price index to the
demographic consequences of the Great Famine, or rather to a more general Malthusian crisis of
overpopulation in a relatively primitive agrarian economy: ‘when the poorer lands, no longer new, punished
the men who tilled them with failing crops and with murrain’, so much so as ‘to send the population figures
tumbling down’.
73  Lawrence Poos has recently provided evidence to indicate significant population decline
in rural Essex after the Great Famine and on into the post-Plague era.
74  For Europe more generally one can
cite evidence for regional depopulations in early-fourteenth century Provence and Tuscany, though evidently
related to the horrendous warfare then afflicting these regions.
75   Bruce Campbell, however, has provided
equally compelling evidence of continued population growth in Norfolk, while also demonstrating in various
articles that late-medieval English agriculture was far less primitive and far less prone to Malthusian
pressures than Postan had suggested.
76  Richard Smith’s masterful survey of ‘demographic developments in32
Bruce Campbell, English Seigniorial Agriculture, 1250 - 1450, Cambridge Studies in Historical Geography
no. 31 (Cambridge and New York,  2000).
77  Richard Smith, ‘Demographic Developments in Rural England, 1300-48: a  Survey,’ in Campbell,
ed., Before the Black Death (n. 75), pp. 25 - 78; see also Harvey, ‘ “Crisis” of the Early Fourteenth Century
(n. 75)’, pp.1-23 ; Barbara Harvey, ‘The Population Trend in England Between 1300 and 1348’, Transactions
of the Royal Historical Society, 5
th ser., 16 (1966), 23-42, with a much stronger attack on Postan’s thesis,
denying any evidence of population decline before the Black Death; and see also Hallam, ‘Population
Movements in England, 1086-1350’ (n. 14), pp. 508-93, also casting doubts on general population decline
before 1348.  But also note Richard Smith’s criticisms of Hallam’s data.
78 Herlihy, Medieval and Renaissance Pistoia (n. 75), pp.  122-25.
79  i.e. if ) y > ) (M.V) ý ÏP.  See Peter Spufford, Money and Its Use in Medieval Europe
(Cambridge, 1988), pp.  267-82 ; John U. Nef, ‘Mining and Metallurgy in Medieval Civilization’, in M.M.
Postan, ed., Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol. II: Trade and Industry in the Middle Ages (1952),
pp. 456-69; revised edn. (1987), pp. 696-734; D. Kovacevic, ‘Les mines d'or et d'argent en Serbie et en
Bosnie médiévales’, Annales: E.S.C., 15 (1960), 248-58;  Philippe Braunstein, ‘Innovations in Mining and
Metal Production in Europe in the Late Middle Ages,’ Journal of European Economic History, 12 (1983),
573-91; Ekkehard Westermann, ‘Zur Silber- und Kupferproduktion Mitteleuropas vom 15. bis zum frühen
17. Jahrhundert: über Bedeutung und Rangfolge der Reviere von Schwaz, Mansfeld und Neusohl,’ Der
Anschnitt: Zeitschrift für Kunst und Kultur im Bergbau, 38 (May-June 1986), 187 - 211;  Munro, ‘The
Central European Mining Boom (n. 20)’, pp. 119-83. See also n. 18 above, n. 105 below.
rural England, 1300-48’, while inconclusive, noting complex regional variations in demographic decline,
with continued if slow growth, or stagnation, does not lend any support to Postan’s drastic views
77.   Nor do
the nominal-wage data support the depopulation hypothesis; and the fall in prices was general, and not, as
Table 2 demonstrates, limited to just grains.
This prolonged fall in prices was instead genuine deflation, for which monetary reasons must be
sought.  The true explanation for this evidently stark monetary contraction and deflation, apparent also from
the Tuscan price data,
78 remains a mystery that  cannot satisfactorily be resolved.  Possibly it was due to a
relative scarcity of precious metals, if, as several historians have asserted, the major German and Central
European silver mines had begun to experience not just diminishing returns but serious physical depletion
by the early fourteenth century, while the European economy continued to grow, and with it, the aggregate
demand for coined money. 
79  Indeed, as Nicholas Mayhew has also demonstrated, contrary to another of
Postan’s assertions, coined money is perishable to some considerable degree:  from wear, tear, and normal
loss in circulation, from shipwrecks, unrecovered hoards, conversion into jewellery and plate, etc.,  so that33
80 See Nicholas Mayhew, ‘Numismatic Evidence and Falling Prices in the Fourteenth Century’,
Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 27 (1974), 1-15;  John Munro, ‘Bullion Flows and Monetary Contraction
in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries,’ in  John F. Richards, ed.,  Precious Metals in the Later
Medieval and Early Modern Worlds (Durham, 1983), pp. 97-158; reprinted in John Munro, Bullion Flows
and Monetary Policies in England and the Low Countries, 1350-1500 (London-Aldershot, 1992).
81  Michael Prestwich, ‘Currency and the Economy of Early Fourteenth-Century England’, in
Nicholas Mayhew, ed., Edwardian Monetary Affairs, 1279-1344 (British Archeological Reports, BAR
International Series, no. 36 (Oxford, 1977), pp. 45-58; Edward Ames, ‘The Sterling Crisis of 1337-1339,’
Journal of Economic History, 25 (1965), 496-552, reprinted in Roderick Floud, ed., Essays in Quantitative
Economic History (Oxford, 1974), pp. 36-58; Mavis Mate, ‘High Prices in Early Fourteenth-Century
England: Causes and Consequences’, Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 28 (1975), 1-16; Robinson,
‘Money, Population, and Economic Change (n. 18)’, pp. 63-76; Peter Spufford, Money and Its Use (n. 79),
pp. 267-88.
82  The fall in the bimetallic ratio may have been due to both declining silver outputs from Bohemian
mines and increasing supplies of West African (Sudanese) and Hungarian gold. See especially Frederic Lane,
‘The First Infidelities of the Venetian Lire,’ in Harry A. Miskimin, David Herlihy, and A. L. Udovitch, eds.,
The Medieval City (New Haven and London, 1977), pp. 52-9; Peter Spufford, Handbook of Medieval
Exchange, Royal Historical Society Guides and Handbooks no. 13 (London, 1986), Graph 3 and Table II,
pp. li-lxiii; Spufford , Money and Its Use (n. 79), pp. 267-88 (on ‘the victory of gold’), 340-42.  Spufford's
dates have been adjusted by those of Lane. See also Mavis Mate, ‘The Role of Gold Coinage in the English
Economy, 1338 - 1400', Numismatic Chronicle, 7
th ser. 18 (1978), 126-41.
the money supply will indeed contract if not continually replenished with fresh minting.
80  For England itself,
some historians have also suggested that the crown’s foreign military expenditures (under both Edward II
and Edward III) had led to major outflows of bullion, though the fall in mint-outputs and the onset of
deflation seems to precede the evidence for any such drastic bullion outflows.
81  Finally, since England in
this era was minting only silver, and no gold before January 1344 (none since 1257), the very dramatic rise
in the bimetallic ratio, from about 12.0:1 in the 1290s to 14.2:1 in the mid-1320s may have instigated a large
outflow of silver coinage to acquire the higher valued gold.  Indeed, such bullion movements may have been
necessary to permit England’s inauguration of an effective gold coinage in the period 1344-52, though with
a then falling bimetallic ratio.
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Some very general indication of possible bullion outflows from England and a relative scarcity of
specie during the second quarter of the fourteenth century may be found in the coinage-output statistics
(Table 9).   The mean annual values of those outputs (all in silver) fell from a peak of £125,836 sterling in
1306-10 to a nadir of £381 in 1326-30; recovering only to a mean of £7,091 in 1346-50, at the outbreak of34
83   An absence of minting may indicate only that the nation’s mints were offering a mint price for
bullion uncompetitive with those of neighbouring foreign mints. With coinage debasement in a bimetallic
system (in England, after 1344), a coinage debasement in, say silver, might succeed in recoining much of the
current silver monetary stock, in inducing dishoarding, and in attracting foreign bullion, but at the expense
of losing the now ‘disfavoured’ gold to foreign mints. See the essays in Munro, Bullion Flows and Monetary
Policies (n. 79), and in n. 20 and 79.  Graphs for England and the Low Countries, each portraying aggregate
mint outputs in current money-of-account and the ‘basket of consumables’ price indices do show a strikingly
close relationship, with about a five-year lag in prices.  See Figures 33-34 in pfd format in
http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/munro5/RWCharts3.pdf
84  Nicholas Mayhew, ‘Money and Prices in England from Henry II to Edward III’, Agricultural
History Review, 35:2 (1987), Table I, p. 125:  indicating that the coined money supply contracted  from about
£1,100,00 sterling in 1311-24 to just £500,000 in the 1340s. See also Nicholas Mayhew, ‘Population, Money
Supply, and the Velocity of Circulation in England, 1300 - 1700,’ Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 48:2
(May 1995), 238-57;  Mayhew, ‘Numismatic Evidence and Falling Prices (n. 79)’, pp. 1-15; and sources in
n. 80 above. For a more recent estimate, see : Martin Allen, ‘The Volume and Composition of the English
Silver Currency, 1279 - 1351', British Numismatic Journal, 70 (2000), forthcoming; and Martin Allen, ‘The
Volume of the English Currency, 1158 - 1470', Economic History Review, 2
nd ser., 54 (2001), forthcoming,
Table 1: an estimated coined silver stock  of £1,900,000 - £2,300,000 in 1319, falling to about £700,000 -
£900,000 in 1351.
the Black Death.  Such mint-accounts provide, however, only a very general and very tenuous guide to
current monetary conditions.  They can be of some value in that years with  very low mint outputs generally
coincide with eras of prolonged deflation (marked as well by complaints about the scarcity of specie); and,
conversely, years of very high mint outputs generally coincide with eras of prolonged inflation.  But
extrapolating a nation’s current money supply from these accounts is an enterprise fraught with great
dangers, for many complex reasons, the most important of which is that mint-accounts combine stocks and
flows in unpredictable and unquantifiable fashions.
83  Nevertheless, some brave historians believe that a 30-
year running average of such outputs may provide an acceptably reliable indication of the coined money
stock.  Recently, two economic historians have used a combination of mint accounts and coin hoards to show
that the English money supply contracted  by over one half in this era.
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What is especially striking and peculiar about this deflation, though affording further evidence that
it was a genuine deflation, was the marked decline in nominal wages shown in the accompanying tables.
From about 1337 to 1340, the mean money wage of a master building craftsmen in southern England fell
from 4d per day to 3d per day, a decline of 25 percent; and that very low mean wage-rate was maintained35
85 See the sources cited above in nn.  3-4.  Wages for masons and carpenters at the Oxford colleges
did not fall, however; and remained at the daily rate of 4d  set from at least 1300.
86 Phelps Brown and Hopkins, ‘Building Wages’ (n. 3), Table 1, p. 178.
87 Money wages for master masons and carpenters were typically 3d. per day from before 1264 to
1302; for many, 3.5d until 1310; and then 4d. until 1338. See n. 3 above.
88 For other analyses of medieval English wages before and after the Black Death, see in particular
Farmer, ‘Wages and Prices, 1042-1350 (n. 21)', pp. 760-78, 811-17; Farmer, ‘Prices and Wages, 1350-1500
(n. 21)', pp. 467-83 (whose conclusions do not always match my own); and sources cited above in nn. 3, 4,
8, 21, 30, 34. For the more general economic and social consequences of the Black Death, see: Hatcher,
‘England in the Aftermath of the Black Death (n. 34)’, pp. 3 - 35; Hatcher, Plague, Population, and the
English Economy (n. 12), pp. 11 - 73;  Colin Platt, King Death: The Black Death and Its Aftermath in Late-
Medieval England (London and Toronto, 1996), pp. 1-47, 177-92;   J.  L.  Bolton, ‘The World Upside
Down’: Plague as an Agent of Economic and Social Change’, in Mark Ormrod and Phillip Lindley, eds., The
Black Death in England (Stamford, 1996), pp. 17-78;   Putnam, The Enforcement of the Statute of Labourers
9n. 39);  Penn and Dyer, ‘Wages and Earnings in Late Medieval England (n. 34)’, pp. 356-76.
until early 1351, i.e. several years after the Black Death.
85  The only other period in recorded English price-
history with any such decline in the nominal wages of building craftsmen came almost six-centuries later:
the post-World War I slump of 1920-23 (31.3 percent decline) and the early depression years of 1929-34 (8.3
percent decline). 
86 In the earlier part of this early-fourteenth century period, before this fall in nominal
wages, i.e. with continued nominal wage rigidity,
87 real wages did rise, though the brief rise appears to be
dramatic  only because of the recovery from the drastic nadir of the Great Famine years.    When the real-
wage of those master craftsmen peaked in 1334-35, it was not appreciably higher than in the very early years
of the century (1303-07).  Then their real wages suffered a sharp fall, indeed fell quite steeply before the
Black Death, with the initial recovery of the price level from 1344, and especially with the inflation that
soared immediately after the Black Death, one that endured  for a full generation.
Money wages and the statute of labourers following the Black Death (1348)
That is why the Ordinance (1349) and Statute of Labourers (1350-51) were so very unreasonable and
cruel, but also so difficult to enforce: in attempting to fix money-wages at the pre-Plague level, when both
money and real wages had been so unusually low.
88  Thus, specifically forbidding anyone to offer or accept
any wages higher than those prevailing in 1346 (20 Edwardi III), the Statute of Labourers set the maximum36
89 Statute 25 Edwardi III stat.  2 c. 3, in Statutes of the Realm (n. 28),  vol. I, pp. 311-12.  See also
n. 29 above.  Wages for the winter season from Michaelmas to Easter were not specifically stipulated, except
that they were to be ‘less according to the rate and discretion of the justices’. For a discussion of this Statute,
and the subsequent labour legislation, see Farmer, ‘Wages and Prices, 1350-1500 (n. 21)', pp. 483–90.
90 Statute 23 Henrici VI c.  12 (1444-45), in Statutes of the Realm (n. 28),  vol. II, 337-39.  See above
nn. 41, 51.
91 See above pp.  and n. 41. As also noted there, these rates were just 1d per day higher than those
of 1290.
92  Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Science, Beveridge Price History Collection,
Box P9.
93  Cf.  Beveridge, ‘Wages in the Winchester Manors (n. 29)’, pp.  26-8: cf. his comments on ‘the
failure of the Black Death to cause any immediate change of [wage] rates’ in the Winchester manorial
accounts of 1349-50.
summer wages (Easter to Michaelmas) for master masons, carpenters, and tilers, ‘without meat or drink’,
at 3d per day; for their servants and labourers, at 1½ d a day; but it also permitted a rate of 4d per day for
master free-masons.
89  This obnoxious  statute remained in force (reconfirmed numerous times), ostensibly
on a national basis, until 1444, when Parliament finally raised the maximum daily  rate for such craftsmen
to 5½ d for summer and 4½ d for the winter season, without food and drink (or: 4d and 3d, respectively, with
food and drink).
90   As noted earlier in this study, London had independently, in 1350, established its own
maximum wage of 6d per summer and 5d per winter day for these same craftsmen;
91 and such rates were
already in force at Westminster Abbey, for master building craftsmen in 1349.
92 
Thereafter, but not immediately after the Black Death, money wages did rise, certainly for these
urban-based craftsmen.
93  At Oxford, where most building craftsmen had not suffered the nominal wage cuts
in the 1330s, the prevailing daily wage rate rose from 4d to 5d during the 1350s; in other small-sized towns
the rate rose from 3d to 5d by the end of the decade.   Not until 1363, as noted before, did Oxford masons
and carpenters gain the daily rate of 6d, at least for summer work, that London had authorized in 1350; and
not until about 1407-1409 did the mean daily rate for craftsmen in the other smaller towns achieve the same
6d  level, i.e. the mean rate for the Phelps Brown & Hopkins index, unchanged in their own index until 1536.
In many, indeed evidently most, of the Winchester manors and at Battle Abbey, the daily wage for37
94  See n. 31 for the Beveridge Price and Wage History Collection, in the BLPES (LSE) Archives.
At Battle Abbey (Box.  H:10-11), carpenters and masons had their pay raised from 4d to 5d daily in 1425;
at Itchingswell (Box A.33:159432), from 1433; but at Overton (Box A.33:159406), and Wycombe
(BoxA.33:159407) first carpenters and then masons enjoyed the same increase from 4d  to 5d as early as
1401-05. At the urban Winchester College (Box F.8), wages for master carpenters had risen to 6d per day
without food by 1398 (4d daily with food); but for master masons, the mean rate did not reach 6d  daily
(without food) until 1409.  See also the raw-wage data published in Thorold Rogers, History of Agriculture
and Prices (n. 4), vol. II:1259-1400, pp. 272-34; and vol. III:1401-1582, pp. 583-663.
95 See Table 3 and n. 22 above.
96  G.A. Holmes, The Estates of the Higher Nobility in Fourteenth-Century England (Cambridge,
1957), p. 115; see also pp. 85-120; Richard H. Britnell, ‘Feudal Reaction after the Black Death in the
Palatinate of Durham,’ Past & Present, no. 128 (August 1990), pp. 28-47; and n. 142 below.
97 Ritchie (née Kenyon), ‘Labour Conditions in Essex (n. 34)’, pp.  91-111.  Data from presentments
before  Justices of the King’s Bench at Brenwood in November 1389, following the 1388 Statute of
Cambridge (see n. 44  above).  As she also notes (p.  102), ‘eight hundred men who were receiving illegally
high wages is not a large number for a country the size of Essex.’  She also noted daily wage payments of
4d  with food, for tasks in the Winchester manorial accounts that are specifically listed as ‘without food’.
See nn.  47, and, for a rather different view about wage rates in this era, n.  86.
such building craftsmen, while soon rising back to the 4d  level that had prevailed from about 1310 to 1337,
remained fixed at that truly low level -- even if 25 percent above that stipulated by the Statute of Labourers,
with some occasional exceptions for senior craftsmen at 5d daily, until about c.1410-c.1425.
94  As also noted
above, the wages of occasional day labourers, chiefly agricultural, on Taunton manor, after doubling in the
years following the Black Death (1349-1356), then fell to the pre-Plague level of 1d daily, remaining there
until 1412-13.
95  Such evidence may lend support to oft-cited contention of G.A. Holmes that by the 1370s
(and on the eve of the Peasants’ Revolt) the landlords or the great landed magnates had succeeded in
obtaining a greater share of the national income than they had enjoyed before the Black Death.
96
Nora Kenyon Ritchie, however, did find a few examples of supposedly higher rates, though largely
for agricultural workers, given in some Essex manors in the late 1380s.   Furthermore, such evidence comes
from judicial proceedings and not from account rolls.  Nevertheless her hypothesis is certainly one to be
considered:  that aggressive new leaseholders of former demesne lands were more willing to offer higher
wages to attract labour than were traditional manorial lords. Rather surprisingly, no one has pursued or
investigated this intriguing thesis since the publication of her article, in 1934.
9738
98 Corporation of London Record Office, Bridgemaster's Accounts, Weekly Payment Series, Vols.
III - IV; Corporation of London Record Office, London Bridgemaster's Accounts, Weekly Payments, First
Series, Vol. IV. Unfortunately these accounts cease in 1445.  See also Knoop and Jones, Mediaeval Mason
(n. 29), pp. 105-06.  Account books of London guildhouses cited in n. below.  Subsequently, from 1441, the
craftsmen employed Tower Bridgemaster received a very minor seasonal adjustment in wages: a reduction
in the daily rate for a now shorter winter season, to 7.5d but an increase to 8.5d for the rest of the year, thus
slightly increasing the annual wage payments. See a discussion of these accounts in pp.   above.
99  Penn and Dyer, ‘Wages and Earnings in Late Medieval England (n. 34)’, pp. 356-76.
London’s own 1350 wage ordinance was soon if not immediately allowed to lapse. For when the
Tower Bridge accounts commence in 1381, the prevailing daily rate then ranged from 7 d to 7½ d, and
indeed for winter months as well as for the summer.   At Westminster Abbey, however, the rate was less,
at 6 2/3d per day, though with some extra material benefits not given to the Tower Bridge craftsmen.  In the
Bishop of Winchester’s Southwark manor, from as early as 1406, and in most London guildhouses by 1420,
that rate had increased to 8d daily (without food and drink); and that same rate had become uniform in the
Tower Bridge Master’s accounts from June 1425 (though not at Westminster Abbey until 1439-40, perhaps
because its master craftsmen had continued to receive some extra material benefits from the Abbey, along
with their money wages).
98 
Money, prices, and real wages in England after the Black Death: the inflation of 1349 - 1376
These rather complex data indicate that the commonly expressed views about post-Plague wages in
England are much oversimplified, in particular the comment in a recent article by Simon Penn and
Christopher Dyer:  that ‘the evidence for a rise in both cash wages and real wages ...coinciding with the
sudden and sustained population decline after the Black Death of 1348-9 has been well established’.
99  What
must be challenged in this statement (and article) is the verdict on real wages, for the very simple reason that
the Black Death, not only in England but throughout western Europe, was followed by a horrendous inflation
that lasted for at least the ensuing quarter-century.  Thus, as the Tables 2 - 8 clearly indicate, its initial
consequence was to swamp the rise in nominal wages for most workers, most especially for Flemish
craftsmen, but even for England’s urban craftsmen (certainly in the small to middle-sized towns), and
certainly for most of the manorial craftsmen and other artisans.   As Table 2 indicates, the  real wages for39
100 Beveridge Price and Wage History Collection, Archives BLPS: boxes A.31 (Taunton), A.32
(Esher), A. 33 (Itchingswell, Overton, Wycombe), F.8 (Winchester College), G.14 (Hinderclay and
Redgrave), H.10-11 (Battle Abbey).
101  Herlihy, Medieval and Renaissance Pistoia (n. 75), p.  125.
master masons and carpenters at Oxford, and Cambridge (Canterbury and Exeter, etc.) fell, not rose, in the
immediate aftermath of the Black Death and then recovered somewhat during the 1350s, only to decline
again slightly in the 1360s.   They did not in fact regain the level that had been achieved in the mid-1330s
until about the mid-1370s.   Many manorial craftsmen in many manorial estates, especially those of the far
flung holdings of the Bishop of Winchester, had to wait until the early fifteenth century to achieve a
significant gain in their real incomes (at least those measured in terms of wages given without food and
drink):  at Battle Abbey, Redgrave manor, Hinderclay, Itchingswell (Ecchinswell), Overton, Taunton, Esher,
Wycombe, and also Winchester College, to name only a few.
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The post-Plague European inflation, which, as a comparison of the Tables 2, 4, and 9 reveals, was
even more severe and longer lasting in Flanders than in England (and in Tuscany, as well), was again clearly
a monetary phenomenon.   Depopulation, after all, according to some disciples of the Postan school, is
supposed to cause deflation, not the opposite.  The monetary reasons – if we properly relate monetary and
real variables – are not difficult to seek.  As David Herlihy so aptly commented, ‘men were dying, but coins
were not’ (at least not so quickly).
101  Thus, whatever the current status of western European precious-metal
mining, the effect of such drastic depopulations,  perhaps as much as 40 percent of the total inhabitants,
from bubonic and pneumonic plagues, if not so much from warfare, was undoubtedly to augment
dramatically the per capita supplies of coined money.   In terms of the modernized version of the Fisher
Identity, i.e. M.V = P.y, if the real variable y, representing Net National Income, contracted so much more
rapidly than did the volume of money payments (ie. the product of M.V), then obviously prices had to rise.
The same conclusions are to be drawn in using the preferable Cambridge ‘cash balances’ approach: so that
M = k.P.y (and thus k = 1/V).
   Secondly, the fiscal consequences of warfare in western Europe (including the concurrent Italian40
102 See  Albert Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling: a History of English Money, 2
nd edn. revised by E.V.
Morgan (Oxford, 1963), pp. 15-45; essays in Munro, Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies (n. 79); and
sources in n. 104 below.
103 See in particular: Harry Miskimin, The Economy of Early Renaissance Europe, 1300 - 1460
(Cambridge, 1975), pp. 25-32; Herlihy, Medieval and Renaissance Pistoia (n. 75),  pp. 55-71, 180-212;
Robert Lopez, ‘Hard Times and Investment in Culture’, in Wallace Ferguson, et al., eds., The Renaissance
(New York, 1962), pp. 29-52; Giovanni Boccaccio, The Decameron, trans. J.M. Rigg (London, 1921):
introduction, esp. p. 7; Anthony Cassell, ‘Boccaccio, Giovanni’, in Joseph Strayer, et al, eds., Dictionary of
the Middle Ages, Vol. 2 (New York, 1983), pp. 277-90.
wars), of increased taxes and other levies, probably also induced some considerable dishoarding.   At the
same time the French, Flemish, Brabantine, Aragonese, and various Italian governments, to mention only
a few,  sought both to finance and to facilitate the necessary cash flows for warfare by engaging in drastic
coinage debasements, some severe enough to promote a veritable ‘flight from coinage’.  The English crown,
however, was a singular exception to these monetary manipulations: for it undertook only one, relatively
minor weight-reduction in its silver coins,  in 1351, thereafter maintaining a perfectly stable coinage, in both
metals, until 1411-12 (Table 9).
102  
Thirdly, as some historians have suggested, citing Italian literature -- e.g. Boccaccio’s Decameron --
and paintings, adornments in dress and housing, the socio-psychological consequences of both plague and
warfare, especially with such devastating and arbitrary death tolls, was to foster a fatalistic yet hedonistic
spending spree, facilitated all the more by suddenly inherited cash balances.
103 The overall consequences,
as demonstrated in the Tables 2, 4, and 9, for England and Flanders, was to produce a truly momentous
increase in coinage outputs, whose inflationary consequences can hardly be disputed. One will note from the
price-tables for both countries that all three major price series, and not just those for grains, rose during this
quarter-century period following the Black Death:  to the late 1370s in England; and to the 1380s in Flanders,
whose far more drastic and regrettably frequent debasements continued until the 1389-90 monetary reform.
‘Bullion famines’ and periodic deflations in the late-fourteenth and fifteenth centuries
Thereafter, during the final quarter of the fourteenth-century, much of western  Europe  -- certainly
including England, the Low Countries, Tuscany, and Aragon-Navarre -- experienced an equally dramatic41
104 Herlihy, Medieval and Renaissance Pistoia (n. 75),  pp. 128-30; Earl Hamilton, Money, Prices,
and Wages in Valencia, Aragon, and Navarre, 1351 - 1500 (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), Appendices.
105  The sources of the mint data used in these tables, for England and the Low Countries, may be
found in: John Munro, Wool, Cloth and Gold:  The Struggle for Bullion in Anglo-Burgundian Trade,
ca. 1340-1478 (Brussels, 1973); John Munro, ‘Mint Outputs, Money, and Prices in Late-Medieval England
and the Low Countries,’ in Eddy Van Cauwenberghe and Franz Irsigler, eds.,  Münzprägung, Geldumlauf
und Wechselkurse/ Minting, Monetary Circulation and Exchange Rates,  Trierer Historische Forschungen,
7: Akten des 8th International Economic History Congress, Section C-7, Budapest 1982 (Trier, 1984),
pp. 31-122;  John Munro, ‘Mint Policies, Ratios, and Outputs in England and the Low Countries, 1335-1420:
Some Reflections on New Data,’ The Numismatic Chronicle, 141 (1981), 71-116; John Munro, ‘Monnayage,
monnaies de compte, et mutations monétaires au Brabant à la fin du moyen âge,’ in John Day, ed.,  Études
d'histoire monétaire, XIIe - XIXe siècles, Études de l'Université de Paris VII et du Centre National des Lettres
(Lille, 1984), pp. 263-94; Munro, ‘Bullion Flows and Monetary Contraction (n. 79)’, pp. 97-158; Munro,
Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in England (n. 80); Christopher Challis, ‘Lord Hastings to the Great
deflation that lasted until well into the fifteenth century (Tables 2, 4, 8, 9).
104  The extent of deflation became
much more moderate by the early fifteenth century.  Then with the resumption of intensive warfare, from
the Battle of Agincourt in 1415 to the dénouement of the Hundred Years’ War in the 1440s, another era of
inflation ensued in much of north-western Europe, especially in France and the Low Countries, which
consequently experienced severe coinage debasements.   With the end of the Hundred Years War, and indeed
even earlier, from the early 1440s, that war-induced inflationary era was succeeded by yet another era of
deflation, this time as prolonged, and by the 1460s, as pronounced as that of the late fourteenth century.
Though temporarily disrupted by warfare, by other ‘supply shocks’, and again by severe coinage
debasements, especially in the Low Countries during the 1480s, this deflationary trend lasted until about
1515.  Its subsequent reversal marked the beginning of the Price Revolution era.  Again, as in all the previous
inflationary and deflationary cycles, the three major price-indices rose in both England and the Low
Countries fell more or less together in tandem during all these fifteenth-century cycles (Tables 2, 4, 8, 9).
As these tables show clearly, these periods of very pronounced deflation, in the later fourteenth and
mid fifteenth century in particular,  were accompanied by severe slumps in the gold and silver coinage
outputs in  both England and the Low Countries, almost as severe as those for early fourteenth-century
England, while the brief intervening periods of inflation were similarly accompanied by upsurges in mint
outputs.
105  If these brief, periodic bouts of late-medieval inflation can be attributed to a combination of42
Silver Recoinage, 1464 - 1699,’ in Christopher Challis, ed.,  A New History of the Royal Mint, (Cambridge,
1992), pp. 83-178, 179-397; and ‘Appendix 1:  Mint Output, 1220-1985,’ pp. 673-698; G.C. Brooke and E.
Stokes, ‘Tables of Bullion Coined from 1337 to 1550,’ The Numismatic Chronicle, 5th ser., 9 (1929), 27-69.
See Figures 23-34 in http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/munro5/RWCharts3.pdf
106 Eliyahu Ashtor, Les métaux précieux et la balance des payements du Proche-Orient à la basse
époque (Paris, 1971); Eliyahu Ashtor, A Social and Economic History of the Near East in the Middle Ages
(London, 1976), pp. 319-31. See also John Day, ‘The Great Bullion Famine of the Fifteenth Century’, Past
and Present, no. 79 (May 1978), 1-54; reprinted in John Day, The Medieval Market Economy (Oxford,
1987), pp. 1-54;  Munro, ‘Bullion Flows and Monetary Contraction (n. 80)’,  pp. 97-158;  and the next note.
expansionary war-induced fiscal and monetary policies, and especially,  in the Low Countries, by severe
coinage debasements, the longer periods of deflation are much more difficult to explain.   Complicating any
such analysis is the now large, contradictory, and often confusing literature on the so-called ‘Bullion
Famines’ of this era, from the 1370s to the 1470s.   
The most favoured theories advanced by proponents of the ‘bullion famine’ thesis are the following:
(1)  a severe worsening of the late-medieval mining slump, so that even the opening of some new mines in
Serbia and Sardinia failed to compensate for the sharp decline in outputs elsewhere, and indeed a veritable
cessation of silver mining in some regions; (2) a steadily worsening of balance-of-payments deficit with
Asia, with consequent bullion outflows via the Levant and the eastern Baltic; and also (3) a severe
diminution, though not a complete cessation, in European gold imports from the Italian trade with North
Africa. 
Nevertheless, if Ashtor has provided some impressive evidence for Venice’s large silver exports to
the Levant in the later fifteenth century, there is no concrete evidence to show that an overall European
balance-of-payments deficit had been worsening from a full century earlier.
106  Indeed, a major factor that
helped to end the so-called ‘bullion famine’ era was the Central European silver-copper mining-boom, which
began during the very nadir of deflation in the 1460s, when the consequently high value of silver induced
a veritable revolution in mining technology (in chemical and civil engineering).  That boom augmented
European silver production by over five-fold by the 1530s; and without such large increases in its silver
stocks, Venice would never have been able to conduct such an increased volume and value of trade with the43
107  The technological revolutions involved:  (1) chemical engineering:  the Seigerprozess in smelting
argentiferous-cupric ores with lead to separate the two metals; and (2) mechanical engineering: adits and
mechanical pumps to permit much deeper, well drained mining shafts.  See Munro, ‘The Central European
Mining Boom (n. 20), pp. 119 - 83; John Munro, ‘The Monetary Origins of the ‘Price Revolution’ Before
the Influx of Spanish-American Treasure: The South German Silver-Copper Trades, Merchant-Banking, and
Venetian Commerce, 1470-1540’, in Dennis Flynn, ed.,  Monetary History in Global Perspective, 1500 -
1808, Variorum Series: An Expanding World: The European Impact on World History, 1450 - 1800 (London:
Ashgate Publishing), forthcoming; John Nef,  ‘Silver Production in Central Europe, 1450-1618', Journal of
Political Economy, 49 (1941), 575-91;  Nef, ‘Mining and Metallurgy in Medieval Civilisation (n. 78),’ pp.
691-761; Braunstein, ‘Innovations in Mining and Metal Production in Europe (n. 79)’, pp. 573-91; Ekkehard
Westermann, ‘Die Bedeutung des Thüringer Saigerhandels für den mitteleuropäischen Handel an der Wende
vom 15.  zum 16.  Jahrhundert,’ Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands, 21 (1972), 68-92.
See n. 78.
Levant in the 1490s.
107   Furthermore, the fact that even before that mining boom had commenced, mints in
England, France, and the Low Countries had all succeeded in reviving, if not in fully recovering former
levels of coinage outputs, in the 1420s and early 1430s, suggests that there was no downward linear trend
that would indicate a general drainage of European bullion to the ‘East’. Thus additional, if not alternative,
explanations for periodic bullion scarcities should be sought for this era.
Such an explanation may be found in examining the behaviour of bullion flows rather than  of
monetary stocks: specifically,  in two sets of adverse changes in the income velocity of money, or in the
demand for idle cash balances, that may be related to the pernicious effects of warfare and plagues, from the
1370s.  First, the now chronic and even more devastating warfare throughout so much of Europe, combined
with drastic depopulations, produced severe dislocations to established patterns of international trade, while
sharply raising transaction costs in that commerce, thus even more reducing flows of both commodities and
bullion. Worse, responses to the ancillary manifestations of that warfare, in terms of commercial blockades,
confiscations, and especially coinage debasements, radically reduced bullion  flows even more.  In particular,
most west European rulers, in defending themselves against aggressive debasements by their neighbours,
necessarily banned the domestic circulation of most foreign coins, especially silver coins (all the more
subject to surreptitious debasements); and such bans also demanded that all or most foreign coin be
surrendered as bullion to their own mints.  More important, in seeking to attract more bullion to their own
mints, to increase coinage outputs and their seigniorage revenues, virtually all rulers banned its export. Even44
108  Cf. Spufford, Money and Its Use (n.79),  p. 347: many contemporary European observers believed
that ‘thesaurisation [hoarding, the accumulation of plate] was the main cause of the bullion famines’ during
the later 14th and early 15th centuries; and also, pp. 346-47, who goes on to say: ‘In retrospect it appears that
it was itself in part a response to the famine. Nevertheless it made that shortage worse, although the export
of precious metals from Europe now seems more important, combined with the failures of the mines to make
good the losses. But whether or not contemporaries were right in the analysis of its causes, the fact of a
bullion famine, not only of silver, but also of gold, was clear for all to see at the end of the fourteenth
century. In the middle of the fifteenth century, it was yet worse’. 
109  See  J.D.A. Thompson, Inventory of British Coin Hoards, A.D. 600 - 1500, Royal Numismatic
Society Publications (Oxford, 1956), pp. xxxvi -xlix and p. 163. He states that ‘the reigns of the three
Edwards [1272-1377] are, with the exception of the Civil Wars of Charles I, the most prolific in coin-finds
since the Romano-British era. This is due primarily to a period of continual unrest and bad economic
conditions which encouraged an abnormal amount of hoarding.’  But elsewhere (p. xvi) he more cogently
argued that ‘the accepted view that the majority of coin-hoards were deposited either for safety in war-time
or from fear in economic crises is not a safe assumption’. Many of the 14
th-century hoards are related to the
continuing Scottish wars.  Of the 394 coin hoards in the British Isles from c.600 to 1500, 85 can be dated to
the reigns of Edward II, Edward III, and Richard II (1307-1399), with 14 in the period 1377-99.  Dr. Allen
Martin has produced an updated list of 14
th-century English hoards: 36 for 1330-51 (and another 40 in
Scotland); 16 for 1351-1412; and only 12 for 1412-1464 (‘The Durham Mint: The Control, Organization,
Profits, and Output of an Ecclesiastical Mint’, PhD dissertation, University of Durham, 1999). If the absolute
number of extant hoards declines in the very late 14
th and early 15
th  century, the sharp declines in population
and coinage outputs were far greater (thus reducing the likely incidence of hoards).  Such coin hoard
evidence would therefore provide better evidence for the deflation of c. 1327-43, weaker evidence for the
deflation of 1377-1410, and virtually none for the deflation era of c.1440-1470.  Yet the survival of specific
hoards may be accidental; and money hoarded in one period was undoubtedly dishoarded and spend in some
ensuing period (thus eliminating the evidence of the hoard). For the Low Countries, see Peter Spufford,
when enforcement of those bans failed to prevent international exchanges of precious metals, they still
depressed monetary and trade flows by raising transaction costs.
Finally, the noxious combination of such warfare, famines, plagues, the imposition of higher taxes
and such monetary policies, defensive or aggressive,  and the consequent commercial disruptions led to
periodic but often severe economic depressions, certainly commencing by the late 1370s and 1380s.  Such
conditions also bred a more general climate of insecurity and pessimism that further discouraged spending
and investment, increased hoarding, and further aggravated those depressions.  Thus, by the 1370s, that post-
Plague social climate of hedonistic spending-sprees had given way to much more pervasively gloomy and
pessimistic outlooks amongst the populace in general, one that increased their demand for idle cash-balances,
i.e. elevated their tendency to hoard.
108 While fourteenth-century England has provided an unusual number
of extant coin hoards, their survival may be accidental and their evidence is inconclusive.
109  Better evidence45
Monetary Problems and Policies in the Burgundian Netherlands, 1433-1496 (Leiden, 1970), pp. 55-73; and
Appendix D: Coin Hoards, 1425-40, pp. 203-13.
110 See Miskimin, Economy of Early Renaissance Europe (n. 103), pp. 92-104; 134-44; Johan
Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages (London, 1926), pp. 140-52; Françoise Piponnier, Costume et vie
sociale: la cour d’Anjou, XIVe-XVe siècle (Paris, 1970), chap. 7-10; Agnes Geijer, A History of Textile Art
(London, 1979), pp. 141-55; Susan M. Stuard, ‘Gravitas and Consumption’, in Jacqueline Murray, ed.,
Conflicted Identities and Multiple Masculinities: Men in the Medieval West, Garland Medieval Casebooks
vol. 25 (New York, 1999), pp. 215-42; Lopez, ‘Hard Times (n. 103)’, pp. 19-32.  In or about 1500, a
Venetian visitor wrote a memoir about England, in which he stated, with some considerable wonder, that
‘there is no small innkeeper, however poor and humble he may be, who does not serve with silver dishes and
drinking cups; and no one, who has not in his house silver plate to the amount of at least £100 sterling, . ..
is considered by the English to be a person of any consequence’. Charlotte A. Sneyd, ed., A Relation or
Rather  a True Account of the Island of England with Sundry Particulars of the Customs of These People,
and of the Royal Revenues Under King Henry the Seventh, about the Year 1500, Camden Society
Publications, Old Series, vol. 37 (London, 1847), pp. 28-29.
111 See Mayhew, ‘Population, Money Supply, and Velocity (n. 84)’, pp. 238-57; and  the mint-data
sources cited above in n. 105.  From 1361-65 to 1416-20, gold accounted for 85% to 98%, and usually in the
95%-98% range, of the total value of the Tower Mint’s coinage outputs.  Thereafter the proportion fell
because the Low Countries’s mints adopted a bimetallic ratio even more favourable to gold, until the 1470s,
of late-medieval hoarding, especially following the Black Death, can be found in the greatly increased use
of gold and silver ornamentation in the form of plate, jewellery, brocaded textiles, belt buckles, wall
hangings, and furniture.  Such luxurious and often very ostentatious artistic display provided not only
aesthetic satisfaction but, for many a more important consideation, a feasible means of storing precious
metals that could readily be restored to coinage, when so needed.
110
Hoarding is obviously a self-justifying deflationary phenomenon; for, as prices fell from all
combined circumstances of monetary contraction, the rational response of the money-holding populace
would have been to save rather than to spend in the present, in anticipation of even lower prices in the future.
Furthermore, the general forces of more gentle, less disruptive population decline, with smaller communities
and smaller families, may also have acted to curb the income-velocity of money, i.e. to increase the relative
demand for real cash balances.
Finally, for England itself one may cite a particularly significant monetary change: the fact that the
overwhelming bulk of the coinage, sometimes as much as 95 percent by value, was struck in gold rather than
silver – and gold coinages are necessarily undertaken at the expense of silver.
111  For if the smallest46
when the Burgundian government  reverted to a more pro-silver ratio, one that attracted more and more South
German silver to Antwerp. In the English mints, after 1470, gold resumed a more predominant role in the
coinage, accounting for 71% to 88% of total mint outputs by value.
circulating gold coin, the quarter-noble, worth 20d or 20 current silver pence could purchase 20 gallons of
ale or loaves of bread, one can readily imagine that its velocity in circulation would be very low, compared
to that of a silver pence or halfpence.
The question of late-medieval credit and the effective money supply
Nevertheless, according to many historians, a supposed growth in the use of credit during the later
Middle Ages should have fully offset or counteracted those deflationary forces: particularly through the
agency of deposit-and-transfer banking and bills-of-exchange banking. Yet neither was an innovation in this
era, and both saw their most rapid initial diffusion in the last half-century of the receding Commercial
Revolution era (c.1180-c.1320).  The reasons why credit instruments largely failed to provide a sufficient
remedy for period monetary contractions in late-medieval Europe are very complex, but may be briefly
summarized here. 
First, late-medieval Europe experienced very few additional innovations; and most credit instruments
were still far from being effective substitutes for coined money, with the possible though still dubious
exceptions to be found in a few West-European towns whose commerce was dominated by Italian merchant-
bankers. Second, much more widespread and more powerful forces, economic and political, involving
increased hostility from both Church and state, seriously impeded the employment or circulation of credit,
with a multitude of examples to be cited in England, France, the Low Countries, and many Hanse towns, if
not so much in Italy itself.  Indeed, in both England and the Low Countries, late-medieval nationalist
monetary policies effectively prevented the emergence of deposit-banking in the former, and virtually closed
down such banks in the latter, following the Burgundian unification of the Low Countries, in a series of ever
more severe ordinances (1433-34, 1467, 1480, and 1489). Furthermore, various Burgundian ordinances, both47
112  See John Munro, ‘Patterns of Trade, Money, and Credit,’ in James Tracy, Thomas Brady Jr., and
Heiko Oberman, eds., Handbook of European History in the Later Middle Ages, Renaissance and
Reformation, 1400 - 1600, Vol. I: Structures and Assertions (Leiden, 1994), pp. 147-95; John Munro,
‘Bullionism and the Bill of Exchange in England, 1272-1663:  A Study in Monetary Management and
Popular Prejudice’, in Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies UCLA, ed., The Dawn of Modern
Banking (New Haven and London, 1979), pp. 194-96, 204-208; reprinted in Munro, Bullion Flows (n. 80);
John Munro, ‘English “Backwardness” and Financial Innovations in Commerce with the Low Countries, 14th
to 16th centuries,’ in Peter Stabel, Bruno Blondé, and Anke Greve, eds., International Trade in the Low
Countries (14
th - 16
th Centuries): Merchants, Organisation, Infrastructure, Studies in Urban, Social,
Economic, and Political History of the Medieval and Early Modern Low Countries, no. 10 (Leuven-
Apeldoorn, 2000), pp. 105-67; Raymond De Roover, Money, Banking and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges:
Italian Merchant-Bankers, Lombards, and Money Changers: A Study in the Origins of Banking (Cambridge,
Mass., 1948), pp. 130, 236-46, 331-57, esp. pp. 339-42; Herman Van der Wee, ‘Monetary, Credit, and
Banking Systems’, in E.E. Rich and C.H. Wilson, eds., Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. V: The
Economic Organization of Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 302, 312, 323-24 (noting similar
problems in 15
th-century Italy), 361-62; Van der Wee, Antwerp Market (n. 6), vol. II, pp. 85-86, 333-40, 355-
58;  and sources in n. 114.
113 See sources in nn. 110, 112; and essays in Munro, Textiles, Towns, and Trade (n. 24).
114 Pamela Nightingale, ‘Monetary Contraction and Mercantile Credit in Later Medieval England,’
Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 43 (November 1990), 560 - 75; Frank Spooner, The International
Economy and Monetary Movements in France, 1493-1725 (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), pp. 3, 53-71 (noting
ducal and municipal, also sought to restrict pawnbroking (1442, 1451, 1457, 1473, 1477).
112   
Third, because of those increasingly hostile attitudes from state-dominated legal institutions, despite
the growth of a more independent and international Law-Merchant, the enforcement of debt repayments,
especially those involving (non-notarized) holograph documents, became even more costly and ineffective,
thus restricting credit instruments to a small circle of merchants, chiefly Italian, who knew and trusted each
other.  Fourth, most European states and principalities, even in Italy, had failed to provide the legal
institutions and sanctions for true negotiability -- i.e. the conversion of a debt instrument into cash or goods,
or to be used in place of cash: the fundamentally necessary condition to permit credit instruments effectively
to augment the money supply.
113  Fifth, consequently and in sum, credit instruments were far from being
divorced from the use of coined money; and, in general, as Spufford, Nightingale, Mayhew, Spooner,
Mueller and so many others have effectively demonstrated, credit either expanded or contracted with the
coined money supply in the late-medieval and early-modern economies, usually in a non-proportional
fashion.
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on p. 54 that, in the 16
th century, the failure of the bullion fleets to reach Seville on schedule often led to
financial crises and severe credit contractions);  Spufford, Money and Its Use (n. 79), pp.  346-48; Reinhold
Mueller, ‘ “Chome l'ucciello di passegio”: la demande saisonnière des espèces et le marché des changes à
Venise au moyen âge’, in John Day, ed., Études d'histoire monétaire, XIIe-XIXe siècles (Université de Paris
VII, Lille, 1984), pp. 195-220;  Mayhew, ‘Money and Prices (n. 84)’, p.  121: ‘..credit – in the sense of cash
advances – followed the behaviour of the money supply.  Lending does not contract in times of a glut of coin
or expand in times of scarcity.  Thus credit reflected the supply of coin rather than compensated for it’.
115 Herlihy, Medieval and Renaissance Pistoia (n. 75), pp.  125-30.
116 Beveridge, ‘Wages in the Winchester Manors (n. 29)’, p. 31;  Beveridge, ‘Westminster Wages
in the Manorial Era (n. 29)’, pp. 18-35.
The late-medieval deflations, wage stickiness, and the course of real wages: England, 1376 - 1470
With the onset of this general and very widespread deflation (evident also in late fourteenth-century
Tuscany),
115 wage stickiness now assumed a significance never before revealed in European economic
history.  For in England, at least, unlike its experience in the second quarter of the fourteenth-century, most
money wages did not decline.  William Beveridge himself was the first to call attention to this phenomenon,
commenting that ‘from 1290 to 1379, money wages and the price of wheat move decade by decade always
in the same direction, rising and falling together; thereafter they part company completely.’ To explain this
striking dichotomy, he argued that the socio-economic consequences of the Black Death and subsequent
plagues were to transform money wages from their original institution ‘as a substitute either for customary
service or for allowances in kind’, both tied to living costs, into true payments determined by the actual
labour market.
116  The previously noted fall in the proportion of the wage typically paid in kind, from about
one-half before the Black Death to one third thereafter, lends some credence to Beveridge’s thesis.
 The iconoclastic and brilliant Anthony Bridbury, however, came to a strikingly different conclusion
in his now classic 1973 article on the Black Death: namely, that the initial mortality from that disaster ‘was
quite incapable of altering the social and economic relationships because so much of the population was
surplus by the fourteenth century’; that the  Plague was ‘more purgative than toxic’; and that cumulative
depopulation did not succeed in fundamentally altering the land:labour ratio to raise labour productivity and49
117 Anthony Bridbury, ‘The Black Death’, Economic History Review, 2
nd ser., 26 (1973), 582, 591-92.
118 Bridbury’s thesis rests upon the assumption that England was so overpopulated before the Black
Death that the entire agrarian economy suffered from massive ‘disguised unemployment’.  Not only is that
thesis untenable but it is contradicted by the arguments and evidence posed in his subsequent article: A. R.
Bridbury,  ‘Before the Black Death,’ Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 30 (1977), 393-410.
thus real wages until the later 1370s.
117    Though his arguments should not be dismissed out of hand, they
are not really supported by the wage and price evidence, nor by economic theory and logic.
118 
 In fact, what one now witnesses, from the late 1370s, is the nominal and real-wage pattern that will
prevail, certainly in Western Europe, for the next six centuries.  Many of the arguments that follow could
just as well pertain to the so-called ‘Great Depression’ era of severe deflation and rapidly rising real wages
from 1873 to 1896.
Thus in England, with a few exceptions to be noted later, real wages began their pronounced, steady,
inexorable rise into the early and mid-fifteenth century essentially because of downward wage stickiness and
prolonged general deflation, even if with some temporary and minor dips in the early 1380s, late 1390s, and
later 1430s.  Indeed, for the early fifteenth-century there really is no clearly discernible real wage trend to
be observed, not from after the 1420s; and the aforementioned peak in the mid-1470s is really an anomaly.
Yet it would be wrong to rule real factors entirely out of court; and one may justifiably postulate that
the Classical theory does retain some merit.  Possibly the high real wages recorded in England during the
mid-fifteenth century, during these prolonged conditions of both deflation and  wage stickiness, were
‘justified’, in ‘clearing labour markets’, so to speak, if there had been some accompanying rise in the
marginal revenue product of the artisans enjoying such high wages.  How in particular are we to explain the
undoubtedly widespread rise in nominal wages during the second and third decades of the fifteenth century,
despite generally prevailing low prices, thus further increasing the real wages, without some productivity
increases? 
Deflation, wage stickiness & the course of real wages: the case of the Flemish fullers, 1370 - 1430
The same situation may also be found to a lesser extent in the southern Low Countries (Flanders and50
119 Munro, Wool, Cloth, and Gold (n. 104),  pp.  43-74; appendices, pp.  187-214; the one exception
was the not very successful new coinage of 1409. See also the studies in Munro, Bullion Flows and Monetary
Policies (n. 79).
120 By the monetary formula for a renforcement, which involves reciprocal changes: [1/(1 + x)] - 1,
where x = the percentage change in the silver content of the groot (gros). Thus [1/(1.316) - 1] = 0.760 - 1 = -
0.240 or 24.0 percent, and quite mathematically exact.  See John Munro, ‘Deflation and the Petty Coinage
Problem in the Late-Medieval Economy: The Case of Flanders, 1334 - 1484,’ Explorations in Economic
History, 25 (October 1988), 387-423; reprinted in Munro, Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies (n. 79). See
n. 122 below.
Brabant) during the early to mid-fifteenth-century, though with some added and very interesting
complications.   In Flanders, as Tables 4, 8, and 9 clearly indicate, the steep decline in coinage outputs and
fall in the price-level had commenced about a decade after such phenomena had become apparent in
England, from the very late 1380s.   Despite a recoinage, with full-scale monetary reform in the early 1390s,
coin outputs fell throughout that decade, ending in 1402 with a complete closure of the mints, which
remained  virtually dormant until 1416.  At the same time, Flanders’s composite price level (1451-75=100)
fell from a peak of 133.8 in 1387 to just to just 83.5 in 1405, a fall of 37.6 percent. Aggravating though by
no means solely responsible for this very steep deflation was Duke Philip the Bold’s dramatic monetary
reform of 1389-90, a renforcement that strengthened the silver coinage by 31.6 percent, while also altering
the mint ratio sharply in favour of that metal (from 10.41:1 to 9.68:1, and thus reducing the value of the
Flemish gold noble from 102d to 72d groot).
119 To accommodate these changes, and in particular to
compensate those merchants, textile industrialists, and financiers who had depended upon payments in gold,
now reduced in relative value, the ducal government and many of the town governments stipulated a
proportional reduction in wages and some other money-of-account payments: a  wage reduction inversely
proportional to the silver renforcement of 31.6 percent would have been exactly 24.0 percent.
120   At Bruges,
the daily money-wages of master masons, carpenters, and other building craftsmen, which had risen during
the inflationary 1380s, though not by as much as the extent of general inflation, were abruptly and arbitrarily
cut by 25 percent:   from 12d to 9d groot, in early 1390, as were those of their journeymen, from 6d to 4d51
121 Stadsarchief Brugge, Stadsrekeningen 1388/89 to 1399/1400: wage payments for building
craftsmen in the ‘werken’ accounts.
122  In Louis Gilliodts-van Severen, ed., Inventaire des archives de la ville de Bruges, 6 vols. (Bruges,
1871-78), vol. III, no. 706, pp. 134-5, 140-2 (January 1390).  See also Hans Van Werveke, ‘De economische
en sociale gevolgen van de muntpolitiek der graven van Vlaanderen (1337-1433)’, Annales de la Société
d'Emulation de Bruges, 74 (1931), 1-15;   Hans Van Werveke, ‘De Vlaamse munthervorming van 1389-90’,
Nederlandsche historiebladen, 1:3 (1938), pp. 336-47; both reprinted in Hans Van Werveke, Miscellanea
Mediaevalia: Verspreide opstellen over economische en sociale geschiedenis van de middeleeuwen (Ghent,
1968), pp. 243-54, 268-80; De Roover, Money, Banking and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges (n. 110),  pp. 227-
29; Van der Wee, Antwerp Market (n. 6),  Vol. II, pp. 14-18, 29-30.
123 In 1383, during the Artevelde revolt (1379-85) and just before the initial, abortive renforcement
of 1384, the daily wages of Bruges master craftsmen in the building trades had been reduced even more
sharply, from 12d to 8d groot, but were raised to 9.33d in 1386 and then fully restored to 12d in 1387.  In
1386, just after the suppression of the Artevelde revolt, the daily wages of Bruges policemen had been raised
from 6d to 7.67d (7d 16 mites) groot, but were set back to 6d in 1387. Note again that the policemen's daily
wages were paid for a 365-day year.  Data extracted from the Bruges municipal accounts: Stadsarchief
Brugge, Stadsrekeningen 1382/83 to 1397/98. Unfortunately the Ghent wage accounts are far too sparse to
permit similar comparisons, and Ypres' stadsrekeningen now survive only from 1406 in the second copy
deposited at the Lille Chambre des Comptes (now in the AGR).  For Bruges policemen, see below.
124 For some evidence on nominal-wage reductions during this same deflationary era (c.1380-c.1430),
and on the difficulties in interpreting the published evidence, see nn. 139-140 below.
12 mites (4.5d).
121  According to some contemporary reports, such wage reductions did produce riots and
considerable social unrest in Bruges and other Flemish cities.
122
In retrospect, civil disturbances in Flanders were rather less pronounced than might have been
expected.  But presumably only the guild artisans, a minority, were in position to voice strong objections;
and evidently many, if not all of them, grudgingly accepted the argument that their new wages, while
nominally lower, were being paid in strong rather than weak money.
123 Quite evidently wage reductions were
imposed much more easily under conditions of a publicly promulgated coinage renforcement, when the
public could readily perceive the physical differences between the new and old coinages, than under
deflationary conditions without any such coinage changes.
124  
Nevertheless the various attempts by Flemish weaver-drapers to impose similar wage cuts during
the early 1390s did produce some labour strife in the Flemish cloth industry.  Only the fullers, however, have
left us any concrete records of concerted opposition, and only in three drapery towns: Kortrijk, Wervik, and52
125  See in particular, Victor Fris, ‘Les origines de la réforme constitutionelle de Gand de 1360-1369’,
Annales du XXe congrès de la fédération archéologique et historique de la Belgique, 3 (1907), 421 - 59;
David Nicholas, The Metamorphosis of a Medieval City:  Ghent in the Age of the Arteveldes, 1302 - 1390
(Lincoln and London, 1987); David Nicholas, The Van Arteveldes of Ghent: The Varieties of Vendetta and
the Hero in History (Ithaca, 1988); David Nicholas, Medieval Flanders (London, 1992), pp. 273-323 ; and
Marc Boone and Hanno Brand, ‘Vollersproeren en collectieve actie in Gent en Leiden in de 14e en 15e
eeuw,’ Tijdschrift voor sociale geschiedenis, 19:2 (May 1993), 168-92; Marc Boone, Hanno Brand, and
Walter Prevenier, ‘Revendications salariales et conjoncture économique: les salaires de foulons à Gand et
à Leyde au XVe siècle,’ in Erik Aerts, Brigitte Henau, Paul Janssens, and Raymond Van Uytven, eds., Studia
Historica Oeconomica: Liber Amicorum Herman Van der Wee (Leuven, 1993), pp. 59-74; John Munro,
‘Industrial Entrepreneurship in the Late-Medieval Low Countries (n. 36) ’, pp. 377-88.
126 Rates deduced from texts in Espinas and Pirenne, Recueil de documents (n. 49), vol. II, no. 492,
pp. 535-37; Algemeen Rijksarchief, Trésor de Flandre, Series I, no. 2208; and especially Rijksarchief van
Oost Vlaanderen te Gent, Oostenrijks Fonds, layette 2 (for 2 May 1423): ‘desquelz [desdiz foulons] ils
n'avoient et ne leur en vouloit en baillier que trente deux gros ... et est salaire trop petit...’  See also Van
Werveke, ‘De economische en sociale gevolgen (n. 122)’, pp. 4-14; Nicholas Metamorphosis of a Medieval
City (n. 125) p. 130; and the following note.  Fullers’s wage data for other Flemish and Dutch drapery towns
indicates that, on average, each journeyman received 35% of the wage, leaving 30%  for the master (who,
of course, received revenues from several similarly manned fulling vats).
127 Even though the weaver-drapers had crushed the 1373 strike, Count Louis de Male (no friend of
the weavers) had then intervened and increased their wage to 45d gros. Text of 4 September 1373 in
Rijksarchief Van Oost-Vlaanderen, Oostenrijks Fonds, layette 1; provisions also repeated in Ibid, layette 2
(2 May 1423). See also Espinas-Pirenne, Recueil de documents (n. 49), vol.  II, no. 485, pp. 526-27
(ordinances banning strikes); no. 491, pp. 533-35 (letters of the deken of weavers guild submitting dispute
with fullers to arbitration); no. 492, pp. 535-37: Ghent fullers seek the count's pardon (who awards a wage
of 45d per maerclaken). We do not know the earlier wage. In January 1386, after their real wage had
deteriorated by 27 percent (as measured by this Flemish price index), the fullers' peaceful request for another
increase now encountered a very hostile reaction from Count Louis' successor, Duke Philip.  Fully supporting
the drapers, he curtly told the fullers ‘to be content’ with their current wage, and furthermore decreed that
henceforth any foreign fullers would be free to establish fulleries within Ghent. Duke Philip also rebuffed
the fullers' demands for a change in their guild constitution. Algemeen Rijksarchief, Trésor de Flandre, Series
I, no. 2208; also published in J. Bartier and A. Van Nieuwenhuysen, eds., Les ordonnances de Philippe le
Hardi, de Marguerite de Mäle, et de Jean Sans Peur, 1381-1419, Vol. I: Les ordonnances de Philippe le
Ghent. That opposition of course depended upon the relative strength of their ambachten or guilds. The
weakest were evidently the Ghent fullers, who, in 1361, had lost both their representation in the town
government and the right to select their own leaders.
125  Evidently they accepted, without much struggle, a
quite brutal 29 percent reduction in their combined money-wage, with the 1390 monetary reform:  from 45d
to 32d groot, for a master and two journeymen, in fulling a maerclaken broadcloth in three days.
126  What
makes their situation even more pitiful is that, unlike the building craftsmen in Bruges, they had not had an
increase in money-wages since 1373;
127 and since the inflationary conditions of the 1380s still prevailed in53
Hardi et de Marguerite de Male, du 16 octobre 1381 au 31 décembre 1393, Recueil des Ordonnances des
Pays Bas, première série: 1381 - 1506 (Brussels: Palais des Académies, 1965), I, no. 88, pp. 123-4.  See also
Marc Boone, Gent en de Bourgondische hertogen ca. 1384 - ca. 1453: een sociaal-politieke studie van een
staatsvormingsproces, Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en
Schone Kunsten van België, Klasse der Letteren, Jaargang 52, no. 133 (Brussels, 1990), pp. 133-34.
128 See Table 2. In 1390, a wage of 35d groot Flemish per cloth would purchase 0.192 basket (priced
at 166.55d groot), compared to 0.328 basket in 1373. Not until 1423, after renewed inflation and another
strike, would the Ghent fullers obtain any further raise in their money wages.
129 See Federigo Melis, ‘La diffusione nel Mediterranea occidentale dei panni di Wervicq e delle altre
citta della Lys attorna al 1400’, in Studi in onore di Amintore Fanfani, III: Medioevo (Milan, 1962), pp. 219-
43; John Munro, ‘The Symbiosis of Towns and Textiles:  Urban Institutions and the Changing Fortunes of
Cloth Manufacturing in the Low Countries and England,  1270 -1570,’ The Journal of Early Modern History:
Contacts, Comparisons, Contrasts, 3:1 (February 1999), 1-74.
130  Henri De Sagher, et al, eds., Recueil de documents relatifs à l'histoire de l'industrie drapière en
Flandre, IIe partie: Le sud-ouest de la Flandre depuis l'époque bourguignonne, 3 vols. (Brussels, 1951-66),
III, no. 553, pp. 445-6, 451-2; and no. 554:136, p. 468. The two journeymen were to receive 14d groot each
and the master 7d, for a total of 35d per cloth in three days. The journeymen were also to receive another
1.25d groot (16d parisis) for scrubbing the cloths (‘van erdene’). The Wervik dickedinnen broadcloth was
to be 38 ells by 9.5 quarter ells on the loom, about the same size as the Ghent dickedinnen.
1390, their wage-reduction to 32d groot meant a decline of 41.5 percent in their real wages since 1373.
128
Somewhat more successful were the fullers in the small drapery town of Wervik, now a major leader
of the younger, more aggressive, so-called nouvelles draperies, which were faring  rather better than the
traditional draperies of the drie steden (Ghent, Ypres, Bruges), especially in Mediterranean markets.
129  Soon
after the 1390 renforcement, the seigneur and bailiff of Wervik's feudal seigneury decreed an immediate
reduction of 27 percent in the fullers’ pay: from 48d to 35d groot per cloth, which still left them better off
than the Ghent fullers.  Nevertheless, in May 1392, but rather too late, the Wervik fullers’ guild, after threats
of going on strike, appealed this decree to the ducal Council of Flanders. The ducal council, however, ruled
‘in favour of the drapers’ of Wervik and its bailiff, forcing the Wervik fullers to accept this new wage rate,
which was subsequently ratified by the promulgation of the Wervik drapery keuren in October 1397.
130
Of the three recorded disputes, the Kortrijk fullers, employed by a nouvelle draperie that rivalled
Wervik’s in importance, fared by far the best, perhaps because they had responded much earlier and much
more vigorously in their protests. Like the Ghent fullers, they had also not received any increase in money54
131 Again thanks to intervention from Count Louis de Male. Algemeen Rijksarchief, Trésor de
Flandre, Series I, no. 1103; partly published in Espinas-Pirenne, Recueil de documents (n. 49), vol.  I, no.
206, pp. 668-9; and in Bartier-Van Nieuwenhuysen, Ordonnances de Philippe le Hardi (n. 127), vol. I, no.
253, pp. 385-6.  The only previous wage datum is for a wage increase to 15d 4 mites in 1348; in 1350, that
wage represented 31.35 g of silver and 0.230 unit of a basket of consumables (priced at 65.67d gros, in Table
2). The new wage of 1374, at 41d groot, represented 45.67 g silver and 0.301 basket (priced at 136.15d
groot).
132 Algemeen Rijksarchief, Trésor de Flandre, Series I, no. 1103; partly published in Espinas-Pirenne,
Recueil de documents (n. 49), vol.  I, no. 206, pp. 668-9; and in Bartier-Van Nieuwenhuysen, Ordonnances
de Philippe le Hardi (n. 127), vol. I, no. 253, pp. 385-6: ‘les diz drapiers disans que ce estoit trop grand
salaire et qu'ilz devoient estre contens de xxxii [32] gros, attendu que au temps de la dicte ordonnance [1373-
4, of Louis de Male] la monnoie estoit plus feble que elle n'est de present, car le franc d'or valoit pour lors
xxxvii [37] gros ou environ et aujourduy il ne vault que xxxiii [33], et selonc ce que la dicte monnoie estoit
plus forte le salaire des diz foulons devoit estre diminue...’ (In fact the silver coinage of 1374 was stronger
than that of 1390).  The Flemish gold noble had been revalued to 6s 0d or 72d gros, from 8s 6d (102d).
133 The Flemish price index used here (1451-75=100), fell from the peak of 124.9 in 1386-90,
reflecting the debasements of those years, to a trough of 87.5 in 1401-05.  The reduction in the silver traite,
because of the renforcement, as noted before, was from £5.337 to £4.050 gros per kg; and expressed in terms
of the physical change in coinage : (1.00 + 0.316)/1 - 1 = 0.7598 - 1 = -0.2401. See Tables B-1 and B-3 in
Munro, ‘Mint Outputs, Money, and Prices (n. 104)’, pp. 96, 100.
wages since 1374, despite all the intervening debasement-induced inflation.
131 When the Kortrijk weaver-
drapers attempted to impose a cut in their wages, though a more modest one of 22 percent, from 41d to 32d
groot per broadcloth (the same rate imposed at Ghent), the fullers guild appealed to Duke Philip's councillors
for arbitration.   In imposing the new wage of 36d groot, and thus a relatively minor 12 percent wage-
reduction, Duke Philip’s councillors split the difference between the weaver-drapers and the fullers.
132 
The real winners of this Kortrijk labour contract were surely the fullers, who, despite the 12 percent
reduction in money-wages, soon found themselves much better off because of the stark deflation that quickly
ensued, from the early 1390s.  Presumably, the Flemish renforcement, which necessarily reminted the
existing stock of debased silver coins into fewer stronger coins, was a factor of considerable importance in
aggravating the already existing forces for deflation; and the fall in the mean Flemish price index over the
1390s was somewhat greater than the direct monetary changes from renforcement: i.e. 30.3 percent vs. 24.0
percent.
133  The extent of the Flemish deflation and the consequent rise in real wages can be seen in the
accompanying Tables 5 and 6.  Thus, by 1396-1400 the mean purchasing power of wages for the Kortrijk55
134 See above, p. 000 and nn. 125-26.
fullers was 26 percent higher than it had been during the debasement years of 1385-88 (Table 5).  In 1400,
their real-wage was 45.5 percent above what they had been earning when the 1390 contract was imposed:
and in fact that was the highest real wage they had so far achieved (Table 6). 
In stark contrast was the plight of the hapless Ghent fullers. Having suffered a severe 29 percent cut
in money wages in 1390,
134 they did not manage to regain their real wages of 1386-90 until the very nadir
of the deflation, in the late 1390s; and, even so, their mean real wage for 1396-90 was still 9 percent below
their 1381-85 mean (see Table 5). They would, in fact, never regain that earlier level of real income during
the period covered in this study; and during the early fifteenth-century inflation, their wages suffered a
further deterioration in purchasing power.
Deflation, inflation, and real wages: other urban craftsmen in Flanders and Brabant, 1370 - 1470
In Flanders, the building craftsmen of Ghent and Bruges, and the policeman in the latter town,
however, fared considerably better during the very end of the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries; though
clearly the fifteenth century as a whole was from being a consistent Golden Age.  Only the Bruges data are
shown (Table 4), because the craftsmen’s wages in Ghent and Bruges were virtually identical throughout
the fifteenth century (or to the late 1470s, when the accounts cease recording daily wages for individual
craftsmen); and they of course demonstrate the same relative degree of wage stickiness. The tables plot
nominal and real wage indices (with the same base: 1451-75=100), and the latter as well in terms of the
specific number of ‘commodity baskets’ that a master mason or carpenter could purchase with his estimated
annual money-wage income (for 210 days). Initially, with the abrupt 25 percent cut in nominal wages with
the 1390 monetary reform, from 12d to 9d groot, they did suffer a very brief if substantial drop in real
income (from RWI 103.4 to 62.6), before the aforementioned deflation became more pronounced; and over
the next decade, following the monetary reform, the mean purchasing power of those wages rose by 75.3
percent (to 110.3 in 1399), maintaining almost as high a level in the following decade (110.1 in 1411: see
Table 4).  Towards the end of that period, however, in 1396-7, those craftsmen had also secured a small56
135 Stadsarchief Brugge, Stadsrekeningen 1384-85 to 1399/1400: from the construction werken
accounts.
136 See in particular: John Hatcher, ‘The Great Slump of the Mid-Fifteenth Century,’ in Richard
Britnell and John Hatcher, eds.,  Progress and Problems in Medieval England (Cambridge, 1996), pp.  237-
72; Pamela Nightingale, ‘England and the European Depression of the Mid-Fifteenth Century,’ The Journal
of European Economic History, 26:3 (Winter 1997), 631-56; Van der Wee, Antwerp Market (n. 6), vol. II,
61-73;  Munro, ‘The Symbiosis of Towns and Textiles (n. 129)’, pp. 1-74; John Munro, ‘Anglo-Flemish
Competition in the International Cloth Trade, 1340 - 1520,’ in Rencontres d'Oxford (septembre 1994):
L’Angleterre et les pays bas bourguignonnes: relations et comparaisons, XVe - XVIe siècle, ed. Jean- Marie
Cauchies,   Publication du centre européen d’études bourguigonnes, 35 (1995): 37-60; John Munro,
‘Economic Depression and the Arts in the Fifteenth-Century Low Countries,’ Renaissance and Reformation,
19 (1983), 235-50; reprinted in Munro, Textiles, Towns, and Trade (n. 24)’; see also Munro, Bullion Flows
increase or restoration in their nominal wages: the masters, from 9d to 10d groot; and journeymen, from 4½
d to 5d groot.
135   
The policemen of Bruges began somewhat better off than the craftsmen because their wages had not
been cut in 1390  -- after all, they were expected to maintain social order with the arbitrary pay cuts.  Finally,
in 1398, they too suffered a reduction in  their money wages,  though only 16.7 percent (from 6d to 5d); but
unlike the craftsmen their money-wages were never again restored (for the duration of the records, to 1476).
Thus, their real wages peak, shortly after, in 1399, but remain relatively high until the eve of the Battle of
Agincourt, in 1415.
Thereafter, with Burgundian involvement in the resumption of more serious warfare in northern
France, and with renewed debasements in and after 1416, the real  wages for craftsmen and policemen once
more began to fall, and then fall sharply.  By the terrible war-torn, plague-ridden, and famine-struck year
of 1439, they had plummeted 58.9 percent, to an index of just  45.3 ; and despite the fact that these craftsmen
had received an increase in their nominal wages, from 10d to 11d in 1432, their real wage at the end of that
decade was only 72.4 percent as high as in the previously annis horribilis, 1390 (Table 4).  So much,
therefore, for the late-medieval Golden Age for craftsmen and labourers.
According to many economic historians, the ensuing three decades were an era of very severe
commercial, financial, and agrarian depression for both England and southern the Low Countries.  Indeed
the latter also suffered from the final stages and fatal decline of their traditional luxury woollens industry.
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and Monetary Policies (n. 79).
137 Algemeen Rijksarchief België, Rekenkamer, Stadsrekeningen Aalst, registers nos. 31,412 -
31,520.
Yet in this same period, the real wages for Flemish urban craftsmen, who had maintained their nominal wage
increase (except briefly, in 1439), soared once again, by a remarkable 179.5 percent,  to reach a high of 125.6
in 1464 –  just before the next round of debasements.   Again they did so principally because this was a
period of  stark deflation, and, as noted, of very low mint outputs, sometimes with only a bare trickle of
coinage -- one of not the only factor that precipitated the renewal of debasements in 1466 (Tables 4, 9). 
The subsequent era of war-inspired and debasement-induced inflations again brought real wages
tumbling down, as Tables 4, 8, and 9 indicate; but unfortunately the Bruges and Ghent wage payment series
terminate in the mid-1470s. In the mid-sized town of Aalst, to the east of Ghent, however, the daily wage
rates for master masons and carpenters remains fixed at 6d groot per day until well into the early sixteenth
century, though some senior craftsmen were earning 7d to 8d daily; but after 1510-11, more and more such
craftsmen were earning these higher rates of 7d and 8d (up to the 1530s).
137  And as noted earlier, craftsmen’s
wage rates in the towns of neighbouring Brabant, further to the east, generally remained fixed for most of
this period: in Mechelen to 1490; and in Antwerp until 1513.
The price and wage history of Brabant, following the Burgundian monetary unification and reform
of 1434-35, was unsurprisingly similar to that of Flanders.  Not so before then, however, as the
accompanying Table 8 shows (employing the same base, 1451-75=100).  With far more drastic coinage
debasements in early fifteenth-century Brabant (under Dukes Antoine, Jan IV, and Philip van Sint-Pol, 1406-
1430), the real wages of Antwerp’s and Mechelen’s master masons and carpenters plunged steeply,
especially after 1410, and then over the next three decades, by over one half (from an index of 109.8 in 1410
to 51.3 in 1437, but most clearly evident in the number of commodity baskets). Thereafter, as in Flanders,
their real wages soared strongly, well more than doubling, to peak at 120.0 in 1463, virtually at the same time
as did the Flemish real-wage indices. As Table 8 shows, continuing the story from the 1470s to the initial58
138 See Van der Wee in nn. 6 and 10 above.
139  Verlinden-Scholliers, Dokumenten (n.6), vol. II.ii, pp. 1244-99.
140 Van der Wee,  Antwerp Market (n. 6),  vol. II, pp.  61-73; see also Herman Van der Wee,
‘Typologie des crises et changements de structures aux Pays-Bas, XVe-XVIe siècles,’ Annales:  E.S.C., 18
(1963), 209-25.
phases of the sixteenth-century Price Revolution, the Antwerp and Mechelen craftsmen’s real wages plunged
especially severely during the bout of the very drastic coinage debasements under Maximilian in the 1480s,
recovered during the strong-money regime of the 1490s, though by no means to their former peak; and then
drifted downwards over the first third of the sixteenth century. During the subsequent era of the full Price
Revolution, the real-wage experience of the Brabantine craftsmen differed very markedly from their English
brethren, for reasons which lie well beyond the scope of this study.
138  But, for that matter, so they did during
much of the fifteenth century, which for the Brabantine and Flemish craftsmen was only briefly a Golden
Age, in terms of real wages, and chiefly during a period of undisputed depression. 
Fifteenth-century anomalies:  wage flexibility and falling real wages in (chiefly) rural areas
Indeed, another unsurprisingly anomaly to be noted about this mid-fifteenth century not-so-golden
era are the nominal wage-rates for master carpenters and thatchers in some small Flemish villages to the east
of Ghent:  Afsne, St. Denijs, Zaffelare, Destelbergen, and Zavergem (Table 7).  Their daily summer wage
rates,  having risen to 10d groot Flemish in the 1420s (as at Bruges and Ghent), generally remaining at that
level for the next three decades, then fell, from the 1450s: for Afsne thatchers, by 30 percent, to 7d groot;
and for the others, by 20 percent, to 8d groot.  Despite the strong deflation of this era, their real-wages,
measured now in terms of Flemish commodity baskets, fell from a mean of 14.7 units in the 1440s to just
12.3 units in the 1460s.  In the neighbouring village of  Zavergem, the thatchers’s daily money-wage fell
from 10d groot in the early 1430s to 8d and finally to 6d in the late 1450s, an overall decline of 40 percent
in the nominal rate, before partially recovering, to 8d, in the 1460s.
139 Such evidence may support Herman
Van der Wee’s contention that, in this mid-fifteenth century ‘depression‘, the agricultural sector suffered the
most severely.
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141 Data for the Flemish villages and Mechelen’s Onse Lieve Vrouw Hospital extracted from
Verlinden-Scholliers, Dokumenten (n. 6), vol. II.ii, pp. 1244-99.
142 Data communicated to me by Prof. Mavis Mate in an unpublished paper, ‘Population Fluctuations
in South-East England, 1400-1530’, for which I am most grateful.
143 See above pp.  and nn. 8, 21, and 30.   For other examples given in these published sources,
especially in the Beveridge articles, for some Winchester (especially Hinderclay) and Westminster manors
in the 1390s:  a fall in the mean wage of threshers from 9.50d to 8.88d per three-rased quarters; and for
reapers, from 17.13d to 14.96d per acre, from 1380-9 to 1390-9.  From the tables presented in all these
published sources, 40 wage groups can be tabulated for the years 1380-1400; and for some time in this
period, the data suggest that 32 of the 40 experienced at least some nominal-wage reductions: 20 in the 1380s
and 22 in the 1390s, and thus 12 over both decades.  But over all the unweighted decennial means of the 40
But some evidence for nominal wage-cuts also come from urban sources.  Thus, the daily wages for
carpenters employed by Mechelen’s Onse Lieve Vrouw Hospital, unlike those employed by the city, were
reduced from 12d groot Brabant (8d groot Flemish) to 9d  in the late 1440s, though subsequently restored,
at least in part, to 8d  and then 10d  groot by the mid 1460s.  Suffering the worst were the manual labourers
employed by this Mechelen hospital: their nominal wages fell from the peak of 8d groot Brabant (5.333d
groot Flemish) in 1444 to a low of 5d in 1457, a decline of 38 percent.
141 
 Nor were such nominal wage cuts in the midst of the fifteenth-century Golden Age limited to the
Low Countries. For England during this era, Mavis Mate has provided some similar evidence for rural
workers in Kent and Sussex: with nominal wage-reductions up to 30 percent for mowers at Barton, Kent,
in the 1440s (enduring  to the 1470s); cuts of 20 percent for ploughman at Wye, in Sussex, in the 1440s; and
of 20 percent for carpenters at Lullington, Sussex, in the 1450s.
142  Furthermore, even earlier, in late
fourteenth-century England (1380-99),  the various decennial means of wages published in the already-cited
works of Beveridge, Thorold Rogers, and Steffan indicate that many rural workers then also evidently
suffered some reductions in their daily wages: as much as 29.4 percent for wheat threshers in S.E. England
and 26.9 percent for Westminster farm labourers.  But doubts about the statistical methods used to compile
these means, especially when direct comparisons are made with the actual manorial accounts, prevent one
from asserting that the nominal wages for each class and grade of worker fell, or fell as much as portrayed
in these decennial indices.
14360
money-wage series fell 3.6 percent overall.  For reasons indicated on p.   above, concerning the computation
of decennial mean wage rates, this possibly dubious working-table is not being published here.
144 Wilton-Prescott, Macroeconomics (n. 64), pp. 216-18; but this is referred to as a ‘short-run
disequilibrium in the labour market’. 
145  See the studies in Munro, Textiles, Towns, and Trade (n. 24); and also Munro, ‘Symbiosis of
Towns and Textiles (n. 127)’, and other sources cited in nn. 122, 134 above.
Some conclusions on later-medieval wage stickiness and real wages
Five obvious conclusions can now be drawn: (1) the fifteenth-century was not, and was far from
universally being, a Golden Age of the Labourer in even north-western Europe;  (2) nominal wage stickiness
was indeed very widespread, especially in the fifteenth century, but was also not universal; (3) urban
craftsmen were far more likely to enjoy conditions of downward wage stickiness than were the presumably
less well organized and less well protected rural and especially agricultural workers;  (4) those who did enjoy
the most pronounced rise in real wages from the late fourteenth-century were precisely those who did enjoy
conditions of downward wage stickiness but only during eras of deflation; (5) but such eras,  unfortunately,
at least for  many, often coincided with severe economic depressions.
The more fitting conclusion would be to return to the Keynesian view of such wage rigidity during
periods of inflation, at least according to some standard Macroeconomics textbooks, namely a situation that
‘results in a higher real wage and a reduction in the demand for labour’, so that ‘employment declines and
so does output’; and so very often, ‘a decline in demand leads to a prolonged recession’.
144    The available
evidence does not permit us to ascertain whether such conditions, especially in the depression era of the mid-
fifteenth century, led to increased unemployment – apart from evident unemployment in the declining
Flemish and Brabantine cloth industries.
145   Some evidence,  discussed above, does suggest that employment
for most craftsmen, was normally discontinuous or ‘discrete’ in this late-medieval era; and such conditions
may well have reduced the number of days in which they secured paid employment.  On the other hand, as
suggested either, such unemployment may have been more voluntary than involuntary, if they were satisfied61
146  See above pp.  and nn.  46-47 for the discussion of a possibly backward-bending supply curve
of labour during this late-medieval era..
147 See n.  134.
148  The elasticity of substitution sKL is the ratio of the proportional changes in the marginal products
of land+capital (yK) and labour (yL).  Conversely, if K increases relatively to L, and if the proportional
increase in K/L exceeds the proportional fall in the ratio of the marginal products of land-capital and of
labour – i.e. if SKL > 1, then the share of the national income accruing to these increased factors K will also
rise. For mathematical proof, see P.R.G. Layard and A.A. Walters, Microeconomic Theory (London-New
York, 1978), pp. 63-68, 270-76 (CES Production Function). See also Henry Phelps Brown and P.E. Hart,
‘The Share of Wages in National Income;’ Economic Journal, 62 (1952), reprinted in Phelps Brown and
Hopkins, Perspective of Wages and Prices, pp. 106-30: ‘when big changes occur in money wage rates, the
to accept more days of leisure.
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One should also note that, under such deflationary conditions, the typical employer faced and still
faces not only a potential rise in his real labour costs, but even more certainly a rise in the cost of borrowing
capital.  For the effect of such deflation is to increase real interest rates [nominal rate minus the inflation
rate, or plus the deflation rate], all the more so, since the historical evidence rarely if ever indicates a
commensurate fall in nominal interest rates.  Rash, however, would be the economic historian who would
contend that every deflationary period that also experienced downward wage stickiness for much of the
labour force was also one of recession or depression.  Two such periods in the modern era with these
characteristics were the so-called ‘Great Depressions’ of 1873-1896 and 1929-1939. But if economic
historians now doubt that such a label can justifiably be fixed to the first of these, despite some cyclical
downswings, certainly the latter was a Great Depression; and many would justify that term (despite evidence
of widespread unemployment) for the mid-fifteenth century era, as just noted.
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Interpreting real-wage trends is also fraught with other dangers.  Thus, even if the amount of labour
(L) was diminishing, relative to the employed stock of land and capital (whose sum is K), as evidently did
occur in late-medieval Europe, and even if labour then enjoyed a rise in real wages, the European labour
force may not have gained an increased share of the national income. That would have occurred only if the
elasticity of substitution between L and K, as the ratio of the marginal products of land+capital  and of labour
(yK/yL) had been less than unity
148:    if: yK/yL = SKL  < 1 62
accompanying changes in the share of wages [of national income] are relatively small’; and ‘a main cause
of the long-period change in the shae of wages has been simply the change in the relative number of wage
earners’.
149  Penn and Dyer, ‘Wages and Earnings (n. 34)’, p. 356, citing in particular Rodney Hilton, ‘Some
Social and Economic Evidence in Late-Medieval English Tax Returns’, in R.H. Hilton, ed., Class Conflict
and the Crisis of Feudalism (London, 1985), pp. 253-67.
Finally, a word of caution and a plea for some perspective. As important and as vexing as is the
question of real-wage trends in the late-medieval economy, we must remember that real-wages, and most
especially evidence on wage-rates, do not allow us to deduce levels of real income for even the lower orders
of society.  Penn and Dyer recently commented as well, to stress the importance of this issue, that ‘at least
one-third of the population of late medieval England gained all or a part of their livelihood from earning
wages’.
149 This statement might be more persuasive if the word order were changed to read: ‘gained part or
all’, or better ‘part if not all’ of their livelihood.  Surely, those who lived strictly by money-wages alone, and
who were unable to supplement their annual incomes from agricultural holdings, or from private gardens
with urban dwellings, and especially by practising more than one craft, were a very small minority of late-
medieval English society, if undoubtedly a rather larger proportion of Flemish society.Table 1: Official Money Wages for Building Craftsmen for the Kingdom of England and the
City of London: by Parliamentary Statute or Ordinance, for the Summer and Winter
Seasons, in pence sterling,  1290 - 1495
Summer Season: Easter to Michaelmas (29 September), ‘without meat and drink’
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a. 1290: 2d daily in the summer with food in drink; 1d daily in the winter with food and drink
b. 1290: 4d daily or 1.5d with food and drink, from Michaelmas (29 September) to Martinmas (12
November), and from Candlemas (Purificatio: 2 February) to Easter
c. 1350-51: 25 Ed III stat. 2 c. 3: rates of 4d for master free-masons; 3d for other master masons and
carpenters; for all, from Michaelmas ‘less according to the rate and discretion of the justices’.
d. For the chief master masons and carpenters; but 3d or 2d for the others ‘according as they be worth’
e. 1444-45: 23 Henry VI c. 12: 4d daily with food and drink in the summer and 3d daily with food and
drink in the winter.
f.  1495: 11 Henry VII c. 22:  4d daily with food and drink.
g. 7d daily, summer and winter, for those master masons and master carpenters having charge of six
or more men; and 5d daily with food and drink.
Sources: 
Statutes of the Realm, vol. I, pp. 311-12; II, pp. 337-39, 585-87; H. T. Riley, ed., Munimenta Gildhallae
Londoniensis: Vol. II: Liber Custumarum (London, 1860),vol. I, pp. 99-100; ii, pp. 541-43; H. T. Riley, ed.,
Memorials of London and London Life, in the XIIIth, XIVth, and XVth Centuries: From the Archives of the
City of London, A.D. 1276-1419 (London, 1868), pp. 253-55; R. R. Sharpe, ed., Calendar of Letter-Books
Preserved Among the Archives of the City of London at the Guildhall: Letter-Book G.,  c.A.D. 1352-1374
(London, 1905), pp. 148, 301; Letter Book H.,  c.A.D. 1375-1399 (London, 1907), p. 184.64
Table 2:  Indices of Prices for a Basket of Consumables (Phelps Brown Hopkins Index) and of a Master Mason’s Wages,
Nominal and Real, in England, 1300-04 to 1495-99
Mean of 1450-74 = 100
Year Farinaceous Meat and Fuel and Aggregate Nominal Wage Real Wage
[with drink] Dairy Textiles Price Index Index: Index:
1450-74=100 1450-74=100 1450-74=100 1450-74 = 100 1450-74 = 100 1450-74=100
1300-04 105.54 93.28 57.88 94.32 54.03 57.28
1305-09 117.88 93.92 62.80 101.62 58.89 57.95
1310-14 119.90 120.66 75.60 114.25 65.90 57.68
1315-19 225.06 128.94 67.56 164.96 67.10 40.68
1320-24 156.76 122.00 104.56 132.20 67.19 50.82
1325-29 117.30 107.56 103.34 110.89 67.09 60.50
1330-34 141.80 102.34 95.08 117.40 67.02 57.08
1335-39 89.38 95.22 96.46 93.13 63.43 68.10
1340-44 92.46 86.44 84.06 88.40 50.18 56.77
1345-49 105.24 100.74 90.14 100.24 50.14 50.03
1350-54 147.08 109.76 124.94 128.45 56.48 43.97
1355-59 123.38 104.30 158.46 125.10 72.68 58.09
1360-64 163.00 122.54 140.68 143.05 82.89 57.94
1365-69 142.52 121.68 149.52 136.15 83.22 61.12
1370-74 152.26 137.46 144.20 145.22 82.97 57.13
1375-79 106.70 109.64 131.90 112.87 82.83 73.39
1380-84 113.34 103.84 117.30 110.50 83.22 75.32
1385-89 96.16 106.28 107.36 102.21 82.98 81.19
1390-94 113.04 101.62 106.18 107.34 82.87 77.20
1395-99 112.10 105.52 99.72 106.95 83.13 77.73
1400-04 129.80 104.44 100.80 114.25 84.15 73.66
1405-09 102.54 102.68 107.46 103.59 91.27 88.11
1410-14 111.56 106.88 110.36 109.51 98.87 90.28
1415-19 122.92 108.10 108.46 113.85 100.28 88.08
1420-24 104.38 90.94 103.20 99.25 100.18 100.94
1425-29 106.76 99.52 110.60 105.37 100.12 95.02
1430-34 129.66 98.16 108.08 113.65 99.91 87.91
1435-39 130.08 99.34 104.94 113.46 100.02 88.16
1440-44 97.22 105.22 104.96 102.01 100.05 98.08
1445-49 91.02 99.72 102.02 96.69 99.93 103.35
1450-54 104.00 99.16 95.68 100.63 100.01 99.38
1455-59 90.90 96.62 101.16 95.11 100.01 105.16
1460-64 100.68 97.20 99.18 99.25 99.95 100.70
1465-69 104.16 110.50 103.30 106.16 100.11 94.3065
Year Farinaceous Meat and Fuel and Aggregate Nominal Wage Real Wage
[with drink] Dairy Textiles Price Index Index: Index:
1450-74=100 1450-74=100 1450-74=100 1450-74 = 100 1450-74 = 100 1450-74=100
1470-74 100.24 96.60 100.66 98.86 99.92 101.08
1475-79 89.90 76.46 101.32 87.21 99.93 114.58
1480-84 144.04 116.70 102.74 128.85 100.11 77.69
1485-89 97.64 99.14 106.22 100.04 99.84 99.80
1490-94 105.88 110.28 101.52 105.37 99.75 94.67
1495-99 92.92 98.36 99.30 94.51 99.88 105.67
Sources:  E.H. Phelps Brown and Sheila V. Hopkins, ‘Seven Centuries of Building Wages,’ Economica, 22 (August 1955), and ‘Seven Centuries of
the Prices of Consumables Compared with Builders’ Wage-Rates,’ Economica, 23 (Nov. 1956), reprinted E.H. Phelps Brown and Sheila V. Hopkins,
A Perspective of Wages and Prices (London, 1981), containing additional statistical appendices not provided in the original publication.66
Table 3.
Wages of Hired Day Agricultural Labourers on the Taunton Manor, 1315-1415
Manorial Wage Data from the Winchester Manors
Year Labourers Labour Days Minimum Maximum Mean PB&H Nominal Real
Harvest Number Number Wage Wage Wage CPIndex Wage Index Wage Index
in d.  in d.  Weighted 1451-75=100 1451-75=100 NWI/CPI
in d.  4.0d 1451-75=100






















1337 31.000 62.000 1.000 1.500 1.137 111.48 28.427 25.501
1338 73.000 82.500 1.000 1.500 1.170 84.55 29.242 34.586
1339 78.68
1340 3.000 23.500 1.000 1.000 1.000 96.12 25.000 26.008
1341 1.000 2.500 1.500 1.500 1.500 85.70 37.500 43.757
1342 1.000 10.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 85.10 25.000 29.377
1343 2.000 6.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 84.28 25.000 29.665
1344 2.000 16.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 97.00 25.000 25.773
1345 1.000 98.23 25.000 25.452
1346 3.000 15.500 1.000 1.000 1.000 87.83 25.000 28.46667
Table 3.
Wages of Hired Day Agricultural Labourers on the Taunton Manor, 1315-1415
Manorial Wage Data from the Winchester Manors
Year Labourers Labour Days Minimum Maximum Mean PB&H Nominal Real
Harvest Number Number Wage Wage Wage CPIndex Wage Index Wage Index
in d.  in d.  Weighted 1451-75=100 1451-75=100 NWI/CPI
in d.  4.0d 1451-75=100
1347 509.000 521.000 1.000 1.500 1.488 109.35 37.188 34.008
1348 1.000 5.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 116.25 25.000 21.505
1349 70.000 71.000 1.000 2.500 2.458 97.60 61.444 62.955
1350 93.000 99.000 1.108 2.000 1.374 102.48 34.343 33.514
1351 7.000 8.000 1.500 2.000 1.875 133.58 46.875 35.093
1352 4.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 159.62 50.000 31.323
1353 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 138.95 50.000 35.984
1354 7.000 325.500 2.000 3.000 2.478 116.80 61.943 53.034
1355 2.572 111.98 64.305 57.428
1356 3.000 15.000 2.500 3.000 2.667 114.43 66.667 58.262
1357 5.000 52.000 2.000 3.000 2.077 132.83 51.923 39.091
1358 1.000 1.500 2.000 2.000 2.000 139.15 50.000 35.932
1359 1.000 3.000 2.167 2.167 2.167 125.73 54.175 43.090
1360 1.000 0.500 2.000 2.000 2.000 135.18 50.000 36.989
1361 5.000 11.000 1.000 2.000 1.727 130.95 43.182 32.976
1362 42.000 42.000 1.000 3.000 1.095 153.43 27.381 17.846
1363 38.000 39.500 1.000 2.000 1.013 154.95 25.316 16.338
1364 18.000 18.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 151.23 25.000 16.532
1365 11.000 11.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 142.63 25.000 17.528
1366 21.000 41.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 121.15 25.000 20.636
1367 12.000 319.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 136.83 25.000 18.272
1368 43.000 92.500 1.000 3.000 2.054 138.90 51.351 36.970
1369 2.000 156.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 149.83 25.000 16.686
1370 57.000 131.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 183.80 25.000 13.602
1371 87.000 2653.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 164.20 25.000 15.225
1372 41.000 151.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 132.03 25.000 18.936
1373 15.000 37.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 130.50 25.000 19.157
1374 207.000 219.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 124.78 25.000 20.036
1375 44.000 78.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 124.80 25.000 20.032
1376 95.000 102.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 146.08 25.000 17.114
1377 17.000 61.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 111.58 25.000 22.406
1378 65.000 71.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 94.98 25.000 26.32368
Table 3.
Wages of Hired Day Agricultural Labourers on the Taunton Manor, 1315-1415
Manorial Wage Data from the Winchester Manors
Year Labourers Labour Days Minimum Maximum Mean PB&H Nominal Real
Harvest Number Number Wage Wage Wage CPIndex Wage Index Wage Index
in d.  in d.  Weighted 1451-75=100 1451-75=100 NWI/CPI
in d.  4.0d 1451-75=100
1379 10.000 15.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 94.24 25.000 26.529
1380 8.000 70.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 106.23 25.000 23.535
1381 1.000 118.19 25.000 21.153
1382 219.000 235.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 111.12 25.000 22.497
1383 1.000 108.23 25.000 23.100
1384 227.000 305.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 116.20 25.000 21.515
1385 7.000 13.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 110.75 25.000 22.573
1386 6.000 31.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 104.10 25.000 24.015
1387 3.000 20.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 100.28 25.000 24.931
1388 126.000 142.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 102.45 25.000 24.402
1389 715.000 717.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 100.28 25.000 24.931
1390 20.000 60.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 105.55 25.000 23.685
1391 1.000 132.85 25.000 18.818
1392 7.000 17.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 104.40 25.000 23.946
1393 8.000 34.500 1.000 1.000 1.000 100.50 25.000 24.876
1394 170.000 195.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 100.65 25.000 24.839
1395 7.000 62.500 1.000 1.000 1.000 93.25 25.000 26.810
1396 28.000 71.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 99.18 25.000 25.208
1397 1.000 116.18 25.000 21.519
1398 17.000 122.500 1.000 1.000 1.000 121.43 25.000 20.589
1399 55.000 135.500 1.000 1.000 1.000 112.93 25.000 22.139
1400 38.000 131.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 104.48 25.000 23.929
1401 8.000 10.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 130.03 25.000 19.227
1402 27.000 109.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 127.28 25.000 19.643
1403 1.000 118.85 25.000 21.035
1404 1.000 99.33 25.000 25.170
1405 99.000 272.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 98.73 25.000 25.323
1406 24.000 36.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 99.70 25.000 25.075
1407 1.000 99.35 25.000 25.164
1408 275.000 337.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 107.23 25.000 23.315
1409 235.000 571.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 119.78 25.000 20.872
1410 41.000 162.000 1.000 2.000 1.086 130.13 27.160 20.87369
Table 3.
Wages of Hired Day Agricultural Labourers on the Taunton Manor, 1315-1415
Manorial Wage Data from the Winchester Manors
Year Labourers Labour Days Minimum Maximum Mean PB&H Nominal Real
Harvest Number Number Wage Wage Wage CPIndex Wage Index Wage Index
in d.  in d.  Weighted 1451-75=100 1451-75=100 NWI/CPI
in d.  4.0d 1451-75=100
1411 960.000 1157.000 1.000 3.000 1.379 105.95 34.464 32.529
1412 12.000 28.000 1.000 2.833 1.196 102.83 29.911 29.089
1413 20.000 60.500 1.000 4.000 1.070 108.33 26.756 24.700
1414 32.000 35.000 1.000 4.500 1.457 108.13 36.429 33.691
1415 2.000 24.500 1.000 3.000 1.000 115.30 25.000 21.683
Source:
Beveridge Wage and Price History Collection, Box A.32 (Winchester Manorial Wages): Archives of the British Library of Political and Economic Science70
Table 4. Prices of and Price Indices for a Basket of Consumables, in Flanders (Bruges-Ghent)
With Wages of and Wage Indices for Master Building Craftsmen in Bruges
in d. groot Flemish: in quinquennial means, 1351-55 to 1496-1500
Mean of 1451-75 = 100
Years Grains: Butter Textiles Aggregate Total Value Wages of Bruges Real Wage Real Wage
Quinqu- Wheat, Rye and (Low) Price of Master Building Wage Index Index in Units of
ennia Barley, Peas Cheese Quality) Index Basket Craftsmen Mean Mode (NWI/CPI) Commodity
57.143d 44.664d 25.519d 127.326d in d. in Bruges in d gr. Baskets
groot Flemish groot Flem groot Flem groot Flem groot Mean: Major/Minor 11.000d for 210 days
1451-75= 1451-75= 1451-75= 1451-75= Flemish wages 1451-75= 1451-75= wages
100 100 100 100 100 100
1351-56 68.155 63.044 39.66 60.651 77.224 5.200 47.273 77.943 14.141
1356-60 101.779 93.149 45.94 87.561 111.488 6.000 54.545 62.294 11.302
1361-65 108.244 98.240 56.95 94.454 120.264 6.850 62.273 65.929 11.961
1366-70 126.573 101.840 74.78 107.518 136.898 8.000 72.727 67.642 12.272
1371-75 121.344 112.359 107.22 115.361 146.884 8.000 72.727 63.043 11.438
1376-80 105.020 121.359 109.91 111.732 142.264 8.800 80.000 71.600 12.990
1381-85 110.256 135.707 110.80 119.294 151.892 8.800 80.000 67.061 12.167
1386-90 132.369 122.622 112.28 124.923 159.060 10.867 98.788 79.079 14.347
1391-95 82.351 99.248 83.66 88.540 112.734 9.000 81.818 92.409 16.765
1396-00 92.357 92.141 80.61 89.927 114.500 9.850 89.545 99.576 18.066
1401-05 93.309 80.696 86.73 87.566 111.494 10.000 90.909 103.818 18.835
1406-10 111.719 91.053 106.12 103.347 131.588 10.000 90.909 87.965 15.959
1411-15 94.265 92.410 103.12 95.388 121.454 10.000 90.909 95.304 17.290
1416-20 110.781 104.675 103.64 107.208 136.504 10.200 92.727 86.493 15.692
1421-25 110.274 114.401 105.98 110.862 141.156 10.200 92.727 83.642 15.175
1426-30 126.514 114.522 111.20 119.237 151.820 10.200 92.727 77.767 14.109
1431-35 135.656 115.153 116.24 124.573 158.614 10.800 98.182 78.815 14.299
1436-40 178.012 109.162 117.47 141.728 180.456 10.800 98.182 69.275 12.568
1441-45 114.330 113.071 115.33 114.088 145.264 11.000 100.000 87.651 15.902
1446-50 107.243 110.048 113.86 109.553 139.490 11.000 100.000 91.280 16.560
1451-55 94.835 102.673 109.24 100.471 127.926 11.000 100.000 99.531 18.057
1456-60 131.778 107.294 104.29 117.681 149.838 11.000 100.000 84.976 15.417
1461-65 84.626 90.731 98.16 89.479 113.930 11.000 100.000 111.758 20.276
1466-70 91.545 101.196 94.39 95.500 121.596 11.000 100.000 104.712 18.997
1471-75 97.215 98.106 93.93 96.869 123.340 11.000 100.000 103.232 18.729
1476-80 122.387 118.350 92.79 115.040 146.476
1481-85 200.818 131.932 106.52 157.754 200.86271
Years Grains: Butter Textiles Aggregate Total Value Wages of Bruges Real Wage Real Wage
Quinqu- Wheat, Rye and (Low) Price of Master Building Wage Index Index in Units of
ennia Barley, Peas Cheese Quality) Index Basket Craftsmen Mean Mode (NWI/CPI) Commodity
57.143d 44.664d 25.519d 127.326d in d. in Bruges in d gr. Baskets
groot Flemish groot Flem groot Flem groot Flem groot Mean: Major/Minor 11.000d for 210 days
1451-75= 1451-75= 1451-75= 1451-75= Flemish wages 1451-75= 1451-75= wages
100 100 100 100 100 100
1486-90 203.856 187.117 164.40 190.077 242.018
1491-95 176.017 122.192 157.51 153.427 195.352
1496-00 88.210 90.631 147.79 101.000 128.599
Sources:  
Wages and cloth prices: Stadsarchief Brugge, Stadsrekeningen 1350-51 to 1499-1500; Algemeen Rijksarchief, Rekenkamer, reg. nos. 32,461-32,532;
Stadsarchief Gent, Stadsrekeningen, 1350-51 to 1499-1500
Prices: Charles Verlinden, E. Scholliers, et al, eds., Documents pour l'histoire des prix et des salaires en Flandre et en Brabant/Dokumenten voor
de geschiedenis van prijzen en lonen in Vlaanderen en Brabant, 4 vols. (Bruges, 1959 - 65), Vols. I and II; John Munro, ‘Mint Outputs, Money, and
Prices in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries,’ in Eddy Van Cauwenberghe and Franz Irsigler, eds.,  Münzprägung, Geldumlauf und
Wechselkurse/ Minting, Monetary Circulation and Exchange Rates,  Trierer Historische Forschungen, 7: Akten des 8th International Economic History
Congress, Section C-7, Budapest 1982 (Trier, 1984), pp. 31-122.72
Composition of the Flemish Basket of Consumables:
Commodity: Mean Value in Weight Weight in the
1451 - 75 in this Phelps-Brown  
Index Index (England)
Grains:
 45.46 litres of wheat
 39.37 litres of rye
 18.18 litres of barley 
 24.37 litres of peas
163.66 litres of barley malt
Subtotal  57.143  44.88%  42.5%
13.61 kg of butter
13.61 kg of cheese
Subtotal  44.664d  35.08%  37.5%
1.225 metres of coarse woollens
Subtotal  25.519d  20.04%  20.0%
TOTAL 127.326d 100.0% 100.0%73
Table 5.         Fullers's Wages in Ghent (Flanders), in d. groot Flemish and in commodity baskets,
1373-1430
Year Nominal Nominal Bruges Income for Income for Value of Price No. of 
Wage in Wage in Police- 210 days 210 days Commodity Index Commodity
d groot d groot man's per fuller per fuller Basket in 1451-75=100 Baskets
Flemish Flemish Daily journeyman journeyman d. groot per annual
3 days: journeymen Wage in d. groot in £ groot Flemish wage
M + 2J per day Flemish Flemish
1373 45.00 5.250 5.000 1102.500 4.594 137.200 107.755 8.036
1374 45.00 5.250 5.000 1102.500 4.594 136.150 106.930 8.098
1375 45.00 5.250 5.000 1102.500 4.594 164.850 129.471 6.688
1376 45.00 5.250 5.000 1102.500 4.594 150.020 117.824 7.349
1377 45.00 5.250 5.000 1102.500 4.594 139.150 109.286 7.923
1378 45.00 5.250 5.000 1102.500 4.594 150.380 118.106 7.331
1379 45.00 5.250 5.000 1102.500 4.594 136.240 107.001 8.092
1380 45.00 5.250 6.000 1102.500 4.594 135.530 106.443 8.135
1381 45.00 5.250 6.000 1102.500 4.594 134.940 105.980 8.170
1382 45.00 5.250 6.000 1102.500 4.594 146.430 115.004 7.529
1383 45.00 5.250 6.000 1102.500 4.594 144.780 113.708 7.615
1384 45.00 5.250 6.000 1102.500 4.594 155.630 122.230 7.084
1385 45.00 5.250 6.000 1102.500 4.594 177.680 139.547 6.205
1386 45.00 5.250 6.000 1102.500 4.594 168.920 132.667 6.527
1387 45.00 5.250 6.000 1102.500 4.594 170.680 134.050 6.459
1388 45.00 5.250 6.000 1102.500 4.594 134.400 105.556 8.203
1389 45.00 5.250 6.000 1102.500 4.594 154.750 121.538 7.124
1390 32.00 3.733 6.000 784.000 3.267 166.550 130.806 4.707
1391 32.00 3.733 6.000 784.000 3.267 135.250 106.223 5.797
1392 32.00 3.733 6.000 784.000 3.267 114.550 89.966 6.844
1393 32.00 3.733 6.000 784.000 3.267 100.490 78.923 7.802
1394 32.00 3.733 6.000 784.000 3.267 111.740 87.759 7.016
1395 32.00 3.733 6.000 784.000 3.267 101.640 79.827 7.713
1396 32.00 3.733 6.000 784.000 3.267 106.760 83.848 7.344
1397 32.00 3.733 6.000 784.000 3.267 129.610 101.794 6.049
1398 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 118.830 93.327 6.59874
Table 5.        Fullers's Wages in Ghent (Flanders), in d. groot Flemish and in commodity baskets,
1373-1430
Year Nominal Nominal Bruges Income for Income for Value of Price No. of 
Wage in Wage in Police- 210 days 210 days Commodity Index Commodity
d groot d groot man's per fuller per fuller Basket in 1451-75=100 Baskets
Flemish Flemish Daily journeyman journeyman d. groot per annual
3 days: journeymen Wage in d. groot in £ groot Flemish wage
M + 2J per day Flemish Flemish
1399 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 104.950 82.426 7.470
1400 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 112.350 88.238 6.978
1401 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 112.130 88.065 6.992
1402 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 113.120 88.843 6.931
1403 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 117.020 91.906 6.700
1404 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 108.650 85.332 7.216
1405 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 106.550 83.683 7.358
1406 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 107.460 84.398 7.296
1407 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 124.880 98.079 6.278
1408 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 131.540 103.310 5.960
1409 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 159.420 125.206 4.918
1410 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 134.640 105.744 5.823
1411 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 105.090 82.536 7.460
1412 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 114.720 90.099 6.834
1413 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 126.580 99.414 6.194
1414 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 124.780 98.000 6.283
1415 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 136.100 106.891 5.760
1416 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 146.230 114.847 5.361
1417 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 164.870 129.487 4.755
1418 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 126.750 99.548 6.185
1419 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 118.840 93.335 6.597
1420 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 125.830 98.825 6.231
1421 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 132.890 104.370 5.900
1422 32.00 3.733 5.000 784.000 3.267 143.580 112.766 5.460
1423 40.00 4.667 5.000 980.000 4.083 131.180 103.027 7.471
1424 40.00 4.667 5.000 980.000 4.083 146.320 114.918 6.69875
Year Nominal Nominal Bruges Income for Income for Value of Price No. of 
Wage in Wage in Police- 210 days 210 days Commodity Index Commodity
d groot d groot man's per fuller per fuller Basket in 1451-75=100 Baskets
Flemish Flemish Daily journeyman journeyman d. groot per annual
3 days: journeymen Wage in d. groot in £ groot Flemish wage
M + 2J per day Flemish Flemish
1425 40.00 4.667 5.000 980.000 4.083 151.810 119.229 6.455
1426 40.00 4.667 5.000 980.000 4.083 139.910 109.883 7.005
1427 40.00 4.667 5.000 980.000 4.083 148.900 116.944 6.582
1428 40.00 4.667 5.000 980.000 4.083 145.450 114.234 6.738
1429 40.00 4.667 5.000 980.000 4.083 161.100 126.526 6.083
1430 40.00 4.667 5.000 980.000 4.083 163.740 128.599 5.985
Sources:   Georges Espinas and Henri Pirenne,  eds., Recueil de documents relatifs à l'histoire de l'industrie
drapière en Flandre, Ire partie: Des origines à l'époque bourguignonne, 4 vols. (Brussels, 1906-1924), II, no. 492,
pp. 535-37; Algemeen Rijksarchief, Trésor de Flandre, Series I, no. 2208; and especially Rijksarchief van Oost
Vlaanderen te Gent, Oostenrijks Fonds, layette 2 ; sources for tables 1-4.76
Table 6. Nominal and Real Wages of Kortrijk Fullers, 1351 - 1450
Wages to Full one Broadcloth in Three Days: Master and Two Journeymen
in d. groot Flemish: in quinquennial means




in d. groot Pay for One
Cloth
per day 210 days of
Consumables
Price Index Wage Income
Flemish in d. groot in d. groot in d. groot in d. groot 1451-75=100 in Commodity
Baskets
Flemish Flemish Flemish Flemish (harmonic
means)
1351-55 15.167 5.308 1.769 371.583 77.224 60.651 4.812
1356-60 15.167 5.308 1.769 371.583 111.488 87.561 3.333
1361-65 15.167 5.308 1.769 371.583 120.264 94.454 3.090
1366-70 15.167 5.308 1.769 371.583 136.898 107.518 2.714
1371-75 20.333 7.117 2.372 498.167 146.884 115.361 2.946
1376-80 41.000 14.350 4.783 1004.500 142.264 111.732 7.061
1381-85 41.000 14.350 4.783 1004.500 151.892 119.294 6.613
1386-90 40.000 14.000 4.667 980.000 159.060 124.923 6.137
1391-95 36.000 12.600 4.200 882.000 112.734 88.540 7.824
1396-00 36.000 12.600 4.200 882.000 114.500 89.927 7.703
1401-05 36.000 12.600 4.200 882.000 111.494 87.566 7.911
1406-10 36.000 12.600 4.200 882.000 131.588 103.347 6.703
1411-15 36.000 12.600 4.200 882.000 121.454 95.388 7.262
1416-20 38.400 13.440 4.480 940.800 136.504 107.208 6.810
1421-25 38.400 13.440 4.480 940.800 141.156 110.862 6.619
*1426-30 39.200 13.720 4.573 960.400 151.820 119.237 6.3
**1431-35 42.200 14.770 4.923 1033.900 158.614 124.573 6.503
1436-40 40 14.000 4.667 980.000 180.456 141.728 5.431
1441-45 40 14.000 4.667 980.000 145.264 114.088 6.746
1446-50 40.000 14.000 4.667 980.000 139.490 109.553 7.026
*  In 1429, raised to 44d groot Flemish
** In Nov. 1433 cut to 36d, but raised to 39d in December, and to 40d in June 1434.
Source: Georges Espinas and Henri Pirenne,  eds., Recueil de documents relatifs à l'histoire de l'industrie drapière en Flandre, Ire partie: Des
origines à l'époque bourguignonne, 4 vols (Brussels, 1906-1924), II, no. 492, pp. 535-37; Rijksarchief van Oost Vlaanderen te Gent, Oostenrijks
Fonds; Algemeen Rijksarchief, Trésor de Flandre, Series I.77
Table 7a. Daily Summer Wages in the Small Towns and Villages of Eastern Flanders, 1409 - 1470
in d. groot Flemish and annual wage income in units of the Flemish 'basket of consumables'
Year Flemish Afsne Afsne Afsne Afsne Afsne Afsne St. Denijs St. Denijs
Basket of Masons Masons Carpenters Carpenters Thatchers Thatchers Thatchers Thatchers
Consumables wage in wage in wage in wage in wage in wage in wage in wage in
in d. groot d. groot in BC units d. groot in BC units d. groot in BC units d. groot in BC units
Flemish (daily) (annual) (daily) (annual) (daily) (annual) (daily) (annual)
1409 159.42 9.00 11.86 10.00 13.17 8.00 10.54
1410 134.64 9.00 14.04 10.00 15.60 8.00 12.48
1411 105.09 9.00 17.98 10.00 19.98 8.00 15.99 8.00 15.99
1412 114.72 9.00 16.47 10.00 18.31 8.00 14.64
1413 126.58 9.00 14.93 10.00 16.59 9.00 14.93
1414 124.78 9.00 15.15 10.00 16.83 9.00 15.15 9.00 15.15
1415 136.1 9.00 13.89 10.00 15.43 9.00 13.89 9.00 13.89
1416 146.23 9.00 12.92 10.00 14.36 9.00 12.92 9.00 12.92
1417 164.87 9.00 11.46 10.00 12.74 9.00 11.46 9.00 11.46
1418 126.75 9.00 14.91 10.00 16.57 9.00 14.91
1419 118.84 9.00 15.90 10.00 17.67 8.00 14.14 9.00 15.9
1420 125.83 10.00 16.69 8.00 13.35 9.00 15.02
1421 132.89 10.00 15.80 8.00 12.64 9.00 14.22
1422 143.58 10.00 14.63 8.00 11.70 9.00 13.16
1423 131.18 10.00 16.01 8.00 12.81 9.00 14.41
1424 146.32 10.00 14.35
1425 151.81 10.00 13.83 10.00 13.83 10.00 13.83
1426 139.91 10.00 15.01 10.00 15.01 10.00 15.01
1427 148.9 10.00 14.10 10.00 14.1 10.00 14.1
1428 145.45 12.00 17.33 10.00 14.44 10.00 14.44 10.00 14.44
1429 161.1 12.00 15.64 10.00 13.04 10.00 13.04 10.00 13.04
1430 163.74 12.00 15.39 10.00 12.83 10.00 12.83 10.00 12.83
1431 154.89 12.00 16.27 10.00 13.56 10.00 13.56 10.00 13.56
1432 154.15 10.00 13.62 10.00 13.62 10.00 13.62 10.00 13.62
1433 174.77 10.00 12.02 10.00 12.02 10.00 12.02 10.00 12.02
1434 171.03 10.00 12.28 10.00 12.28 10.00 12.28 10.00 12.28
1435 138.23 10.00 15.19 10.00 15.19 10.00 15.19 10.00 15.19
1436 122.42 10.00 17.15 10.00 17.15 10.00 17.15 10.00 17.15
1437 140.38 10.00 14.96 10.00 14.96 10.00 14.96 10.00 14.96
1438 221.9 10.00 9.46 10.00 9.46 10.00 9.46 10.00 9.46
1439 255.56 10.00 8.22 10.00 8.22 10.00 8.22 10.00 8.2278
Year Flemish Afsne Afsne Afsne Afsne Afsne Afsne St. Denijs St. Denijs
Basket of Masons Masons Carpenters Carpenters Thatchers Thatchers Thatchers Thatchers
Consumables wage in wage in wage in wage in wage in wage in wage in wage in
in d. groot d. groot in BC units d. groot in BC units d. groot in BC units d. groot in BC units
Flemish (daily) (annual) (daily) (annual) (daily) (annual) (daily) (annual)
1440 162.02 10.00 12.96 10.00 12.96 10.00 12.96 10.00 12.96
1441 158.99 10.00 13.21 10.00 13.21 10.00 13.21 10.00 13.21
1442 139.36 10.00 15.07 10.00 15.07 10.00 15.07 10.00 15.07
1443 178.33 10.00 11.78 10.00 11.78 10.00 11.78 10.00 11.78
1444 130.42 10.00 16.10 10.00 16.10 10.00 16.10 10.00 16.1
1445 119.22 10.00 17.61 10.00 17.61 10.00 17.61 10.00 17.61
1446 144.25 10.00 14.56 10.00 14.56 10.00 14.56 10.00 14.56
1447 161.01 10.00 13.04 10.00 13.04 10.00 13.04 10.00 13.04
1448 144.93 10.00 14.49 10.00 14.49 10.00 14.49 10.00 14.49
1449 118.42 10.00 17.73 10.00 17.73 10.00 17.73 10.00 17.73
1450 128.84 10.00 16.30 10.00 16.30 10.00 16.30 10.00 16.30
1451 126.94 10.00 16.54 10.00 16.54 10.00 16.54
1452 122.05 10.00 17.21 10.00 17.21 10.00 17.21
1453 134.40 10.00 15.63 10.00 15.63 10.00 15.63
1454 133.87 10.00 15.69 10.00 15.69 10.00 15.69
1455 122.37 10.00 17.16 8.00 13.73 7.00 12.01
1456 151.34 10.00 13.88 8.00 11.10 8.00 11.1
1457 165.25 8.00 10.17
1458 152.79 8.00 11.00
1459 134.53
1460 145.28 6.00 8.67
1461 129.24 7.50 12.19
1462 120.67 7.50 13.05
1463 103.33 7.50 15.24
1464 100.59
1465 115.82 7.00 12.69
1466 119.28 12.00 21.13 7.00 12.32 7.00 12.32
1467 128.35 7.00 11.45 7.00 11.45 7.00 11.45
1468 120.08 7.00 12.24 7.00 12.24
1469 122.26 7.00 12.02 7 12.02
1470 118.01 7 12.46 7 12.4679
Table 7b:    Daily Summer Wages in the Small Towns and Villages of Eastern Flanders, 1409 - 1470:
in d. groot Flemish and annual wage incomes in units of the Flemish ‘basket of consumables’
Year Flemish Zaffelare Zaffelare Destelbergen Destelbergen Destelbergen Destelbergen
Basket of Thatchers Thatchers Thatchers Thatchers Masons Masons
Consumables wage in wage in wage in wage in wage in wage in
in d. groot d. groot in BC units d. groot in BC units d. groot in BC units
Flemish (daily) (annual) (daily) (annual) (daily) (annual)
1409 159.42 6 7.90
1410 134.64 6.00 9.36 8.00 12.48
1411 105.09 6.00 11.99 8.00 15.99
1412 114.72 6.00 10.98
1413 126.58 10.00 16.59
1414 124.78 10.00 16.83
1415 136.10 10.00 15.43
1416 146.23 9.00 12.92
1417 164.87 9.00 11.46 9.00 11.46
1418 126.75 9.00 14.91 9.00 14.91
1419 118.84 9.00 15.90 9.00 15.9
1420 125.83 5.5 9.18 9.00 15.02
1421 132.89 6 9.48 9.00 14.22
1422 143.58 6 8.78 9.00 13.16
1423 131.18 6 9.61 9.00 14.41 10.00 16.01
1424 146.32 6 8.61 10.00 14.35
1425 151.81 6 8.30 10.00 13.83
1426 139.91 6 9.01 10.00 15.01 10.00 15.01
1427 148.90 6 8.46 10.00 14.10 10.00 14.1
1428 145.45 6 8.66 10.00 14.44 10.00 14.44
1429 161.10 6 7.82 10.00 13.04 10.00 13.04
1430 163.74 7 8.98 10.00 12.83 10.00 12.83
1431 154.89 7 9.49 10.00 13.56 10.00 13.56
1432 154.15 7 9.54 10.00 13.62 10.00 13.62
1433 174.77 7 8.41 10.00 12.02
1434 171.03 7 8.59 10.00 12.28
1435 138.23 7 10.63 10.00 15.19
1436 122.42 7 12.01 10.00 17.1580
Year Flemish Zaffelare Zaffelare Destelbergen Destelbergen Destelbergen Destelbergen
Basket of Thatchers Thatchers Thatchers Thatchers Masons Masons
Consumables wage in wage in wage in wage in wage in wage in
in d. groot d. groot in BC units d. groot in BC units d. groot in BC units
Flemish (daily) (annual) (daily) (annual) (daily) (annual)
1437 140.38 7 10.47 10.00 14.96
1438 221.90 7 6.62 10.00 9.46 8.00 7.57
1439 255.56 10.00 8.22
1440 162.02 10.00 12.96
1441 158.99 6 7.93 10.00 13.21
1442 139.36 6 9.04 10.00 15.07
1443 178.33 6 7.07 10.00 11.78
1444 130.42 6 9.66 10.00 16.10
1445 119.22 6 10.57 10.00 17.61
1446 144.25 6 8.73 10.00 14.56 10.00 14.56
1447 161.01 6 7.83 10.00 13.04
1448 144.93 6 8.69 10.00 14.49
1449 118.42 5 8.87 10.00 17.73




1454 133.87 8.00 12.55 8.00 12.55
1455 122.37 8.00 13.73 8.00 13.73
1456 151.34 6 8.33 8.00 11.10 8.00 11.1
1457 165.25 8.00 10.17 8.00 10.17
1458 152.79 8.00 11.00
1459 134.53 8.00 12.49
1460 145.28 8.00 11.56
1461 129.24 6.5 10.56 8.00 13.00
1462 120.67 8.00 13.92
1463 103.33 6 12.19 8.00 16.26
1464 100.59 6 12.53 8.00 16.70
1465 115.82 6 10.88 8.00 14.51
1466 119.28 6 10.56 8.00 14.08
1467 128.35 8.00 13.09
1468 120.08 8.00 13.99
1469 122.2681
Year Flemish Zaffelare Zaffelare Destelbergen Destelbergen Destelbergen Destelbergen
Basket of Thatchers Thatchers Thatchers Thatchers Masons Masons
Consumables wage in wage in wage in wage in wage in wage in
in d. groot d. groot in BC units d. groot in BC units d. groot in BC units
Flemish (daily) (annual) (daily) (annual) (daily) (annual)
1470 118.01 7.00 12.46
Table 7b Daily Summer Wages in the Small Towns and Villages of Eastern Flanders, 1409 - 1470
in d. groot Flemish and annual wage income in units of the Flemish 'basket of consumables'
Year Flemish Destelbergen Destelbergen Zavergem Zavergem Zavergem Zavergem
Basket of Carpenters Carpenters Carpenters Carpenters Thatchers Thatchers
Consumables wage in wage in wage in wage in wage in wage in
in d. groot d. groot in BC units d. groot in BC units d. groot in BC units
Flemish (daily) (annual) (daily) (annual) (daily) (annual)
1409 159.42 6.00 7.9
1410 134.64 9.00 14.04
1411 105.09 9.00 17.98
1412 114.72 6.00 10.98 9.00 16.47
1413 126.58 10.00 16.59 9.00 14.93
1414 124.78 10.00 16.83 8.00 13.46 9.00 15.15
1415 136.10 10.00 15.43 9.00 13.89
1416 146.23 9.00 12.92 9.00 12.92
1417 164.87 9.00 11.46 9.00 11.46
1418 126.75 9.00 14.91
1419 118.84 9.00 15.90 6.00 10.6
1420 125.83 7.00 11.68 6.00 10.01
1421 132.89 8.00 12.64 6.00 9.48
1422 143.58 8.00 11.70 6.00 8.78
1423 131.18 8.00 12.81 6.00 9.61
1424 146.32 6.00 8.61
1425 151.81 10.00 13.83 6.00 8.30 6.00 8.3082
Year Flemish Destelbergen Destelbergen Zavergem Zavergem Zavergem Zavergem
Basket of Carpenters Carpenters Carpenters Carpenters Thatchers Thatchers
Consumables wage in wage in wage in wage in wage in wage in
in d. groot d. groot in BC units d. groot in BC units d. groot in BC units
Flemish (daily) (annual) (daily) (annual) (daily) (annual)
1426 139.91 10.00 15.01 6.00 9.01
1427 148.9 10.00 14.10 6.00 8.46
1428 145.45 10.00 14.44 6.00 8.66
1429 161.10 10.00 13.04
1430 163.74 10.00 12.83
1431 154.89 10.00 13.56 7.00 9.49
1432 154.15 10.00 13.62 10.00 13.62
1433 174.77 12.00 14.42 10.00 12.02
1434 171.03 10.00 12.28
1435 138.23 10.00 15.19 8.00 12.15
1436 122.42 10.00 17.15 8.00 13.72
1437 140.38 10.00 14.96 8.00 11.97
1438 221.9 10.00 9.46 8.00 7.57
1439 255.56 10.00 8.22 8.00 6.57
1440 162.02 10.00 12.96 8.00 10.37
1441 158.99 10.00 13.21 8.00 10.57
1442 139.36 10.00 15.07 8.00 12.06
1443 178.33 10.00 11.78 8.00 9.42
1444 130.42 10.00 16.10 8.00 12.88
1445 119.22 10.00 17.61 8.00 14.09
1446 144.25 10.00 14.56 8.00 11.65
1447 161.01 10.00 13.04 8.00 10.43
1448 144.93 10.00 14.49 8.00 11.59
1449 118.42 8.00 14.19
1450 128.84 8.00 13.04
1451 126.94 8.00 13.23
1452 122.05 8.00 13.76
1453 134.40 8.00 12.50
1454 133.87 8.00 12.55
1455 122.37 8.00 13.73
1456 151.34 8.00 11.10
1457 165.25 8.00 10.1783
Year Flemish Destelbergen Destelbergen Zavergem Zavergem Zavergem Zavergem
Basket of Carpenters Carpenters Carpenters Carpenters Thatchers Thatchers
Consumables wage in wage in wage in wage in wage in wage in
in d. groot d. groot in BC units d. groot in BC units d. groot in BC units
Flemish (daily) (annual) (daily) (annual) (daily) (annual)
1458 152.79 10.00 13.74
1459 134.53 8.00 12.49 6.00 9.37
1460 145.28 6.00 8.67
1461 129.24 7.00 11.37 7.00 11.37
1462 120.67 7.00 12.18 6.00 10.44
1463 103.33 7.00 14.23 6.00 12.19
1464 100.59 7.00 14.61 6.00 12.53
1465 115.82 7.00 12.69 6.00 10.88
1466 119.28 7.00 12.32 7.00 12.32
1467 128.35 7.00 11.45 8.00 13.09
1468 120.08 7.00 12.24 8.00 13.99
1469 122.26 7.00 12.02 8.00 13.74
1470 118.01 7.00 12.46 8.00 14.24
Source:
Charles Verlinden, E. Scholliers, et al, eds., Dokumenten voor de geschiedenis van prijzen en lonen in Vlaanderen en
Brabant/Documents pour l’histoire des prix et des salaires en Flandre et en Brabant, 4 vols. (Bruges, 1959-65), Vols. I and II..84
Table 8 Master Craftsmen's Wages in Antwerp: Nominal and Real Wages
in pence (d) groot of Brabant, in quinquennial means, 1401-05 to 1516-20
mean of 1451-75 = 100
Summer Wage Summer Wage Summer Wage Summer Wage Summer Wage Winter Winter
Year Masons Carpenters Mean Mason's Mean Master Wage: Wage
Masters Masters Masters labourers Index Craftsmen's percent
d groot d groot d groot d groot 1451-75=100 Mean summer
1401-05 7.750 7.675 7.713 4.000 64.271 6.000 77.85%
1406-10 8.000 8.000 8.000 4.000 66.667 6.000 75.00%
1411-15 8.000 8.000 8.000 4.000 66.667 6.000 75.00%
1416-20 8.000 8.000 8.000 4.000 66.667 6.000 75.00%
1421-25 8.000 8.000 8.000 4.000 66.667 6.000 75.00%
1426-30 8.000 8.000 8.000 4.000 66.667 6.000 75.00%
1431-35 9.700 9.600 9.650 6.100 80.417 7.100 73.75%
1436-40 10.000 10.000 10.000 6.400 83.333 8.200 82.00%
1441-45 11.400 11.800 11.600 6.800 96.667 9.150 79.05%
1446-50 12.000 12.000 12.000 7.000 100.000 9.250 77.08%
1451-55 12.000 12.000 12.000 7.000 100.000 9.250 77.08%
1456-60 12.000 12.000 12.000 7.000 100.000 9.250 77.08%
1461-65 12.000 12.000 12.000 7.000 100.000 9.250 77.08%
1466-70 12.000 12.000 12.000 7.000 100.000 9.100 75.83%
1471-75 12.000 12.000 12.000 7.000 100.000 9.000 75.00%
1476-80 12.000 12.000 12.000 7.000 100.000 9.000 75.00%
1481-85 12.000 12.000 12.000 7.000 100.000 9.000 75.00%
1486-90 12.900 12.900 12.900 7.600 107.500 9.900 76.67%
1491-95 12 12.000 12.000 7.400 100.000 9.000 75.00%
1496-00 12.400 12.000 12.200 7.850 101.667 9.000 73.78%
1501-05 12.500 12.000 12.250 7.700 102.083 9.000 73.47%
1506-10 12.500 12.000 12.250 8.000 102.083 9.000 73.47%
1511-15 14.000 12.900 13.450 8.200 112.083 9.600 71.46%
1516-20 15.000 15.000 15.000 8.500 125.000 10.500 70.00%85
Table 8 Master Craftsmen's Wages in Antwerp: Nominal and Real Wages
in pence (d) groot of Brabant, in quinquennial means, 1401-05 to 1516-20
mean of 1451-75 = 100
Basket of
Goods
Price Index Basket of
Goods
Price Index Mean Master Mean Master Master's Wage Master's Wage
Year Total Value  232.524d Total Value  155.016d Wage Index Real Wage Ind in Commodity in Commodity
Brabant Flemish 1451-75=100 1451-75=100 Basket Units for Basket Units for
 in d. gr.
Brabant






1401-05 149.440 64.269 149.440 96.403 64.271 100.228 10.821
1406-10 159.4 68.552 159.400 102.828 66.667 98.038 10.540
1411-15 172.000 73.971 155.882 100.559 66.667 90.870 9.767
1416-20 187.280 80.542 164.113 105.868 66.667 83.757 8.971
1421-25 209.720 90.193 168.089 108.433 66.667 74.073 8.011
1426-30 232.880 100.153 179.277 115.651 66.667 66.582 7.214
1431-35 238.940 102.759 175.173 113.003 80.417 78.510 8.413
1436-40 291.66 125.432 194.440 125.432 83.333 68.007 7.200 6.741
1441-45 245.260 105.477 163.507 105.477 96.667 92.447 9.885 9.118
1446-50 231.540 99.577 154.360 99.577 100.000 101.369 10.884 9.915
1451-55 229.140 98.545 152.760 98.545 100.000 101.821 10.998 10.235
1456-60 266.420 114.577 177.613 114.577 100.000 87.744 9.459 8.853
1461-65 211.760 91.070 141.173 91.070 100.000 110.151 11.900 10.919
1466-70 225.440 96.953 150.293 96.953 100.000 103.522 11.178 9.912
1471-75 229.860 98.854 153.240 98.854 100.000 101.312 10.963 10.586
1476-80 280.640 120.693 187.093 120.693 100.000 84.255 8.979 8.86
1481-85 362.160 155.752 241.440 155.752 100.000 67.498 6.958 6.657
1486-90 404.820 174.098 269.880 174.098 107.500 62.196 6.707 5.699
1491-95 309.760 133.216 206.507 133.216 100.000 79.179 8.135 6.956
1496-00 268.220 115.352 178.813 115.352 101.667 88.734 9.549 8.815
1501-05 291.7 125.449 194.467 125.449 102.083 81.552 8.819 8.212
1506-10 266.940 114.801 177.960 114.801 102.083 89.192 9.637 9.079
1511-15 320.660 137.904 213.773 137.904 112.083 81.298 8.781 8.204
1516-20 349.400 150.264 232.933 150.264 125.000 83.368 9.015 8.836
Sources:  Herman Van der Wee, The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European Economy, 14th - 16th Centuries, 3 vols.
(The Hague, 1963), Vol. I: Statistics, pp. 333-89 (Synoptic Tables of Wages and Appendices 27-30); Herman Van der Wee,
‘Prijzen en lonen als ontwikkelingsvariabelen:  Een vergelijkend onderzoek tussen Engeland en de Zuidelijke Nederlanden,
1400-1700,’ in Album aangeboden aan Charles Verlinden ter gelegenheid van zijn dertig jaar professoraat (Gent, 1975), pp.
413-47.86
Table 9a. Aggregate Mint Outputs of England and the Low Countries, 1290 - 1520
Gold and Silver Coinage Outputs in kilograms of fine metal and in current
pounds sterling (England) and groot (Flanders/Low Countries)
Years ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND
Gold  Gold  Silver Silver Total  Percent Percent
in kg. in £ ster. in kg. in £ st in £ st Silver Gold
1281-85 21,913.309 68,548.734 68,548.734 100.00% 0.00%
1286-90 17,280.596 54,056.784 54,056.784 100.00% 0.00%
1291-95 1,552.352 4,856.034 4,856.034 100.00% 0.00%
1296-00 12,071.417 37,761.545 37,761.545 100.00% 0.00%
1301-05 16,017.465 50,105.484 50,105.484 100.00% 0.00%
1306-10 40,226.553 125,835.827 125,835.827 100.00% 0.00%
1311-15 10,706.712 33,492.502 33,492.502 100.00% 0.00%
1316-20 7,275.676 22,759.610 22,759.610 100.00% 0.00%
1321-25 1,780.107 5,568.492 5,568.492 100.00% 0.00%
1326-30 121.857 381.190 381.190 100.00% 0.00%
1331-35 209.056 665.131 665.131 100.00% 0.00%
1336-40 429.488 1,551.599 1,551.599 100.00% 0.00%
1341-45 240.011 9,859.484 5,077.456 17,710.473 27,569.958 64.24% 35.76%
1346-50 675.837 27,123.297 1,991.051 7,090.874 34,214.171 20.72% 79.28%
1351-55 1,939.777 83,567.731 17,442.905 67,245.275 150,813.007 44.59% 55.41%
1356-60 1,726.695 74,406.844 4,423.016 17,081.461 91,488.305 18.67% 81.33%
1361-65 2,415.242 104,077.756 1,630.811 6,298.107 110,375.864 5.71% 94.29%
1366-70 1,729.027 74,507.352 293.822 1,134.727 75,642.079 1.50% 98.50%
1371-75 802.608 34,586.019 316.966 1,224.108 35,810.127 3.42% 96.58%
1376-80 235.330 10,140.847 356.898 1,378.322 11,519.169 11.97% 88.03%
1381-85 161.835 6,973.804 317.412 1,225.829 8,199.633 14.95% 85.05%
1386-90 504.811 21,753.331 247.514 955.887 22,709.218 4.21% 95.79%
1391-95 626.546 26,999.152 193.489 747.245 27,746.397 2.69% 97.31%
1396-00 391.143 16,855.142 175.596 678.143 17,533.285 3.87% 96.13%
1401-05 168.671 7,268.390 66.344 256.216 7,524.606 3.41% 96.59%
1406-10 69.005 2,973.568 10.592 40.907 3,014.475 1.36% 98.64%
1411-15 1,870.669 89,519.896 967.484 4,483.340 94,003.236 4.77% 95.23%
1416-20 1,035.150 49,563.076 837.763 3,882.476 53,445.552 7.26% 92.74%
1421-25 2557.314 122,444.369 3,186.020 14,765.093 137,209.462 10.76% 89.24%
1426-30 599.478 28,703.069 6,858.608 31,785.107 60,488.176 52.55% 47.45%
1431-35 220.785 10,571.183 8,059.545 37,350.656 47,921.839 77.94% 22.06%
1436-40 132.274 6,333.298 977.025 4,527.863 10,861.161 41.69% 58.31%87
Years ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND ENGLAND
Gold  Gold  Silver Silver Total  Percent Percent
in kg. in £ ster. in kg. in £ st in £ st Silver Gold
1441-45 90.778 4,346.467 130.700 605.707 4,952.174 12.23% 87.77%
1446-50 64.336 3,080.422 517.373 2,397.681 5,478.103 43.77% 56.23%
1451-55 63.526 3,041.629 1,460.637 6,769.085 9,810.714 69.00% 31.00%
1456-60 26.719 1,279.288 1,415.094 6,558.024 7,837.312 83.68% 16.32%
1461-65 488.118 29,731.331 3,432.915 18,067.349 47,798.679 37.80% 62.20%
1466-70 1288.157 83,263.992 5,168.090 29,938.348 113,202.339 26.45% 73.55%
1471-75 538.669 34,818.552 2,422.654 14,034.247 48,852.799 28.73% 71.27%
1476-80 404.477 26,144.624 834.683 4,835.252 30,979.875 15.61% 84.39%
1481-85 219.449 14,184.753 995.231 5,765.296 19,950.049 28.90% 71.10%
1486-90 129.749 8,386.730 926.785 5,368.794 13,755.524 39.03% 60.97%
1491-95 268.983 17,386.525 1,270.840 7,361.876 24,748.402 29.75% 70.25%
1496-00 278.926 18,029.238 2,490.940 14,429.823 32,459.060 44.46% 55.54%
1501-05 516.604 33,392.271 4,313.544 24,988.026 58,380.297 42.80% 57.20%
1506-10 1523.115 98,451.267 3,633.212 21,046.916 119,498.183 17.61% 82.39%
1511-15 694.599 44,897.564 1,089.012 6,308.562 51,206.126 12.32% 87.68%
1516-20 743.656 48,068.530 79.145 458.481 48,527.011 0.94% 99.06%88
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1336-40 266.769 3,975.690 3,641.114 4,873.432 8,849.122 44.93% 55.07%
1341-45 1.322 26.600 176.761 310.860 337.460 7.88% 92.12%
1346-50 315.965 6,596.362 5,553.490 11,138.594 17,734.956 37.19% 62.81%
1351-55 1,096.661 24,811.554 5,178.951 11,397.252 36,208.806 68.52% 31.48%
1356-60 3,191.827 80,870.028 8,820.730 21,251.516 102,121.544 79.19% 20.81%
1361-65 2,629.891 77,350.494 3,992.165 11,141.966 88,492.460 87.41% 12.59%
1366-70 1,586.502 50,200.530 10,030.194 32,269.760 82,470.290 60.87% 39.13%
1371-75 1,375.349 32,921.278 2,215.757 8,315.146 41,236.424 79.84% 20.16%
1376-80 261.200 10,555.072 915.615 3,648.742 14,203.814 74.31% 25.69%
1381-85 529.809 22,941.630 2,816.883 11,467.496 34,409.126 66.67% 33.33%
1386-90 423.106 20,865.908 1,787.714 7,792.290 28,658.198 72.81% 27.19%
1391-95 368.614 14,458.242 3,676.062 14,958.400 29,416.642 49.15% 50.85%
1396-00 324.589 12,731.424 5,791.306 23,507.520 36,238.944 35.13% 64.87%
1401-05 31.535 1,236.902 691.661 2,826.540 4,063.442 30.44% 69.56%
1406-10 19.025 636.250 1,113.700 3,887.994 4,524.244 14.06% 85.94%
1411-15 5.884 196.762 2,484.269 8,665.846 8,862.608 2.22% 97.78%
1416-20 4.308 181.634 3,124.468 15,052.698 15,234.332 1.19% 98.81%
1421-25
37.626 2,000.940 11,897.359 57,614.792 59,810.488 3.67% 96.33%89
Table 9. Aggregate Mint Outputs of England and the Low Countries, 1290 - 1520
Gold and Silver Coinage Outputs in kilograms of fine metal and in current
pounds sterling (England) and groot (Flanders/Low Countries)
Years LC LC LC LC LC LC LC
Gold  Gold  Silver Silver Total  Percent Percent
in kg. in £ groot in kg. in £ groot in £ groot Silver Gold
1426-30 533.508 32,798.618 7,999.913 43,326.036 112,796.344 61.59% 38.41%
1431-35 713.610 42,313.694 6,609.816 34,252.100 149,615.344 77.11% 22.89%
1436-40 462.681 25,789.038 5,015.219 25,788.306 54,322.696 52.53% 47.47%
1441-45 111.931 6,466.290 102.683 527.552 6,993.842 92.46% 7.54%
1446-50 2.550 148.084 5.911 40.786 188.870 78.41% 21.59%
1451-55 581.075 35,611.968 164.611 880.316 51,582.008 98.29% 1.71%
1456-60 226.060 13,854.358 64.066 408.310 15,922.228 97.44% 2.56%
1461-65 6.596 404.224 0.000 0.000 404.224 100.00% 0.00%
1466-70 243.168 15,738.918 4,628.964 27,867.694 44,268.420 37.05% 62.95%
1471-75 261.202 18,927.514 7,313.984 45,191.724 64,119.238 29.52% 70.48%
1476-80 264.130 16,937.013 2,435.507 14,877.766 35,296.998 57.85% 42.15%
1481-85 52.818 4,735.692 6,534.304 56,337.178 61,553.570 8.47% 91.53%
1486-90 112.938 20,319.780 6,803.602 78,323.898 102,460.862 23.56% 76.44%
1491-95 19.308 1,273.661 2,780.071 19,521.098 20,857.438 6.41% 93.59%
1496-00 474.633 44,464.280 5,209.254 43,603.013 88,067.293 50.49% 49.51%
1501-05 538.871 51,112.530 3,157.836 26,902.913 78,015.442 65.52% 34.48%
1506-10 311.480 29,575.609 1,383.730 11,892.196 41,467.805 71.32% 28.68%
1511-15 257.699 24,459.800 1,640.383 14,074.127 38,533.927 63.48% 36.52%
1516-20 145.094 13,779.872 705.122 6,152.620 19,932.492 69.13% 30.87%
Sources:  
John Munro, ‘Mint Policies, Ratios, and Outputs in England and the Low Countries, 1335-1420: Some Reflections on New Data,’
The Numismatic Chronicle, 141 (1981), 71-116.  [formerly listed as: 8th series, Vol. I]; John Munro, ‘Bullion Flows and Monetary
Contraction in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries,’ in John F. Richards, ed.,  Precious Metals in the Later Medieval
and Early Modern Worlds (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1983), pp. 97-158; both reprinted in John Munro,
Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in England and the Low Countries, 1350 - 1500, Variorum Collected Studies series CS 355
(Aldershot, Hampshire; and Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1992); John Munro, ‘Mint Outputs, Money, and Prices
in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries,’ in Eddy Van Cauwenberghe and Franz Irsigler, eds.,  Münzprägung, Geldumlauf
und Wechselkurse/ Minting, Monetary Circulation and Exchange Rates,  Trierer Historische Forschungen, 7: Akten des 8th
International Economic History Congress, Section C-7, Budapest 1982 (Trier 1984), pp. 31-122.90
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